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A B S T R A C T
This dissertation studies the implementation and impae, of 
the capital-intensive agricultural projects in south Africa's 
Ban uus tans, vith specific reference to Bophuthatswana.
first section of the dissertation looks at the theoretical 
background of rural development in the Bantustans in general, 
while the second section looks specifically at the Ditsobotl, 
Projects in Bophuthatswana as a case-study. In the second 
section, the aims of the development institutions involved 
in the projects are assessed through a survey of planning 
and other documents. A questionnaire-survey is also utilised 
to determine the socio-economic conditions or the project 
participants as well as to gain their opinions of the 
way in which the projects are affecting them.
r A V  .
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INTRODUCTION
"Bophuthatswana achieved its first major breakthrough 
in its goal to achieve self-sufficiency in Food 
", 0fficial 8rain receipt records.... for 
the 1960/81 season indicate that for the first time 
the country produced maize in excess of its own 
domestic consumption... one major contribution to 
this achievement was made through the agricultural 
development projects "(1)
There has to date been very little analysis of the capital- 
intensive agricultural projects in the Bantustans. Yet it 
is becoming increasingly clear that these projects play a 
major role in the South African state's attempt to show the 
world the viability and self-sufficiency of the "independent 
states". These large scale capital intensive agricultural 
projects represent a particular kind of rural development, 
development which requires vast amounts of finance and a highly 
centralised management whose primary task is to produce an 
agricultural surplus.
The agricultural projects in the Ditsobotla region of Bophutha­
tswana are the largest projects of this kind in Southern Africa. 
They lie a few kilometers to the south of Mmabatho, the capital 
of Bophuthatswana. The first outpost of the Ditsobotla projects 
is the crossroads marking Pietfontein village. (See appendix 
A for map of Ditsobotla). ( Also known as Bethal village.)
The largest of the Ditsobotla projects is the Mooifontein 
dryland maize project. From the crossroads at Rietfontein
village it stretches to the south-west as far as the eye can 
see, covering a total of 22 725 ha. Adjacent to the Mooifontein 
project, to the east of the Rietfontein crossroads, is the 
smaller Shiela maize project which comprises 6 511 ha.
By the end of 1983, over R21 million of mainly South African 
sta^e capital, and . esser amounts of private capital, had 
been pumped into the two projects in an attempt to make Bophu- 
thatswana self-sufficient in maize production. As will be 
shown in this study, the high inputs necessitated by the at­
tempts to boost maize production, have placed the more than 
1 700 farmers on whose land the projects are being implemented, 
into millions of rands of debt.
The Ditsobotla district lies to the north-west and just
outside the South African maize triangle. The triangle, which covers
the south-western Transvaal and most of the Orange Free State, forms
the nucleus of South Africa's richest maize producing areas. As one
moves to the western periphery of the triangle, the annual rainfall 
lessens and the production risks increase.
The Ditsobotla district covers an area of 2 533 km. it
has an arid climate and receives an annual average rainfall
of 507,6mm, although this can vary by up to 200mm either way.
Thunderstorms accompanied by high winds and hail are common.
Heavy frost blankets the ground over an average of 106 days
and the predominantly northerly winds can cause severe wind 
erosion.
(iii)
Most of the region comprises a flat plain broken by a series 
of low, rocky hills in the west. Roughly 30 percent cf the 
^ s t r i c t  is regarded as being arable. The grassveld is severely 
overgrazed in most areas.
There are two towns, Itsoseng (population 25 500) and Atamalang 
(population 3 000). Twenty-five "closer settlements" and 52
traditional villages are scattered over the district. Both 
towns are situated near the Bophuthatswana "border" with South 
Africa and have a high percentage of commuters who work in 
the surrounding towns such as Lichtenburg and Delareyville 
in the western Transvaal.
Barely one out of four economically active people resident 
in the district find work there. Man} migrant workers from 
the Ditsobotla district work in Johannesburg and the smaller 
urban areas of the western Transvaal and northern Cape. In 
1980 there was a farming population of 2 640 fulltime, and
2 550 part-time farmers; a total of 5 190 farmers of one sort 
or another. (2 )
The present population of the district is in the region of 
148 000 people, (3) and will double in 24 years.
The research for the present study was carried out during 
1982 and 1983 and written up during 1984. Because of the 
drought and late harvest in 1984, the production figures for
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1C83/8 i crop were not available at the time of writing. However, 
they have subsequently become available and have been added 
where possible.
Although the institutions concerned with rural development in 
Bophuthatswana are obviously involved with all the agricultural 
development projects in the territory and are discussed as 
such in this study, it must be made clear that this thesis 
is primarily a case study of the Ditsobotla dryland projects.
It must be borne in mind that different conditions, especially 
with regard tc the issue of farmer participation, exist on 
AGRICOR's irrigation schemes. However, the irrigation projects, 
at the time of this research, do not form the major thrust 
of AGRICOR's rural development efforts, being secondary to 
the dryland agricultural projects.
As to the question of whether the project participants on the 
Ditsobotla projects are peasants or proletarians, the author of 
this dissertation is in agreement wish Basil Bernstein chat wh­
ile the degree of effective control exercised by capital appears 
to be virtualy total, "the process stops short of full proleta­
rianization in that the separation of the producers and the 
m e n s  of production is not complete. (4) The term peas ant/prole­
tarian or peasant/migrant is thus used in this study. This does 
not negate the fact that there are large numbers of landless 
people in the rural areas of the Bantuscans who are fully prole- 
tarianized.
S E C T I O N  1
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND AGRICULTURE
IN THE
BANTUSTANS
C H A P T E R  ___1
THE RISE OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS 
OF THE BANTUSTAN'S.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines briefly the changes that occurred histori­
cally in the South African economy end how these changes 
affected the Bantustans. The main emphasis however, is on 
the transition of the economy to the monopoly capitalist phase 
and the effects that this restructuring has fad on the condi­
tions of production and reproduction of the African workforce. 
The effect of this restructuring on the Bantustans is also 
considered.
The transition to monopoly capitalism has had important effect 
on the development of the Bantustans. especially with regard 
to agriculture. The contemporary movement of capital into 
agricultural projects in the Bantustans is related to changes 
in the overall structure of capitalist production and accumula­
tion in South Africa over the last two decades or so, and 
the new functions that the Bantustans have come to play in 
regard to these changes. (1 )
The new conditions within the Bantustans have giv_n rise to 
conflicting trends in rural development policies being pursued.
The dominant trend that appears to be emerging is one of in­
creased capital investment in an attempt to increase production 
as a mean; of asserting the "independence" of the Bantustan 
economies.
THE RISE 0? MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
Simkins (1981) has shown that the inhabitants of the African 
reserves were not able to provide for their subsistence require­
ments from agricultural production as early as 1918.(2) In 
spite of the inability of the reserves to provide the reproduc­
tive needs of migrant labourers' families, the myth of their 
ability to do so continued as justification tor the payment 
of low wages by the mines and other < .ployers of migrants 
for a long time afterwards.
By the 19i0's other fractions of capital such as secondary 
industry and white agriculture were beginning to reproduce 
conditions necessary for the production and reproduction of 
labour.(3) Humphrey suggests that:
Unlike mining capital, secondary industry capital 
has an interest in destroying the pre-capitalist 
mode and creating a full proletariat. For this frac­
tion the existence of the pre-capitalist mode limits 
the exploitation of labour and the realisation of 
consumption commodities.(4 )
In 1932 when South Africa abandoned the gold standard, second­
ary industry improved steadily and by 1939 the gross value
t/ X  ^
—  2 —
The dominant trend that appears to be emerging is one of in- 
c.eased capital investment in an attempt to increase production 
as a means of asserting the "independence" of the Bantustan 
economies.
THE RISE OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
Simkins (1981) has shown that the inhabitants of the African 
reserves were not able to provide for their subsistence require­
ments from agricultural production as early as 1918.(2) In 
spite of the inability of the reserves to provide the reproduc­
tive needs of migrant labourers' families, the myth of their 
ability to do so continued as justification for the payment 
of low wages by the mines and other employers of migrants 
for a long time afterwards.
By the 1920 s other fractions of capital such as secondary 
industry and white agriculture were beginning to reproduce 
conditions necessary for the production and reproduction of 
labour.(3) Humphrey suggests that:
Unlike mining capital, secondary industry capital 
has an interest in destroying the pre-capitalist 
mode and creating a full proletariat. For this frac­
tion the existence of the pre-capitalist mode limits 
the exploitation of labour and the realisation of 
consumption commodities.(4 )
In 1932 when South Africa abandoned the gold standard, second­
ary industry improved steadily and by 1939 the gross value
of this sector's output had increased by 140%. (5) The mines 
and white agriculture started losing labour to secondary indus­
try because of the latter's higher wages.
By 1943 secondary industry had outstripped mining in terms 
of its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.). 
Many important changes in the structure of the South African 
economy occurred during and immediately after World War 11, 
changes which laid the foundation for the transition to the 
monopoly phase.(6 )
Manufacturing industries in the 1940's were able to lower 
the cost of labour without the system of migrant labour and 
the labour control that this entailed. The different labour 
needs soon led to a clash of interests between the mining 
and manufacturing factions of the United Party during this 
period. When the United Party relaxed labour controls, this 
led to conflict between the government and white agricultural 
interests. The relaxation of the labour controls coupled with 
the post-war industrial boom, led to an increased flow of 
labour from the farms to the towns.(7)
The response of the National Party after its election victory 
in 1948 was to this distortion in the overall distribution 
of labour within the South African economy. This was essential­
ly a period of allocation of labour between different sectors 
of the economy through the mechanism of the labour bureaux.
^r i°r to the 1948 election, the idea of dividing the rural 
population in the reserves into a group of those who would 
remain permanently on the land and into a rural proletariat 
who would live in the reserves, had been gaining currency. 
The Tomlinson Commission in the 1950's gave this idea formal 
status and in 1961 the government set aside £57,1 million, two 
thirds of which was for the establishment of villages in the 
Bantustans. The Administrative structure of the reserves also 
underwent changes during the 1950's, so that from then onwards 
the\ replaced the white farms as the main source of labour.
Since the 1960's there have been profound changes in the struc­
ture and form of capitalist production in South Africa. These 
changes, which had their roots in the p ^t-World War 11 restruc­
turing, brought the South African economy to the period of 
lai ge scale monopoly capitalism. This period is characterised 
by a massive increase in the volume of foreign investment, 
an interpenetration and centralisation of mining, manufacturing 
and agricultural capital".(8 )
The interpenetration and centralisation of the different sec­
tors of the economy has occurred in a horizontal as well as 
a vertical direction. Horizontal monopolies have meant that 
through mergers and take-overs a few laige, usually multi­
national companies control the bulk of the market.(9) Vertical 
integration refers to the ability of big companies to control 
the manufacture and sale of commodities from the raw material
stage through to transport, manufacturing, packaging, adverti­
sing and retailing.
Agricultural products provide a good example of vertical inte­
gration. Giant companies, known as "agribusiness" are "able 
to control the whole chain from field to table".(10) The actual 
process of the vertical integration of individual small pro­
ducers into the agribusiness network will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter five of this study.
It is only since the advent of monopoly capital that the organi­
sation and finance required for large scale investment in 
agriculture has been available. The giant white agricultural 
co-operatives and their central retail organisation VETSAK, 
as well as the large milling companies, are examples of monopo­
ly conglomerates seeking to expand their activities. The expan­
sion of the activities of these businesses into Bantustan 
agriculture will be discussed in more detail later in this 
study.
The transition to monopoly capitalism which has only reached 
maturity in South Africa during the last decade, has led to 
significant changes in the demand for certain forms of labour
power and the conditions of its reproduction.(11 ) Hindson
stresses that within the category "working class" there were 
significant structural changes during the decade of the 1270’s:
In 1969 18 percent of the African "working class"
in manufacturing industry were employed in semi-
4skilled and 79 percent were in unskilled places, 
whereas in 1977 these proportions had become 23% 
and 72% respectively. (12)
It is clear from these figures that although the majority 
of the African working class still occupies unskilled positions, 
there has been a considerable increase in the demand for the 
movement of Africans into semi-skilled occupations. To a lesser 
extent the same is tru’ for petty bourgeoise and skilled occupa­
tions. (13) The Wiehahn Commission , which recommended the registra­
tion and incorporation of black trade unions into the official 
arena of inaustiial bargaining, and the De Lange Commission 
of enquiry into education, can be seen as a response bv the 
state to this need.
The process of integration and interpenetration of capital 
has resulted in an increase in the organic composition of 
capital (an increase in constant as opposed to variable capital) 
as living labour has been gradually replaced by more and more 
dead labour of machines. The result has been an acceleration 
in the rate of structural unemployment. Hindson (1980) has 
shown that the rate of growth of the capital/labour ratio 
in manufacturing industry in South Africa rose from 2,8 per 
cent in the 1960's to 4,4 percent in the 19701s . (14 )
The self-expansion of capital in industry generates a relative 
surplus population as opposed to an absolute surplus population 
as in the self-expansion of agriculture.(15) The generation
n~ a relative surplus population means that although the abso­
lute number of jobs being created is increasing, it is increas­
ing at a slower rate because every new company which opens 
uses more machinery and fewer people than before. In agricul­
ture, because of the finite amount of land available, as 
machines replace people,less jobs become available in an abso­
lute sense. Both these processes, in agriculture and industry, 
leaa to an acceleration in the rate of structural unemployment.
The generation of an absolute surplus population is very pro­
nounced in the capitalist agricultural sector. This sector 
was the largest employer of wage labour in the 1970's. Thus 
despite the net expulsion of farm workers, the sector employed 
almost 240 000 more African workers than the manufacturing
sector and over 380 000 more than the mining sector as late 
as 19 76.(16)
The absolute decline in the number of workers in the capitalist 
agricultural sector began in the late 1960's. De Klerk (1983/ 
1984), in his study of western Transvaal maize farming,
found that when the increase in the average size of farming 
units is taken into account, between 1968 and 1981 there was
a decline in the number of jobs by almost 60 percent for weed­
ing, /0 percent for harvesting and delivering (the main jobs
done by seasonal workers) and by 50% for permanent farm workers. 
For seasonal workers the average period of employment fell 
as well, from about 10 to 8.5 weeks per farm per year. (17)
M l i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ — _
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Between 1971 and 1976 alone, the total number of casual regular 
workers in capitalist agriculture in South Africa as a whole 
declined at a rate of 5.1 percent per annum.(18) Bromberger 
shows a decrease from 1 351 000 in 1970 to 973 000 in 1980 
in employment in agriculture (agriculture and forestry on 
white owned farms), which represents a 25 percent decline 
since the mid 1960's. However, he questions the continuity 
of such a high rate of structural unemployment, pointing to 
a reversal in the process of capital-labour substitution in 
certain agricultural sectors such as sugar farming because 
of the unsuitability of certain imported technology to local 
conditions.(19)
Looking at figures for all sectors of the economy, Simkins 
(1981) has shown that the unemployment rate increased even 
in times of upswing of the economy and that the percentage 
of those unemployed has doubled in the 1960's. It rose from
11.8 percent in 1970 to 21.1 perce t in 1981 and according 
to Keenan (1984) in all probability reached a figure of 25 
percent by 1983.(20)
These twin processes, the demand for a more skilled labour 
force and the expulsion of labour from production, as well 
as the reaction of the South African state, have led to major 
changes in the supply, reproduction and relocation of labour 
(21). Whereas the 1950’s was a period of allocation of la­
bour between different sectors, the period from the 1960's 
can be termed as a period of relocatio of surplus labour from
the urban industrial areas and from white agriculture, to 
the outlying Bantustans . S i m k m s  has shown that it is only 
after 1955 that the proportion of agricultural subsistence 
requirements which were internally generated by the inhabitants 
of the Bantustans declined rapidly. Before 1955 the proportion 
c* th'; requirements they were able to meet, although be low
subsistence level, remained fairly stable for many years.
S i m k m s  calls this a period of "fragile productivity mainte­
nance". The period of rapid decline, from 1955 to 1969 he
attributes to the modernisation and extension of influx control 
and the relocation policy of the state which followed this.
Together th.i.s state action resulted in an annual population
growth rate of 5,83 percent between 1960 and 1970. Simkins
concludes that it may not be fanciful to see the state's "home­
land development programme" (seriously started in the late 
sixties ) as a reponse to a crisis it had precipitated fifteen
years earlier.(2 2 )
The Riekert, Wiehahn and De Lange Commission can also be seen 
in this context. The Riekert Commission recommendations 
were oriented towards the creation of a more skilled, mobile 
and "stable" black urban population, by the tightening up 
of inf lux control regulations and increasing the distinction- 
between these urban "insiders" and the rural "outsiders" in 
the Bantustans. Simkins calculated that the private industry 
wage/agricultural product ratio rose from 5 in 1955 to 11 
in 1965 ushering in the contemporary disequilibrium between
Uiban and rural African incomes. Increasing dependency of 
the reserves on remittances from the modern sector was the 
inevitable result.(23)
The rural outsiders' would only be allowed into the urban 
areas as temporary industrial workers. They comprise a minority 
of working peasant migrants and a majority of migrating prole­
tarians ,(24) the latter either commuting from the Bantus tan 
dormitory townships or migrating from resettlement camps, 
closer settlements and other rural villages.
Or the various elements of the African working class located 
in the Bantustans, those in the dormitory townships of the 
urban border areas receive similar wages and maintain standards 
similar to those of their urban counter-parts.(25) Inoeed 
to understand the process of restructuring in the wake of 
the abovementioned commissions mor< fully, de Clercq stresses 
the necessity of including this element of the Bantus tan popu­
lation. For example, there is increasing evidence that in 
the field of technical education "Bophuthatswana intends to 
produce a new hierachy of more differentiated and specialised 
workers to answer the changing labour requ rements 
of a modern monopoly capitalist economy. " (26) Although the 
figures provided by official statistics should be treated 
with caution, the 1980 census for Bophuthatswana suggests 
that out of a wot k ~ or ce of 4 0 6 000, 14 0 000 (34%) were employed 
within the borders of the Bantustan, 103 000 (25%) were commu­
ters and 162 000 (40%) were migrants.
z/ r-;
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In summary, we have seen that since the 1920's the reproduc­
tion of a certain portion of the African workforce has been 
taking place within the urban areas. During and after the 
World War 11 restructuring of industry, the proportion of 
fully proletar ianised workers and their families receiving 
their reproduction through the wage relation increased even 
more. However, until 1955 the Bant us tans functioned to 
i eproouce a cheap (below cost) labour supply for a section 
cf L.ie capitalist economy, primarily the mines and small 
competitive capitalist enterprises. With the major transition 
to monopoly capitalism in the 1960's and the state's policy 
cf relocation, the peasant base of the Bantustans has ceased 
to be a source of labour rent for capital. According to 
h ,meson (19 8 0), the reproduction of African workers, who 
f rm the major component of the workforce, is now taking 
place primarily in the urban areas. (27)
Apart from the border - urban area commuters, most of the 
other elements of the African working class in the Bant ust ans 
are largely dysfunctional for capital:
> for the most j: t , thi ej owing
s in p 1 us peculation, many of whom have been relocated
there, 3 w) • n neither eded
r tak< re o f . 1 th< f "worker j nts"
their subsistence 'pi asant activities are laroely
I .... Caj t a1 ' equently
no longer has any interest in the preservation
at least in so far as such suh slstence
(2 6 )the basis for cht ap
 o bs i. 
labour power."
iay provide
Capital's lack of interest in the preservatio n of a subsistence
/ r-
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base in the Bantustans is reflected in the changing legisla­
tion regulating investment in these areas. This legislation 
v\ill be examined in detail in the next chapter.
As we have seen, the emergence of monopoly capital, the in­
creasing surplus population and the state's policy of reloca- 
t-ion, as well as the new conditions of reproduction of labour, 
have led, as Simkins has shown, to the final demise of peasant 
subsistence cultivation in the Bantustans. With the virtual 
collapse of this subsistence cultivation, there is no longer 
a strong class with vested land interest, so the main barrier
to the penetration of "white" agricultural capital has drop­
ped. (29)
It is against this background that the latest rural develop­
ment policies for the Bantustans have been formulated. Al­
though as stated, there is no longer a strong class with 
vested land interest, this has not prevented certain contra­
dictions from arising within the policies being pursued. 
This contradiction is most evident in the "independent" 
Bantustans of Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei.
On the one hand there is a strong rhetoric aimed at the rural 
inhabitants, who form the Bantustans main constituency, of 
local participation and community development, and an avowed 
intent to establish a class of agriculturalists ranging along 
a spectrum from self-sufficient subsistence to commercial
farmers. For example, the general manager of the Ciskei Deve­
lopment Board said in the late 1970's:
"It follows therefore that all policies and program­
mes of the government in the development of the 
oneland should be to promote the widespread parti­
cipation of the people in the development to improve 
their standard of living and aeneral quality of 
life." (30)
The Secretary for Agriculture of Bophothatswana addressing 
a rural development seminar in 1982 told the audience much 
the same:
"Such a broad programme for socio-economic develop­
ment would set in motion the process of rural deve­
lopment which process would depend for its success 
on the people's active participation and personal 
involvement in the decision-making and implementa­
tion . “ (31)
On the other hand the Bantustan administrations, as an exten­
sion of the South African state, are committed to the politi­
cal necessity for agricultural production to give some sem­
blance of self-sufficiency to their "independent" economies. 
Citing the Keiskammahoek and Tyefu irrigation schemes in 
the Ciskei in 1979, Treurnicht said:
"There is little doubt that these schemes will 
make a significant impact on agricultural production 
in the Ciskei..." (32)
The managing director of the Agricultural Development Corpora-
tion of Bophuthatswane (AGRICOR) has said on numerous occa­
sions that AGRICOR's original brief was a technocratic one 
based purely on the highest potential returns. (33)
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the state institu­
tion responsible for overall co-ordination of development 
m  the Bantustans, the Corporation for Economic Development 
(CED), has committed itself to the establishment of large 
agricultural projects with the primary aim of producing an 
agricultural surplus. These projects are usually highly capi­
tal intensive and the majority of the participants are sepera- 
ted from control over their land and from any involvement 
in the productive process.
In contrast to the previously stated "widespread participation 
Ox the people" and their "active participation" in the deve­
lopment process, the capital intensive project approach is 
neither widespread nor does it encourage participation from 
- urax people. .he rationale behind the project approach is 
that rural development efforts must be concentrated in select­
ed areas of high potential where prospects for success are 
the highest. (34) The justification for this kind of rural " 
development is usually given as being due to a limitation 
of resources for development (staff, funds, service facilities 
and agricultural land of high potential), making the develop­
ment of the total area of the Bantustans impractical. (35) 
Tony Venn of the Loxton group, which is involved in the manage-
15
ment of many agricultural projects in the Bantustans, put 
it as follows:
"Resources for development are currently dissipated 
in diffuse, broad spectrum programmes, the impact 
of which is neither effective nor adequate. It 
follows that there is a case for partial concentra­
tion of resources in selected areas where the pro­
spects for success are greatest." (36)
The finance for these agricultural projects has been mainly 
state capital, although the private sector and white agricul­
tural co-operatives are increasingly becoming involved in 
the financing as well as the management of the projects. 
The finance is usually channelled through some form of develop­
ment corporation; either the CED or the local corporation 
in the Bantustans themselves.
In Bophuthatswana the contradiction between the capital inten­
sive projects in a few selected high potential areas and 
the rhetoric of community development ior the rural population 
as a whole, has taken the form of an on-going conflict between 
the Agriculture: Development Corporation of Bophuthatswana
(AGRICOR) and the Department of Agriculture of Bophuthatswana. 
This conflict will be discussed in chapter six of this study.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has briefly outlined the changes which have 
occurred in the structure of capitalist production and accumu-
/ s '  ■
— l b  —
lation in South Africa culminating in the major transition 
to monopoly capitalism in the last two decades. It has also 
attempted to show how the conditions of production and repro- 
_uction in the economy have changed during this time, leading 
to a dramatic increase in the population of the Bantustans 
and a drastic decline in the subsistence production. The
growth of both horizontally and vertically concentrated con­
glomerates connected to the agri-business field and the state's 
attempts to increase the agricultural production of the Bantu­
stans, has led to the present flow of capital into agricultur­
al projects in the Bantustans.
The next chapter will examine the changes in legislation
which have occurred as the conditions of production and repro­
duction in the central economy have led to changes in the
Bantustans.
OPENING THE GATES FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE BANTU"
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Large scale capital penetration and the development of commer­
cial agriculture in the form of capital intensive projects 
or schemes in the Bantustans have only really developed since 
the passing of the 1977 ammendment to the Promotion of Econo­
mic Development of the National States Act No 46 of 1968. 
Before considering this important turning point it is useful 
to examine the legislation proceeding it.
BETTERMENT AND THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION
Although the South African Gove . nt rejected most of the 
major recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission of 1955, 
it has formed the basis for the majority of the planning 
reports on agriculture in the Bantustans from the late 1950's 
until the latter part of the 1970's.
The Commission identified "one-man-one-plot" tenure as the 
main problem underlying the inability of the reserves to 
provide a full-time living for the inhabitants of the Bancu- 
stans. The solution to this problem, according to the Com­
mission, was to divide the rural population into a landless
group dependent on the wage economy and a "progressive farming 
sector". (1 )
Each progressive farmer would be given a 52 morgen plot to 
replace the one to five morgen plots which existed in the 
Bantustans at the time of the Tomlinson Commission. The allo­
cation of these larger plots would have required the removal 
of about half the reserve population and their settlement 
in urban locations within the Bantustans. While some of those 
removed in this manner would have had to find employment 
in decentralised industries ( "border industries") in demarca­
ted growth points, the rest would have been employed in small 
scale handicraft industries in the rural villages.
Yawitch has suggested three main reasons for the government's 
rejection of and its failure to implement the major recommenda­
tions of the Tomlinson Commission. In the first place, the 
government was not willing to risk the widespread resistance 
that would have followed the redistribution of land to create 
more viable plots. Secondly, it was not willing to provide 
the amount of money recommended by the Commission for the 
successful creation of decentralised industries to absorb 
the people who would have lost access to land. Thirdly Yawitch 
suggests, the government was loathe to make the reserves 
self-sufficient as this would have threatened the continuation 
of the system of migrant labour to the central economy. (2 )
In spite of its rejection of the major recommendations, the
4/
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South African state has used certain aspects of the Tomlinson 
Commission report as t 2 basis of its agricultural policy for 
the Bantustans. The most widely implemented recommendation, which 
has its roots in agricultural policy before Tomlinson, was that 
of "betterment". While previously betterment planning was mainly 
concerned with limiting the number of stock units in an attempt 
to limit over-grazing, the 1955 Commission recommended that bet­
terment schemes -"involving the resiting of dwellings and the 
division of land into arable, grazing and residential areas be 
implemented immediately in order to prevent further deterioration 
of the soil, and that these schemes, if necessary be implemented 
without consent of the inhabitants." (3)
For example by 1980, 62,2 percent of the total area of Bophutha- 
tswana had been planned in this manner and of these plans 72,6 
percent have been physically implemented. This brings the total 
area of the region planned and executed to 4 5.2 percent. Beuster 
suggests that there is evidence that production in certain plan­
ned areas in the Bantustans has in fact dropped since implementa­
tion. (4) He cites the main reasons for the drop in production 
as being due to a failure on the part of extension officers to 
help farmers implement the cropping plans drawn up for that area 
as well as a lack of credit and agricultural inputs. Yawitch 
also cites extensive evidence of widespread resistance to the 
implementation of betterment schemes all over South Africa. (5)
The practical implementation of betterment planning for the
Ditsobotla District of Bophuthatswana will be discussed in
Chapter 7.
Further recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission that were 
accepted by the government, were the relocation of a proportion 
of the population onto irrigation schemes which would allow for 
more specialised types of farming on smaller than average plots; 
and that the authorities take the initiative in the establishment 
of sugarcane and fibre (sisal) planting, to be undertaken where 
possible on a peasant cash-cropping basis. (6)
In the years that followed the government's acceptance of these 
recommendations, a few small scale irrigation schemes were deve­
loped, while official agencies initiated the production of such
commercial crops as tea, sisal, sugar, etc. In most cases pea­
sants were unwilling to turn over subsistence production to these
crops, and so with a few exceptions, mostly in sugar production, 
(7) these schemes were developed on a "plantation" basis.
In order to provide employment for Africans who would be moved 
off the land, the Tomlinscn Commission recommended that the 
government make available £ 10 r. illion a year for ten years to 
develop industrial sites both at border points and within the 
Bantustans. Although the government did not vote the expenditure 
of <10 million, it did make available an amount of £.1 million, 
from the Native Trust for the purpose of establishing a Bantu 
Areas Investment Corporation (BIC).
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While the Tomlinson Commission recommended that white entrepre­
neurs be allowed into the Bantustans, the government rejected 
this and stipulated "that Bantu entrepreneurs unhampered by Euro­
pean competition, should be able to develop their own indus­
tries.... (and) that private European entrepreneurs should not 
be allowed there," (8). The BIC was thus constituted under Act 
34 of 1959 t~ mobilize African capital under a principle of 
"self-help" .
THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STATES
ACT NO. 46 OF 1968
The 1959 Act was repealed in 1968 because of the lack of success 
of the BIC in stimulating "development" and creating jobs. It 
was replaced by the above-mentioned Act. This amended legislation 
allowed business undertakings to be carried out by black com­
panies in conjunction with whites, thus making explicit provision 
for white entrepreneurs to enter the Bantustans.
However, the entry of white business into the Bantustans was 
subject to a number of restraints:(9)
a .
b .
c .
They could only operate in the Bantustans as agents 
or contractors to the South African Bantu Trust, the 
economic coordinating instrument of which was the BIC. 
White entrepreneurs could not obtain any proprietary 
or entrenched rights in the Bantustans.
Much of the capital for these schemes came from the
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BIC, usually through the development corporation 
of the particular homeland. In effect the BIC provided 
fairly substantial capital subsidies to the agent 
in an attempt to encourage decentralisation to the 
Bantustans.
d. All such business undertakings had to be carried
out with Africans or African owned companies. This 
system, known as the "agency system" meant that after 
a period of ten years, the white entrepreneurs were 
forced to sell their share of the business to the 
BIC, who would in turn hand it over to local control.
The most important consideration in the financing of business 
or schemes was not so much profit as the creation of jobs 
and the establishment of an African entrepreneurial class in
the Bantustans.
At this stage very little of the money that the BIC made avail­
able went into agriculture. In the Transkei for example, South­
all (1977) has shown that of the 1 300 concerns financed by
the BIC up to 1974 , 86 percent were trading establishments
(general dealers, cafes, butch' rs and bottle stores), 13 per­
cent were service concerns (mostly transport and garages), 
and only two percent light manufacturing establishments. Most 
companies established on an agency basis before 1977 were 
involved in distribution and food processing.
In summary, prior to 1977, there was very little commercial
BIC, usually through the development corporation
of the particular homeland. In effect the BIC provided
fairly substantial capital subsidies to the agent
in an attempt to encourage decentralisation to the
Bantustans.
d. All such business undertakings had to be carried 
out with Africans or African owned companies. This
system, known as the "agency system" meant that after 
a period of ten years, the white entrepreneurs were
forced to sell their share of the business to the 
BIC, who would in turn hand it over to local control.
The most important consideration in the financing of business 
or schemes was not so much profit as the creation of jobs 
and the establishment of an African entrepreneurial class in 
the Bantustans.
At this stage very little of the money that the BIC made avail­
able went into agriculture. In the Transkei for example, South­
all ( 1977) has shown that of the 1 300 concerns financed by 
the BIC up to 19 74, 86 percent were trading establishments
(general dealers, cafes, butchers and bottle stores ) , 13 per­
cent were service concerns (mostly transport and garages ) , 
and only two percent light manufacturing establishments. Most 
companies established on an agency basis before 1977 were 
involved in distribution and food processing.
In summary, prior to 1977, there was very little commercial
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agriculture in the Bantustans. Commercial agriculture was
limited to:
a few "plantation" schemes, producing crops such as 
sisal, tea, sugar, citrus, etc., and run by the agri­
cultural sections of the old Department of Bantu Admin­
istration and Development (later Department of Coopera­
tion and Development) cr the local Bantustan adminis­
tration itself, and usually with little more commercial 
interest than to help finance the local administra­
tion. (10) These departmental schemes also include 
cattle breeding schemes in various districts.
A small number of African farmers ranging from peasant 
subsistence farmers producing a small surplus for 
the market, to fully fledged commercial farmers. In 
certiin areas, such as the Dit.sobotla region of Bophu- 
thatswana, small areas were leased to white farmers 
on a share-cropping basis.
A few co-operatives, usually centred on small-scale 
irrigation schemes, were producing a limited amount 
of cash crops for sale. Since the Agricultural Develop­
ment Act of 1973 provided that credit obtained from 
the Agricultural Development Fund should be channelled 
through co-operatives , many were establishe s merely 
for this purpose. The Teung Irrigation Scheme which
/ X
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was established in 1939 as part of the Taung Reserve 
in present day Bophuthatswana with about 1 150 farmers 
settled on an area of 3 200 ha under flood irrigation 
from the Vaalhartz North Canal, is an example of this 
type of scheme.
In the 1960's the Agricultural Advisory Services of the De­
partment of Bantu Administration and Development and in the 
early 1970's with the granting of self government, the De­
partments of Agriculture of the Bantustans, were mainly con­
cerned with betterment planning. For example, the provision 
of water supplies, fencing, etc., received maximum priority, 
while the improvement of production did not receive much 
attent ion.
In most cases it seems that attempts to encourage African 
farmers to produce for the commercial market were unsuccess­
ful in that they were reluctant to abandon their subsistence 
base. (11) Bernstein suggests that when considering the resis­
tance of peasant producers and their refusal to adopt new 
cultivation practices or their sabotage (thus peasant "conser­
vatism"), it must be borne in mind that such measures intro­
duce new elements of risk in the already precarious basis 
of household production. (12) The risk of commercial product­
ion in the Bantustans is especially marked, given the hopeless 
overcrowding and concomitant small land holdings, as well 
as the lack of agricultural infrastructure.
Crop farmers, convinced of the benefits of using fertilizers, 
improved seed and tractors, are faced with the impossibility 
of mobilizing the required funds or find it difficult to 
purchase inputs in areas not serviced by co-operative de­
pots. (13) In these circumstances the only real option for 
breadwinners in the Bantustans is to find alternative sources 
of cash income, usually through labour migration. It is against 
this background that "farmers’" reluctance to abandon their 
subsistence base for the relatively high risks of commercial 
production must be seen.
THE 1977 AMENDMENT TO THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE NATIONAL STATES ACT NO. 46 OF 1966
The 1977 amendment to the 1968 Act was of major importance 
to the development of commercial agriculture in the Bantustans 
It made possible an unprecedented flow of capital into agri­
cultural production; something which had been inhibited 
by the racial prescriptions contained in legislation prior 
to this period.
The 1968 Act was amended in two important ways. While changing 
the name of the BIC to the Corporation for Economic Develop­
ment (CED), the amendment made provision for whites, coloureds 
and Asians to become shareholders in "Bantu companies" which 
were previously controlled by Africans only. Secondly, Section 
four of the 1977 Act, extends the powers of the CED to carry 
out undertakings, acquire or sell them to any racial group.
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This effectively meant that the compulsion to include Africans 
in any of its undertakings had been dropped.
The lifting of the racial prescription covered virtually 
all the activities of the CED, such as the establishment
of industrial concerns, the regulation of loans, debentures,
stocks and other monies, the guaranteeing of contracts, its 
function as a director or agent and its capacity to lend
money with or without security. (14) As Hoyland puts it:
"With the 1977 Act we can see a move away from 
the function of the old BIC in attempting to create 
an entrepreneurial class in the reserves to the 
encouragement of uninhibited capital investment 
through the CED". (15)
Che object of the CED is
"to plan, finance, coordinate, promote and carry 
out development of the national states and the 
Black population of such states in the field of 
industry, commerce, finance, mining and other busi­
nesses either directly or by means of development 
corporations or corporations.(16)
In the years that followed the constitution of the BIC under 
Act 34 of 1959, various regional development corporations 
were established in all the Bantustans. The Xhosa Development 
Corporation (XDC) was established in 1965 to handle under­
takings in the Transkei and Ciskei and others followed shortly 
afterwards.
The sole shareholder of the CED is the South African Develop-
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ment Trust, the president of which is the president of South 
Africa. The CED is financed from three main sources, viz . 
share capital, own revenue and loan capital. The share capital 
comes from the South African state revenue and can be in­
creased or decreased only by the Minister of Co-operation 
and Development in consultation with the Minister of Finance. 
No dividends are payable on this share capital and any profits, 
which are non-taxable, are reinvested to promote further 
"development". The CED allocates a part of this allotted 
share capital to the development corporations of each Bantu- 
stan. (17)
Whereas the BIC was orientated towards the promotion of an 
African entrepreneurial class in the Bantustans, since the 
change to the CED this role is supposed to have been largely 
taken over by the local development corporations. The CED1 s 
functions, in its own words, "are now concentrated on the 
development cf tne large agricultural projects, industrial 
development, transport and financial support whilst other 
functions have been transferred to the National Development 
Corporations . " (18) (My emp.iasis ) .
BOPHUTHATSWANA SINCE 1977
With the formal granting of "independence" in December 1977, 
the President, Chief Lucas Mangope, issued a directive to 
the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) 
to do away with the "agency system" which restricted temporary 
white ownership of business to a ten year period.
Outside investors can now obtain freehold title to land in 
Bophuthatswana and can therefore own rather than lease the 
factory or agricultural buildings and infrastructure. The 
BNDO offers a subsidy to investors which applies to outlay 
on land and buildings. The BNDC also offers finance at low 
interest rates, transport subsidies, the provision of capital 
infrastructure, as well as m  some cases, the subsidy of 
wages paid to workers. A new incentive package encourages 
investors to look to sources other than the BNDC for finance, 
as interest concessions are applicable regardless of the 
source of that finance. During the 1982-53 financial year, 
several industrial projects were financed from outside sources, 
amounting to a total investment of R27 million. (19)
Apart from business entirely financed and run by outside 
entrepreneurs, the BNDC also operates a bi-part ite system 
where 50 percent of a company's shares are held by the out­
side investor and 50 percent by the BNDC itself. As the com­
pulsion to hand over companies to local people after ten 
years has been dropped, the BNDC has established an investment 
holding company which sells 40 percent of the BNDC holdings 
in selected bi-part ite companies to "members of the public" .
Called the Yabeng Investment Holding Company Limited ("Yabeng" ) 
it has been formed to hold shares in a portfolio of companies 
operating in Bophutnatswana. Shares in Yabeng are being offer­
ed for sale "to enable members of the public, especially 
citizens of Bophuthatswana and financial institutions registered 
in Bophuthatswana to hold an indirect investment in these
companies". (20) The number of shares being offerea total
four million and sell at 25 cents per share. The investor 
has to buy at least R100 worth of shares. The companies in­
volved include Checkers , Frazers, Me*ro Cash and Carry 
and Sun International (formerly Southern Sun Hotels ) .
Although Bophuthatswana has had a certain amount of success 
in attracting private investment in the industrial sector, 
it has had to rely mainly on state capital tc develop its 
agricultural sector. Before looking at the investment of 
state and private capital in more detail in chapter 4, chapter 
3 examines the attractions of the Bantustans for potential 
investors.
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companies". (20) The number of shares oeing offered total 
four million and sell at 25 cents per share. The investor 
has to buy at least R100 worth of shares. The companies in­
volved include Checkers , Frazers, Metro Cash and Carry 
and Sun International (formerly Southern Sun Hotels ) .
Although Bophuthatswana has had a certain amount of success 
in attracting private investment in the industrial sector, 
it has had to rely mainly on state capital to develop its 
agricultural sector. Before looking at the investment of 
state and private capital in more detail in chapter 4, chapter 
3 examines the attractions of the Bant ustans for potential 
investors.
THE INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT IN THE BANTUSTANS
INTRODUCTION
Capital has always penetrated agriculture more slowly than 
industry. There are various reasons for this, the most obvious 
being agriculture's dependence on nature, the perishable cha­
racter of agricultural products, the availability of land 
(not being reproducable in the same way as capital) and the 
unequal exchange between agriculture and industry.(1) However, 
since the organisation and finance required for large scale 
investment in agriculture, whether private or. state capital, 
has become available, these disadvantages have become less 
important. The advantages for investment of agricultural 
capital in the Bantustans in particular are several, 
depending on the type of crop and the form of production.
In more general terms, however, Keenan has o it lined tie fol’owing 
advantages to capital: (2)
1. Di f f erent i al ground r eii_t
Land is an important el ent of
Iture, represents a cert a i n portion i ■ pi-
t a 1 costs of any productive e nterprise. It is not .,.e 
land itself which y:elds "value" but the ground rent 
which represents the future revenues yielded through 
the use of the land. Money invested in 1 : d is equivalent
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to an interest bearing investment. (3)
According to Keenan
one of the biggest advantages accruing to both state 
and private capital invested through para-statal organisa­
tions, such as the agricultural development corporations
a.id agricultural companies^ is that land is usually made 
available for agricultural development projects at a 
nominal price. Where projects are state run and on Trust 
land there may be no charge at all. In addition to the 
obvious contribution towards profits, the low price paid 
for land enables the extension of capitalist agriculture 
into hitherto marginal areas. (4)
This seems to be an important consideration in the case 
of the Mooifontein and Shiela AGRICOR projects in the
Dit sobot la district. 'the cost of the land is borne by 
the project participants who pay approximately R15 -00
a year to the magisterial authority for their 15 ha allot­
ments. These costs are nowhere included in any of the
financial statements issued by the management. The ground 
rent thus accrues to capital at a nominal initial invest­
ment, if any at all.
2 . Chc_ap L a b o u r
while Keenan suggests 
and it is generally true that vages in the Bantust ans 
are lower than in the urban areas of South Africa, a 
note of caution ntcds to be sounded in relation to agri­
culture. It is not clear that w. jrs in the vhite capital­
ist agricultural sector differ significantly from these 
paid j n the Bantust ans. For c :n. pie, in 1983, white
t/ X. '
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farmers on the Hartzwater Irrigation scheme adjacent 
to the Taung Irrigation scheme in Bophuthatswana, paid 
less money wages than the AGRICOR projects (Rl- 50 as 
opposed to R2-00 per day).
j ..ere also seems to be an increasing reluctance on the 
psrt of men especially to work as agricultural labourers 
in certain parts of the Bantvstans . In a study of unem­
ployed men in the Taung region, (5) it was found that 
they would rather wait for a job in construction or other 
formal employment than work for the wages offered on 
the AGRICOR project (R2-00 per day). This reluctance 
for agricultural labouring has manifested itself in a 
shortage of workers on all three of the big AGRICOR pro­
jects, forcing Mooifontein to use school children curing 
1 jeir holidays and Shiela to resort to convict labour
from the nearby Rooigrond Prison.
While this situation obviously does not apply to all 
Bantustans, and may have to do with the relatively better
position of Bophut hat swana in relation to the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vaal industrial complex, it does serve 
as a warning against a simplistic functional st designa­
tion of the Bant ustans as "separate" reservoirs of cheap 
1abour.
Given this pi cvitio, it is clear that in more distant
Bantustans the wages are abysmally low.
As Hoyland (1982) has shown, apart from the right climatic 
conditi , low wages are an important consideration in the 
development of labour intensive crops such as tea, sisal, 
cotton and citrus.
Cont ro ] ]_ed labour
Not only are labour costs kept down, but as Keenan 
has shown, capital undertakings in the Bantustans are also 
exempt from certain labour protection legislation. Many of 
the Bantustans have banned any trade union activity, tt% Ciskei being 
the most notorious in terms of its excesses in this field. 
Bophuthatswana too, has prohibited any "South African" 
trade unions from operating within its borders, opting 
instead for a system of works committees recently an­
nounced by the Minister of Manpower Coordination. These 
works committees will be tightly controlled by the admin­
istration of the Bantustan.
As far as agriculture is concerned, provisions to protect 
workers from victimisation are specifically exempt in 
their application to agricultural workers. This has made 
the projects relatively safe from labour unrest and strike 
action, although resistant a * ke m re subtle forms.(6)
Various forms of subs i dy
A close examination of many of the agricultural projects 
in the Bantustans shows that many of these enterprises 
would not be able to function were it not for the various
s they receive, 
some of the subsidies in t'«? Bantust m  re obtained In the
4-  34  -
foliating ways
a . A direct subsidy from the state. For example, AGFICOR 
in Bophuthatswa.ia gets finance for its projects from 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in 
the form of sof t-loans at 2 percent interest and 
five years grace in paying it back. (7) Under these
conditions inflation virtually makes this a grant. 
If AGRICOR raises money from the private sector the 
interest is softened by either the Bophuthatswana 
administration or by the South African government.
This kind of subsidy is obviously given for political 
and ideological reasons. Ideologically it is important 
for the South African government to show the viability 
of the Bant ust an economies in an attempt to sell 
the idea of "independent states". They therefore 
continue to subsidise the losses of certain projects 
rather than letting them go bankrupt.
b . Private capital is usually subsidised by the CED
or the national development corporations in the Bantu- 
s" ans. This subsidy may take a similar form to that
offered by .•e South African government to industrial
con-erns wanting to set up in decentralised "growth
s ". h< ly ; es to
t , wagi s , as well as the provision 
of capital infrastructure.
*
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AGRICOR for example has gone into business with pri­
vate investors (the Joubert Brothers of Mafikeng) 
to develop two meat processing and distribution in­
dustries, (8) Mrr.abatho Food Corporation, with an 
annual turnover of approximately K9 million, and 
Tswana Foods, with a turnover of R6 million per annum. 
AGRICOR provides these businesses, _n which it holds 
50 percent of the shares, with long term loans in 
respect of trade capital at low interest rates (9,5% 
per annum), as well as capital loans for building 
and expansion at Prime Bank rates.
c. A subsidy in terms of the production risk. In the 
case of the Mooifontein Project for example, whenever 
the amount of total inputs and management fee (expend­
iture) exceed gross income, the resulting debt or 
"blank cheque", as the project participants call 
it, is borne by the latter. The fact that there is 
a "separation" between those responsible for the 
amount of production inputs and those who carry the 
debts is probably a contributing factor to the over­
capitalisation, especially in terms of fertilizer, 
herbicides and pesticides, in what amounts to marginal 
maize areas. Overall costs on the D t s c 1 1 a projects 
are higher than those of comparable areas of white 
farming, (9) although it is difficult to establish
at this stage hew much of the extra expenditure is 
due to the initial costs of establishment of the
Available evidence would appear to indicate that 
the higher costs incurred on the projects are not 
only due to the initial costs of establishment. There 
is very little difference in expenditure between 
the newly established areas of the projects and those 
which have been operating for over eight years (since 
1976). Given the political aim of production for 
self-sufficiency, there does seem to be a tendency 
for management to overspend in situations where they 
themselves are not responsible for the payment of 
any debts.
The over-capitalisation and the resulting debts in­
curred by the participants on the Ditsobotla projects 
will be examined in detail in Chapter 9.
If the situation arises where debts incurred by the 
project participants are too high for them to reason­
ably pay back, it seems inevitable that these debts 
will be written off by the agency concerned and the 
costs will be carried by the Bantustan administration 
i the central government. A( R n Bop) tha­
ts wana is faced with t his situation at the time of 
writing, •■’any of the project participants in the
R , gh their co­
operatives, over HI 5 00C and the ] 983- 84 debts have
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have rvade it worse. In the wake of the continuing 
drought, AGRICOR will no doubt try to persuade the 
Behuthatswana administration to allow them to write 
off the debts to enable them to start again with 
a clean slate.
Thus the suppliers of the agricultural inputs (agri­
cultural machinery, seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, 
herbicides) as well as the management of the projects 
are guarenteed their money, while the project partici­
pants (through their co-operatives), the Bantustan 
administration, and in the last instance, the South 
African government, carry the production risk.
STATE AND PRIVATE CAPITAL:
THE EXPANSION OF COMMODITY RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Bernstein has suggested that in Africa, state forms of capita.
investment in agricultural production are more common tha,
the involvement of large-scale private productive capital:
(for example, international agri-business companies, as ir
South America). (1 ) while this seems to be the trend ir
South Africa': Bantu^tans, the situation is complicated by
the intertwining of private capital with the state through
various forms of agency, tri and bi-partite and other agree- 
ments.(2)
The movement of large-scale state and private capital int 
agricultural production in the Bantustans has resulted i 
attempts to determine the conditions of production and ex 
change through what can be broadly described in terms o: 
the "vertical concentration" of small producers.
STATE OR PRIVATE CAPITAL
Basil Bernstein has laid out very clearly the operation of 
state forms of capital in Africa. (3) He states that the 
further development of commodity relations since independence 
cannot be discussed without considering the role of the state,
of which there are two important aspects in this context.
The first is that the economic role of the state has to be 
located in relation to the possibilities of accumulation 
‘■ i’ 3 ruling ''lass which has formed since independence. 
iheir reproduction as a class and their ability to accumulate 
are tied to the development of the economies of the particular 
social formacions in which they exist. In this sense, they 
have a more direct interest in the development of commodity 
relations within any given country than international com­
panies which mobilise capital and switch investments on a 
global bas- .
 ^he second aspect, which is related to the first according 
to Bernstein, is that the state acts to promote the extension 
and intensification of commodity relations in conditions 
where it might not be immediately profitable for productive 
and finance capital to do so. The role of foreign aid and 
the promotion of rural development schemes which provide 
infrastructure for the further development of commodity rela­
tions (communications, energy, storage, local processing 
fanilities, education and health schemes) or the planning 
and financing of production schemes (agricultural machinery, 
irrigation equipment, improved seeds, fertilizers, insecti­
cides, pesticides, etc.) are relevant in this regard.
In the past such schemes have concentrated on the production 
of export crops and have usuallv incorporated "progressive
. mer incentives. In recent years another strategy has em­
erged, not necessarily a contradictory one, of encouragina 
food production for national self-sufficiency and providing 
production inputs and credits to the poorer rural sectors.
Bernstein hypothesises the reasons for this new emphasis: 
the chronic state of food production, especially staples, 
in many African countries,- the politica. instability associated 
with food shortages and inflationary food prices in the cities; 
the cost in foreign exchange of food imports to make up the 
shortages in domestic production. As Feder (1976) and George 
(1976) have pointed out, while capital in general has an inte­
rest in the extension and intensification of commodity rela­
tions, there is also the more specific interest in expanding 
the market of those capitals engaged in the production of 
agricultural inputs, fhe interest of the ruling class, already 
alluded to, in deepening the material base of appropriation 
and accumulation, may be another reason for encouraging food 
production schemes, according to Bernstein.
This means that alongside the investments of large-scale pro­
ductive capitals in agriculture, a major impetus to the further 
development of commodity relations comes from the operation 
of state-managed forms of capital:
'These represent an alliance between the apparatuses 
of the state which organise the political, ideologi­
cal and administrative conditions of the further 
penetration of capital into peasant agriculture, 
and the provision of the financial and technical
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a u t h o r i t i e s ^ ^  s*)8 0ther quasi - state/Bantustan
The main channel for investment in the Bantustans is through 
the Corporation for Economic Development (CCD), as well as 
directly through the regional development corporations in 
the "independent" Bantustans. Examples of the latter are the 
Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) which 
is concerned with industrial development and the Agricultural 
Development Corporation of Bophuthatswana (ACRICOR) which 
is involved in the development of agricultural projects. The 
operates on a national basis, channelling funds to and 
coordinating the activities of the regional development corpor­
ations in the "independent" Bantustans and the Agricultural 
Companies in the "non-independent" Bantustans.
%
As we saw is chapter 2, the emphasis of these state cotpora- 
tion. has changed since 1977. Whereas the Bantu Investment 
Corporation (BIC, was orientated towards the promotion of 
an African entrepreneurial class in the Bantustans, the CED's 
functions are now concentrated on the development of large 
proiects. especially with regard to agriculture. The develop, 
ment of an African entrepreneurial class was supposed to pass 
on to the regional development corporations, leaving the CED 
free to concentrate on the channelling of finance and expertise 
into capital intensive projects. As this study will try to 
mahe clear, the mantle of creating local entrepreneurs has 
not fallen very comfortably on the shoulders of the regional 
development corporations. AGRICOR in Bophut atswana especially.
i
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owned by the CED and the local development corporation, each 
holding a !>0 percent share.
The agricultural development corporations in the "independent" 
Eantustans have severed all formal links vith the CED. Nonethe­
less there are many ties, the latter usually provides seconded 
personnex, consultants, management for agricultural projects, 
finance and many other services. The agricultural development 
corporations are statuatory bodies with all shares owned by 
the Bantustan administrations.
The main task of the CED is thus to channel state capital
into various projects via the national development corpora­
tions, the agricultural development corporations and the agri­
cultural companies. It also has a secondary tacx, that of 
acting as a channel for private capital wishing to invest 
in specific projects, be they industrial, commercial or agri­
cultural .
LEGISLATION AND INVESTMENT
The key to the understanding of the investment procedure 
through the CED and its offshoots in the Bantustans can be 
found in the amended Promotion of Economic Development of 
the National States Act No 46 of 1968. Section 19 of the Act
reads as follows: (6)
"All income and property and all profits of the
Corporation for Economic Develc;met , Ltd, a develop­
ment corporation and a corporation, from whatever
source the same may be acquired, shall be applied
exclusively to the promotion of the objects of the 
body concerned, and no dividend shall be paid to
the shareholder: provided that the Trustee may direct
that the profits of a corporation shall be paid
to the Corporation for Economic Development, Limited, 
or to a particular development corporation, which 
shall apply any amount so received to the attainment 
of its objects."
Ostensibly this indicates that while the CED invests state 
capital into the Bantustans, whatever profits are made on 
that investment are ploughed back into further 'development'. (7) 
The role of the CED however, becomes clearer when we read 
Section 19 of the Act in conjunction with Section 4, which 
sets out the powers that the CED shall have in the attainment 
of its objects. Two crucial sections read as follows:
4(1 )(u) to act as an agent or representative in con­
nection with any matter of whatsoever nature 
for or on behalf of a person in connection with 
all or any of its objects or itself to appoint 
agents or representatives in connection with 
any of its objects;
4(l)(t) to take deposits offered by any person for in­
vestment and to hold such deposits on such condi­
tions as may be agreed upon, and to arrange 
and to decide upon the investment and application 
thereof;
and if these powers a.-e not sweeping enough:
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it may, gene ally, do anything that is necessary for 
or conducive to '' e attainment of its objects and the 
excercise of its po ers, whether or not it relates to 
any matter expressly mentioned in this section!
The Act thus seems to provide for the investment of state 
capital as well as combinations of state and private capital. 
As Keenan puts it:
"Section 4(l)(t) would seehi to be providing almost 
blanket power to enter into ju-t about any sort 
of agreement, no matter how clandestine, that may 
involve taking monies offered by at.v party and in­
vesting that money, subject to whatever agreements 
may have been made, in any way that can be deemed 
to relate to any aspect set out in Section 3, which 
in itself sets out very wide and loosely defined 
objectives." (8)
While state capital is largely channelled through the CED into 
big agricultural projects, private capital can be invested 
in almost any way which falls within the CED's notion of "deve­
lopment". We will examine some of the wa/s in which state 
and private capital hav^ been invested in a moment, as well 
as the way in which these state managed forms of capital create 
the infrastructure for the extension of commodity relations, 
especially the provision of agricultural inputs.
STATE CAPITAL
'’tate capitrl for the financing c: agricultural projects in
the Bantustans can be channelled through a wide variety of 
state institutions depending to a certain extent on whether 
it is "independent" or not.
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it may, generally, do anything that is necessary for 
or conducive to the attainment of its objects and the 
excercise of its powers, whether or not it relates to 
any matter expressly mentioned in this sect ion[
The Act thus seems to provide for the investment of state 
capital as well as combinations of state and private capital. 
As Keenan puts it:
"Section 4(l)(t) would seem to bt= providing almost 
blanket power to enter into just about any sort 
of agreement, no matter how clandestine, that may 
involve taking mon’as offered by any party and in­
vesting that money, subject to whatever agreements 
may have been made, in any way that can be deemed 
to relate to any aspect set out in Section 3, which 
in itself sets out very wide and loosely defined 
objectives." (8)
While state capital is largely channelled through the CED into 
big agricultural projects, private capital can be invested 
in almost any way which falls within the CED's notion of "deve­
lopment". We will examine some of the ways in which state 
and private capital have been invested in a moment, as well 
as tne way in which these state managed forms of capital create 
the infrastructure for the extension of commodity relations, 
especially the provision of agricultural inputs.
STATE CAPITAL
State capital for the financing of agricultural projects in 
the Bantustans can be channelled through a wide variety of 
state institutions depending to a certain extent on whether 
it is "independent" or not.
''INDEPENDENT" EANTUSTANS 
In the "independent" Bantustans state capital invested
through the agricultural development corporations and through 
the Bantustans' departments of agriculture. The agricultural 
development corporations, such as AGRICOR in Bophuthat swana, 
obtain state capital from a variety of state institutions.
The Bantustan administrations provide finance through various
grants as well as through agricultural and industrial develop­
ment capital funds. They also provide the agricultural develop­
ment corporations with long-term, low interest rate loans.
The agricultural development corporations receive a major
portion of their state capital through the CED and the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs. The latter department 
often channels its low interest loans through the CED to the 
corporations in the Bantustans. The South African Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) also provides loans to the deve­
lopment corporations. The Southern African Development Bank is 
replacinc the above as the major source of state capital.
"NON-INDEPENDENT" BANTUSTANS
State capital channelled through the CED can combine with 
the national development corporation concerned to form an
agricultural company, e ' for example in the case of Gazankulu 
Fruit Farming (Pty) . ... , and Saringwa Escates (Pty) Ltd.,
both of which are citrus estates. (9) State capital can also 
be invested directly through the CED.
PRIVATE CAPITAL
As was said earlier, private capital may be invested in the 
Bantustans in a number of different ways.
Referring to Section 4 (1)(t ) of the Act, Keenan gives a hypo­
thetical example of the type of agreement which is possible 
between private capital and the state. It is conceivable that 
a large food company could make a deposit with the CED with 
an agreement that the CED, in conjunction with certain regional 
development corporations, develops several cotton plantations 
within the Bantustans, and that this cotton be sold exclusively 
to gins owned by the same food company. Since two thirds of 
cotton by weight consists of seed, it is conceivable that 
such an agreement could realise substantial profits for the 
food company through its processing of the cotton seed for 
vegetable oil. (10)
Section 4 (1)(u ) taken in conjunction with Section 4 (l)(t)
would seem to be opening the way for almost any possible permu­
tation of the agency system. For example, Measured Farming, 
a firm of agricultural management consultants, took over the 
Tonga Sisal Project in KaNgwane in 1980 in partnership with 
KaNgwane Agricultural Company (Pty) Ltd. (The latter being 
jointly owned by the local development corporation, the KEDC, 
and the CED). On doing so they formed a new company called 
the Tonga Sisal Company (Pty) Ltd., with 50 percent sharehold­
ing each. Measured Farming are responsible for the management
ts
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of the scheme, and are also involved in sisal projects in 
Venda and Lebowa. (11)
In the "independent" Bantustans the agricultural development 
corporations can also act as an investment broker and actively 
try to attract private capital investment or raise loans on 
the open market. With regard to Bophuthatswana in particular, 
there is an indication that the large white agricultural co­
operatives in the Transvaal are increasingly playing a role 
in this respect. Not only are they providing finance and credit 
facilities, but also management and other advisory services 
for some of the AGRICOR projects. This involvement of the 
white co-operatives follows a decision in 1976 by the Co­
operative Board of the South African Agricultural Union to 
aid the Bantustans with regard to the development of their 
agricultural potential.
The Shiela Verdwaal Dryland Maize Project, which is regarded 
as AGRICOR' s model project, was set up with finance from and 
is managed by Noordwestelike Kotiperatlewe Landboumaatskappy, 
Beperk. (N.W. Koop) N.W. KoSp aJ so organised credit facilities
for certain project members to buy tractors and implements 
through the central co-operative organisation, VETSAK.
Federale Vo Iks--Be legging has also made an approach to AGRICOR 
to finance a maize expansion programme on the Mooifonte in 
Project, but whether this has in fact been taken up is not 
known. (12)
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMODITY RELATIONS
It is clear from the above discussion that state and private 
capital can be combined in a great variety of ways. As was 
discussed in chapter 3, the incentives for private investment 
in agriculture in the Bantustans have greatly increased in 
the last few years. However, the state, through its various
apparatuses such as the CED and the regional development cor­
porations, have by and 1 arge had to pave the way. In Bernstein's 
words, these state-managed forms of capital represent an alli­
ance between the apparatuses of the state which organise the 
political, ideological and administrative conditions of the 
further penetration of capital into peasant agriculture, and 
the provision of the financial and technical means of this 
penetration by private capital such as the central retail
co-operatives, the big food processing and milling companies, 
as well as agri-business consultants such as Measured Farming.
Together these state managed forms of capital provide the 
infrastructure for the further development of commodity rela­
tions in the Bantustans. It is precisely within this context
that the most important form of private capital penetration
wit. in the Bantustans takes place. Large scale productive 
capitals, usually of a multi-national nature find in the 
high technology projects, a guaranteed market for all kinds 
of agricultural inputs. The list of agricultural commodities 
is endless, but ranges from seeds, pesticides, herbicides, 
tractors and mechanical implements, combine harvesters and
m -
trailers, ro items such as gates, fencing, and corrugated iron.
The AGRICOR projects in Bophuthatswar.a provide a good example 
of this process. Together with the Vrystaat en Transvaalse 
Sentrale Aankoops Kotiperasie Beperk (VETSAK), the huge South 
African central co-operative organisation, AGRICOR has esta­
blished a Bopnuthat swar.a branch of th° former called TEMO- 
VET. VETSAK has a 50 percent shareholding in the new company, 
while AGRICOR in conjunction with the two Bophuthatswana Second­
ary Co-operatives, hold the other 50 percent.
The Bophuthatswana shares in TEMO-VET are made up of a 30 
percent share held by AGRICOR, and 10 percent respectively 
held by the Lesedi Secondary Co-operative (Taung Irrigation 
Scheme) and by the Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative (Mooifon- 
tein and Shie'a-Verdwaal Projects).
VETSAK was set up as a central retail co-operative by the 
white agricultural co-operatives in the Transvaal and Oranae 
Free Btate. With those powerful regional co-operatives behind 
it, vE.SAK has grown into a huge multi-national business, 
manufacturing its own range of chemicals and agricultural 
equipment at its various factories, the main factory being 
situated in Germ.xston .
VETSAK also acts as a retail outlet in South Africa for multi­
national giants such as Fiat Trattori, the Italian based
manufacturer whose tractors they distribute in South Africa. 
Other multi-national manufacturers which use VETSAK as a retail 
distributor in South Africa include the largest harvest machin­
ery manufacturer in the world, Claas of Germany the ferti­
lizer machinery manufacturer Amazonen, also of Germany, the 
industrial giant Allis Chalmers of the USA, Hobbs Incorporated, 
also of the USA, and Khun, the French company. (13)
TEMO-VET is thus acting as a local branch of VETSAK in Bophu- 
thatswana. Although AGRICOR, by law, has to put out for tenaers 
for any purchases, it would appear that TEMO-VET is in a posi­
tion of virtual monopoly by virtue of its relationship to 
AGRICOR and the secondary co-operatives on the projects. The 
Board of TEMO-VET is comprised of representatives from the 
boards of the secondary co-operatives, AGRICOR and VETSAK. 
This essentially represents an alliance of CEO, Noordwes Kodpe- 
rasie, and through VETSAK, a combination of multi-national 
and white South African farmers' capital.
As I shall show later in chapter 9, the agri-businesses supply­
ing the above-mentioned commodities are guaranteed their money 
irrespective of the yield, unlike the project participant, 
who, as the last person in this vast chain of appropriation, 
receives what is left over after inputs and management have 
been paid. What is important for capital is not the difference 
between the amount spent on production and gross income (which 
represents the project participants' profit or loss), but
rather the further incorporation of the participants into 
commodity relations. The development of commodity relations 
and the necessity for a cash income (real subsumption of labour 
as opposed to f ormal subsumption) represents an important 
arena within which the expansion and penetration of capital 
can be located.
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C H A P T E R  5
THE VERTICAL CONCENTRATION OF PSASANT-MIGRANTS
INTRODUCTION
As the structure of the world capitalist economy has changed 
from competitive to monopoly capitalism, so too has the form 
of capital penetration into agriculture changed. This change 
in the form of capital penetration can be characterised in 
terms of a change from horizontal concentration (leading to 
large scale agricultural production units based on hired la­
bour), to a vertical concentration of small producers by pro­
ductive private and state capital.
THE DECLINE OF HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION
Much of the literature on the development of capitalism in 
agriculture has been concerned with dispelling the notion 
that the "classical model" is the necessary form of rural 
development. (1)
In terms of the "classic model" of capitalist development in 
agriculture the meant of production (land, machinery, labour 
power) are usually concentrated horizontally in units of pro­
duction equivalent to industrial enterprises in their organisa­
tion of production and modes of economic calculation. This 
process of horizontal concentration usually results in the
expropriation of the peasantry and their internal differentia­
tion towards capitalist farmers and wage workers. As Djurfeldt 
puts its
"According to this classical notion, the agrarian 
future would be one of big estates, managed by capi­
talist farmers, run with machinery and other capital 
intensive methods of production, and employing land­
less labourers." (2)
Chayanov noted the demise of the classical model as a general 
trend in agriculture as early as 1925:
"The dynamic processes of agricultural proletariani­
zation and concentration of production, leading 
to large scale agricultural production units based 
on hired labour, are developing throughout the world, 
....at a rate much slower than wa expected at the 
end cf the nineteenth century... Nevertheless, it 
is clear to everyone working in the field of agricul­
ture that literally before our eyes the world's 
agriculture,... is being more and more drawn into 
the general circulation of the world economy, and 
the centers of capitalism are more and more subordi­
nating it to their leadership." (3)
Kauts '.y, in Die Agrafraoe. was one of the first to examine 
the crisis in "classical" capitalist agriculture in Europe. 
Competition brought about by grain imports meant that capita­
list farms could not reproduce themselves with free labour.(4) 
Much has been written about the ability of family or peasant 
farms to survive more adequately in this situation; the family 
farmer can sell his commodities at their cost prire, while 
the capitalist farmer must add profit. (5) Thus, while in 
certain parts of the world capitalist agriculture flourished 
along classical lines, the tendency in others was for family
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and peasant farmers to be incorporated into larger economic 
undertakings through a process of verticil rather than horj _on- 
tul concentration.
VERTICAL CONCENTRATION OF SMALL PRODUCERS
For Bernstein, vertical concentration refers to the co-ordina­
tion, standardisation, and (greater or lesser) supervision 
of tile production of numerous individual small producers through 
a central agency, whether this represents productive capital 
directly (as in out-grower arrangements', forms of merchant's 
capital which thereby actively intervene in the organisation 
of production, or whether the agency is tnat of a co-operative 
cr other state managed scheme. (6)
The vertical concentration of small producers has taken many 
different forms in different parts of the world. Bernstein 
warns that these different possible paths of development indi­
cate the heterogeneity of forms of peasant production and the 
need for investigating particular peasantries to examine their 
relations with other forms of production and the overall deve­
lopment of commodity relations. (7)
Chayanov outlined the stages of the subordination of agricul­
ture to capitalism and vertical concentration of small pro­
ducers in Europe, Russia and the United States of Ame-ica;(3) 
Once agriculture has been drawn into commodity production, 
it tends to get subordinated to a combined merchant-usurer1s
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capital. This subordination usually involves the provision 
of credit for seed and means of production, buying up harvests 
and the giving of advances for food during the year. As 
Djurfeldt puts it:
"The next step is that capitalism 'begins to actively 
interfere in the organisation of production too. 
It lays down technical conditions, issues seed and 
fertilizers, determines the rotation, and turns 
its clients into technical executors of its designs 
and economic plan'." (9)
Hand in hand with this process, capitalism begins to penetrate 
production itself, not on the farm as such, but "by splitting 
off from the peasant farm individual sectors, predominantly 
those in the primary processing of agricultural raw material 
and, in general, those connected with mechanical processes". do) 
Kautsky shows that after the crisis in European capitalist 
agriculture because of competition from cheap grain imports 
from the colonies, there was a flow of capital out of agricul­
ture , and into agro-industry. He mentions dairies, butcheries, 
breweries, sugar refineries, starch factories, which became 
objects of investment for the landlords and capitalist tenants.
The next stage, in Chayanov's words-
"If to this we add in the most developed capitalist 
countries, such as those in North America, widely- 
developed mortgage credit, the financing of farm 
circulating capital, and the nominating part played 
by capital invested in transport, elevator, irriga­
tion, and other undertakings, then we ha/e before 
us new ways in which capitalism penetrates agricul­
ture.... They convert agriculture, despite the evi­
dent scattered and independent nature of the small 
commodity producers, into an economic system concen­
trated in a series of the largest undertakings 
and, through them, entering the sphere controlled 
by the most advanced forms of finance capital. (11)
according to Djurfeldt the last sentence is important. It 
points to the thesis that these new forms of penetration are 
related to the transition in the capitalist mode of production 
itself, from competitive to monopoly capitalism. (12)
THE CO-OPERATIVE AS A FORM OF VERTICAL CONCENTRATION
Both kautsky and Chayanov saw the agricultural co-operative 
as an intensive form of vertical concentration cf small pro­
ducers. Thus Dj urfeldt suggests that when privcte entrepre­
neurial capital is weak, the vertical concentration can take 
a co-operative form. (13) According to Chayanov, 'the essence 
of of agricultural co-operation' is:
"a deep process of vertical concentration in aancul- 
ture. Moreover it must be noted that in its co­
operative forms this process goes much deeper than 
in its capitalist ones, since the peasant himself 
hands over to co-operative forms of concentration, 
sectors of his farm that capitalism never succeeds 
in detaching from it in the course of their strug­
gle." (14)
Therefore the development of agro-industry does not entirely 
eliminate the small holder; in Kautsky's words, "it binds 
him to the monopsonist power of the factory and converts him 
into a serf of industrial capital, working for its require­
ments". (15) Djurfeldt emphasises that this is exactly the
role of co-operatives: to centralise capital without expropria­
ting the oeasants, so that we get a capitalism without the 
capitalists. In that form, co-operatives are eminently able 
to reproduce themselves; and they come to play exactly the 
same role as private capital in other countries. (16)
In Africa in general, and Bophuthatswana in particular, the 
co-operative as a form of vertical concentration of small 
producers, has become the major way in which capital has at­
tempted to overcome the fragmentat-on of agricultural land 
into small plots. The vertical concentration of numerous small 
producers has enabled capital to create viable units for the 
employment of large scale technology and the inputs that this 
kind of agriculture requires, without the direct expropriation 
of land from peasant/migrants.
In Bophuthatswana for example, as we shall see more clearly 
in later chapters of this study, the participants on the Ditso- 
botla projects each have a 15 ha. arable allotment. The ideal 
utilisation of an average size tractor for dryland maize farm­
ing, is on about 120 ha.; but more complex machinery such 
as the combine harvester requires an even larger land size. 
As an AGRICGR publicity pamphlet puts it:
"Instead of each farmer having a tractor for his 
small farm - making it inefficient and un/iable, 
the projects provide a system of contractor-farmer 
production units with a single tractor and a set 
of implements serving a number of farmers and a more 
economically sized piece of land." (17)
A number of tractor production 
production co-operative. Each 
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operatives usually make up 
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The primary co-opeiat ive, rather than the individual 
thus becomes the legal body in terms of the acquiring 
cultural credit and the repayment of these loans. As 
viously mentioned AGRiCOR publicity pamphlet states:
"Farmers are organised in Primary 
operatives to provide for a common 
cing and management." (18)
The Agricultural Bank of Bophuthatswena, which was 
in 1981 with an initial capital of RIO million, is 
charged with the making of loans and advances to " 
companies". (19) The Board of the Bank has laid 
standards and adapted certain principles:
"'•"o meet the reasonable demands of a developing 
agro-economic situation, bearing in mind the prevail­
ing land tenure systems, cultural influences and 
the basic requirements of an essentially agricultural 
and pastoral people, striving to improve farming 
methods and to make a greater contribution to the 
national economy by way of food production." (20)
These standards and principles include low rates of interest 
on loans and advances, nominal fees for applications, valua­
tions and the preparation of documents, with no raising fee,
e t c . In spite of this, the Bank proposes "to conduct its opera­
tions on business lines" and only applications from farmers
"who, by their diligence, capabilities and labours will make 
a contribution to the national well being" are considered. 
This excludes speculators and some part-time farmers.
In its first annual report the Bank noted that Bophuthatswana 
will have to rely increasingly upon co-operative endeavour 
"so successfully applied in other lands", and that the co­
op system could be adapted to meet the credit needs of farmers 
farming under tribal authority, so that the group and not 
the individual, becomes the responsible debtor for an advance 
from the Bank. In this way, it is hoped, the provision of
acceptable security would become a more realistic possibility. 
The Board further noted that “progress towards a more mature
situation as far as co-operatives are concerned, is not so
evident", but that it would do everything in its power to assist 
in the re-alignment and development of co-operative enterprise.
As well as its support for co-operative farming, the Board 
"realized that the Bank has an important part to play in the 
remodelling and future development of the existing system 
of land tenure in as much as agricultural credit correctly 
applied can promote private farm ownership leading to greater 
self-sufficiency in food production. (21)
The primary agricultural co-operatives in Bophuthatswana form 
the basis of a vertically integrated three tier system provided
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for under the Co-operative Act of Bophuthatswana. The primary 
co-operatives are the basic production units to which the 
individual farmer belongs, that is, it is directly involved 
in the production process. The primary co-operative supplies 
production aids to members on a seasonal basis and receives 
and stores crops on a local level.
A number of primary agricultural co-operatives together form 
and fall under a secondary co-operative. A secondary co-opera­
tive is responsible for action regarding any matter concerning 
the interests and bargaining power of members; for the purchase 
and supply of farming requisites and implements, including 
fertilizers, seed, etc; to arrange crop insurance; to market 
crops for members' accounts or as an agent of the Marketing 
Board; and to disseminate information. If a number of primary 
co-cperatives falling under a secondary co-operative are part 
of an "agricultural project"; the management of that project 
is usually situated within the organisational confines of 
the secondary co-operative.
At the top of the three tier system lies the Federal Co-opera- 
tive; to co-ordinate agricultural co-operative endeavour and 
to act as a wholesale buyer and supplier of implements, trac­
tors, materials and farming requisites. At present Bophutha­
tswana has not yet established a federal co-operative, al­
though, as previously mentioned, there exists a central whole­
sale buyer and supplier of agricultural inputs called TEMO-
VET, a subsidiary of the huge central retail co-operative, 
Vrystaat en Transvaalse Sentrale Aankoopskooperasie (VETSAK), 
which serves as an agent for several multi-national agri­
business concerns in South Africa.
CONCLUSION
The causes of vertical concentration, according to Chayanov, 
are simple: it is evidently because capitalist exploitation
gives a higher percentage from vertical than from horizontal 
concentration. (22) While this may be something of a truism, 
it is clear that to a considerable extent the vertical concen­
tration of small producers transfers the undertakings risk 
from the owners of capital to the farmers themselves.
Also, as we have seen in the previous chapter, with the aid 
of state capital the vertical concentration of small peasant/ 
migrants with entrenched land rights, enables the extension 
of capitalist agriculture into hithertoe marginal areas. 
Whereas it was previously not feasable for individual peasants 
to be granted credit for a whole gamut of inputs which 
are part and parcel of a centrally managed production 
programme, the primary co-operative as a legally constituted 
body responsible for farmers' debts makes this possible.
S E C T I O N 2
THE DITSOBOTLA PROJECTS
AS A
CASE STUDY
THE DITSOBOTLA PROJECTS
CASE STUDY
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This chapter examines the various government institutions 
which are involved in rural development in Bophuthat swana. 
More specifically it traces how the difference in approach 
between the two main protagonists involved in rural development, 
the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture and the Agricul­
tural Development Corporation of Bophuthatswana (AGRICOR), 
cane about, leading to the dominance of the .atter institution 
and the relegation of the former to a more secondary role.
The conflict between the two institutions must be seen against 
the background of the changes in the South African economy, 
the Bantustans and the investment legislation discussed in 
Part 1 of this study. The struggle for political control of 
rural development strategy in Bophuthatswana manifested itself 
in a confrontation between the Bophuthat swana Department of 
agriculture as a representative of local traditional and ruling 
class interests, and AGRICOR which has strived to open the 
doors for South African state and private capital through 
the establishment of capital intensive agricultural projects.
The chapter will therefore examine the development of the 
Department of Agriculture in Bophuthatswana, the estaolishment
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of AGPTCOR and its various supplementary institutions, and 
tne resolution of the differing strategies for rural develop­
ment into the capital intensive project approach being imple­
mented at the time of writing.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
A Department of Agriculture for the area now known as Bophutha- 
tswana was established in 1969 under the Tswana Territorial 
authority. At this stage it was closely related to the Agricul­
tural Advisory Services of the then Department of Bantu Admin­
istration and Development. With the granting of self-government 
to Bophuthatswana in 1972 it became a fully fledged department 
although as late as 1981 it was still, in terms of staff and 
transport, "50 percent under strength". (1) During this period 
the Departmental Budget increased from less than R] million 
to R14 million for 1980/81. (2)
As in the past, one of the major tasks of the Department of 
Agriculture in Bophuthatswana (D. of Agric.) has been in the 
field of planning. Since 1972 this has involved an adapted 
form of "betterment" planning which it inherited fr m the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development. This act­
ivity was and is mainly concerned with the need to protect 
ehe natural resources of the area. For example in 1981/82 
the planning section was concerned mainly with soil conservation 
which involved the beaconing of residential sites and arable 
land, the construction of grass strips and training banks,
reclamation, stabilisation, grazing control, fencing and the 
construction of crush pens and earthen dams. (3)
However in 1976, under the then Secretary for Agriculture, 
Mr David Beuster, who is at present the Managing Director 
of AGRICOR, the D. of A g n c .  decided to launch the Shiela 
Verdwaal Dryland Maize project as a pilot project:
"In order to establish a uefinite pattern for rural 
development.... to concentrate its efforts in a 
few selected target areas in the Homeland". (4)
According to a publicity pamphlet issued by the D. of Agric. 
in 1977 shortly after the establishment of the Shiela project:
"the project is not merely an attempt to boost grain 
production in one specific area - it represents 
the practical application on a pilot scale, of some 
important concepts of the strategy of rural develop­
ment in homelands." (5)
The D. of Agric's direct involvement in this strategy to boost 
grain production through the establishment of projects such 
as the one at Shiela. was to be short-lived. The establishment 
of the Shiela pilot project was merely a precursor of the 
move in 1978 to set up the Agricultural Development Corporation 
of Bcphuthatswana, the rigauful heir to the capital intensive 
production approach. AGRICOR, staffed almost entirely by secon­
ded Corporation for Economic Development (CED) people would 
provide "sound planning, efficient management, good technology, 
adequate credit and adequate marketing arrangements," (6)
t/ y.:
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throurt, the involvement of the private sector and white agri­
cultural co-operatives (7)
In AGRTC OF1s view, the D. of Agric. was supposed to revert
to the provision of necessary infrastructure, particularly 
fencing... as well as handling land allocation matters" and 
the organisation of Primary Agricultural Co-operatives. (8)
However, when Beuster became Managing Director of AGRICOR 
in 1978, the new Secretary for Agriculture, Mr Clem Seape,
had different ideas. Whereas AGRICOR, in line with the policy
of the CED, regarded the capital intensive project as a long­
term vehicle for development, he D. of Agric. under Seape
regarded the projects as an emergency measure:
"to bridge the gap, in the shortest possible time, 
between starvation and subsistence production on 
the one hand, and self sufficiency and commercial 
production on the other." (9)
As t;n alternative the D. of Agric. put forward a dual approach 
comprising: (10)
a, large scale capital-intensive projects which are pro­
duction and profit orientated with a minimum of emphasis 
on training and the development of human resources, as 
a short or medium term emergency measure run almost exclu­
sively by "foreign" capital and expertise;
b. relatively small scale farming, with group farming units 
based on the traditional communal system, communit- deve-
through the involvement of the private sector and white agri­
cultural co-operatives (7)
In AGRICOR’s view, tne D. of Agric. was supposed to revert 
to the provision of necessary infrastructure, "particularly 
fencing... as well as handling land allocation matters" and 
he organisation of Primary Agricultural Co-operatives. (8)
However, when Beuster became Managing Director of AGRICOR 
in 1978, the new Secretary for Agriculture, Mr Clem Seape, 
had different ideas. Whereas AGRICOR, in line with the policy 
of the CED, regarded the capital intensive project as a long­
term vehicle for development, the D. of Agric. under Seape 
regarded the projects as an emergency measure:
"to bridge the gap, in the shortest possible time, 
between starvation and subsistance production on 
the one hand, and self sufficiency and commercial 
production on the other." (9)
As an alternative, the D. of Agric. put forward a dual approach 
comprising: (10)
a. large scale capital-intensive projects which are pro­
duction and profit orientated with a minimum of emphasis 
on training and the development of human resources, as 
a short or medium term emergency measure run almost exclu­
sively by "foreign" capital and expert ise;
b. relatively small scale farming, with group farming units 
based on the traditional communal system, community deve-
lopment orientated and fairly labour intensive. The stra­
tegy is long-term, self perpetuating by multiplier effect, 
run almost exclusively by the D. of Agric. under extension 
officers and community development workers, as opposed 
to managers and foremen, as on the above-mentioned pro­
jects.
The long-term small scale farming approach is comprised of 
two important elements. According to Seape, this "grassroots"
approach means that:
"In this vast and comprehensive Rural Programme, 
Agricultural Extension and Community Development 
taken as techniques for implementing Rural Develop­
ment - play a major role." (11)
The theme of agricultural extension is, according to Seape 
(1982) "to take education to the villages." He suggests that
extension exists to assist farm people through educational 
procedures to:-
a. improve their farming methods and techniques;
b . increase their efficiency and incomes;
c. raise their level of living;
d . lift and improve their social and educational standard 
and thus help them to contribute actively to the
overall economy of the rural areas in particular,
and the country as a whole. (12)
Extension activities include farmers' days, demonstrations
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on livestock innoculation. castration, disease treatment, vege­
table production, soil sampling, lectures to provide farmers 
with theoretical background, tours to show farmers’ successful 
projects, and day-to-day meetings and visits to individual 
farmers and communities. (13)
*he task of community development workers is:
"The incalcat ion of the spirit of self-help, and 
galvanising people into positive action, (the a- 
rousing of) a sense of self-searching, leading to 
the development of progressive nationhood, imbued 
with self-respect and self-confidence, which are 
important ingredients in the moulding of the dignity 
of the human person." (14)
The activities of this division are mainly concerned with 
"community involvement"; the said community being comprised 
of schools, garden clubs, women's associations, churches and 
various regional authorities, in garden projects for vegetable 
production, although more general community facilities also 
seem to be of concern.
By 1982 AGRICOR had gained the upperhand in the struggle to 
dictate the direction of rural development policy in Bophutha- 
tswana, the capital intensive projects being accepted as the 
vehicle for long-term development. Seape went into "retirement" 
at the end of 1982, the D. of Agric. under his rule represent­
ing a last ditch stand to stem the tide of white capital pene­
tration into agriculture, a tide which since 1977 has swept 
aside the remaining political and class barriers to its advance.
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production, although more general community facilities also 
seem to be of concern.
By 1982 AGRICOR had gained the upoerhand in the struggle to 
dictate the direction of rural development policy in Bophutha- 
tswana, the capital intensive projects being accepted as the 
vehicle for long-.arm development. Seape went into "retirement" 
at the end of 1982, the D. of Agric. under his rule represent­
ing a last ditch stand to stem the tide of white capital, pene­
tration into agriculture, a tide which since 1977 has swept 
aside the remaining political and class barriers to its advance.
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Apart from the aforementioned provision of infrastructure 
and the allocation of land, the D. of Agric.'s main involvement 
in the projects has been in the field of co-operat develop­
ment . Many problems have been experienced with ^ne p. imary 
co-operatives which form the basis of the agricultural develop­
ment projects, especially with regard to their ability to 
keep proper books. The D . of Agric. has thus been responsible 
for organising a job-training programme for the management
committees of the primary co-operatives.
The Department has also been responsible for the appointment 
of a firm of auditors who made certain recommendations on
the basis of a study they completed. A research team from
the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit also recently completed
a study into agricultural co-operatives for the Department.
THE AGRICULTURAL DEV •'MENT CORPORATION ( AGRICOR )
Since its inception in 1976, AGRICOR1s policy as regards its 
development strategy has undergone a constant process of change. 
There are three main reasons behind this policy shift.
The first reason lies in the tension that exists between the 
two poles of the duel approach outlined in the previous section, 
that of capital intensive, production - orientated projects 
opposed to the small-scale community development and labour- 
intensive approach proposed by the Bophuthatswana Department 
of Agriculture.
4/
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The second reason behind the policy shift is the ideology 
of "community development" which has permeated Bantustan deve­
lopment policy as part of their relegation as separate entities 
of the "Third World". This ideology came to full fruition 
in Bophuthatswana with the appointment of Elize Moody of the 
Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit, as head of the Department of 
Lands and Rural Development.
The third major influence on the development of AGRICOR's 
policy is the corporation's fascination for the Israeli experi­
ence , with particular reference to the Moshav as a "multi­
purpose" co-operative.
Chief Lucas Mangope stated in 1977, that the development of 
agriculture would be regarded as the most urgent development 
priority in Bophuthatswana. The two main reasons for this 
decision seem to be due to the fact that the majority of his 
constituency reside in the rural areas; but more importantly, 
due to the need to be "self-sufficient" in maize as a strategy 
to convince the outside world of Bophuthatswana's "indepen­
dence". The development of agriculture is also an important 
first step in the ability of the ruling class to accumu­
late. (15)
Consequently, agricultural development was given the highest 
priority when the economic policy for the region was accepted 
by the Executive Council of Bophuthatswana. The establishment 
of AGRICOR in April 1978, must be seen against this background.
/
The Agricultural Development Corporation was established by 
Chief Mangope in terms of the powers vested in him by the 
promotion of the Economic Development of Black States Act 
No. 46 of 1968. The Executive Council decreed that it should 
operate as a non-profit state corporation in which the Bophu- 
t hat swana administration holds 1 000 "ordinary shares of
E l -00 each" and in terms of the 19 58 Act "shall be the only 
shareholder of the Corporation." (16)
As has been mentioned, AGRICOR's original brief was politically 
motivated by the need to assert the viability of an "indepen­
dent economy. This brief, "to feed the nation from its own 
resources", involved the adoption of an essentially technocratic 
approach, where development was "based purely on the highest 
potential returns and also on the speed with which investments 
(could) be recovered". (17) Thus while the Department of 
Agriculture's job lay in the field of planning and extension, 
AGRICOR's was to get production going through capital intensive 
agricultural projects.
ihe functions of AGRICOR, as defined by the Executive Council 
of Bophuthatswana are: (18)
The identification of possible agricultural development 
projects.
The planning and implementation of projects. This 
involves amongst other aspects, obtaining the services 
of suitable management, technical and administrative
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staff for such projects.
Mobilisation of funds for development through liaison 
with government and outside sources, eg. the CEC, 
Co-operatives in the R.S.A., Commercial Banks, etc. 
To act as a central co-ordinating body in respect 
of all existing and future development projects. 
To enter into agreements with outside development 
agencies in respect of management and financing. 
The screening and evaluation of all proposed new 
development projects submitted by cutside agents. 
Potentially viable projects to be submitted to the 
Board of Directors.
To act as Secretariat to the Agricultural Development 
Board and the Agricultural Marketing Board and also 
to handn. certain administrative functions related 
to these Boards on an agency basis.
Agency function in respect of the management uf co­
operatives, eg. bookkeeping services, financial con­
trol, etc.
Administration of marketing functions on behalf of 
the Marketing Board, development of specialised as­
pects of marketing, eg. the establishment of abat­
toirs, grain silos, etc.
To obtain the services of specialist consultants 
and other experts to > idertake surveys and special 
investigations in respect of development prefects.
To perform any other function in the field of agricul­
tural development which may from time to time be 
delegated to it by the Minister or the Executive
i/ X. 
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Council.
After its establishment, AGRICOR's Bear! of Directors accepted 
in principle a schedule of development priorities: (19)
The redevelopment of Taung Irrigation Scheme over
a 5 year period;
The development of dryland crop production areas 
at 20 000 ha. per year for the next 20 years;
The establishment of intensive livestock enter ri­
ses, dairying, poultry, pigs, also over a period
of 20 years;
Full development of livestock production over 30
years;
Further intensification of livestock production 
through bush eradication and the establishment of 
artificial pastures over 50 years or more;
Development of new irrigation schemes only if surplus 
funds are available.
THE RISE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
The community development ethos began to spread its all-perva- 
sive tentacles in November 1980 when Chief Lucas Mangope, 
addressing his cabinet, women's organisations, and representa­
tives from different departments and corporations, staced 
that "where there is no vision, the people will perish." He 
emphasised that the country as a whole should now give atten­
tion to community development and that each development pro-
gramme undertaken should be community orientated. (20) The 
Department of Agriculture had already established a community 
development division in April 1979 and at the time of Chief 
Mangope's speech in 1980, AGRICOR’s Public Relations section 
was in the process of launching another one. By 1983 the De­
partment of Lands and Rural Development, as well as other
institutions such as the University of Bophuthatswana, were 
also dabbling in this much vaunted enterprise.
In 1981 AGRICOR appointed a community development officer 
and a planner, the latter on loan from Israel. Initially con­
centrating on the villages of the Shiela Project, the Community 
Development section established various committees under the 
umbrella of a Development Committee. The main task of this
section seems to have been "education and enrichment" , which 
was divided into practical and academic education. The former 
included such activities as sewing classes, vegetable gardens, 
"the preparation of a cheap body lotion," etc. while the 
latter involved first aid classes, family planning, group 
discussions, youth activities and Bible classes. (21) There
were also efforts to improve civil services in the villages. 
Contacts were made with the Department of Public Works, the 
Water Corporation and other agencies, who with the aid of 
the villagers improved their roads, water and sanitary facili­
ties. Child care centres run on a voluntary basis by mothers 
were also started.
Most of the activities of the community development division
have been limited to the Shiela project, although by 1984
i/
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a start had been made on the Mooifontein Project, namely Spring- 
bokpan and Siberia.
THE RISE OF "TEMISANO"
AGRICOR1s Public Relations Department was given the task of 
developing a concept for public consumption which would embrace 
the two divergent poles of community development and the capi­
tal intensive, centrally managed production strategy in use 
on the projects. The P.R. Department came up with the term 
"TEMISANO" , which means "to farm together" . It was hoped 
that the term would provide a unifying concept for publicity 
purposes.
According to various AGRICOR publicity pamphlets, (22) compati­
bility oetween community development and the race to feed 
the nation from its own resources has been found in the concept 
of Temisano:
"TEMISANO is a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan­
ning effort with the aim of establishing sound rural 
communities with their initial bases being economi­
cally viable agricultural projects. " (23)
TEMISANO, as a co-ordinated effort to stimulate social and 
economic development in selected rural areas, is divided into 
four development areas:
1. Agricultural Production - the first stage of a Temi­
sano Project centres around the e ablishment of
iz  z 'l
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an Agricultural Production Unit. The Production 
Units are based on agricultural co-operatives. 
Community Development - the ideas behind community 
development are "to develop the human resources 
*n the community and to broaden the economic base 
of the community making it less dependent on laruer 
towns for its basic economic and social needs, thus 
rendering it more stable and more attractive as a 
dwelling place". (24)
i raining - both within the community end on the 
production unit. Not only in agricultural skills 
and management, but in community leadership, account­
ancy for the co-operative and the community, as 
well as in child and community health care and educa- 
t ion.
Secondary Industries - agriculturally-based secondary 
industries such as mills, cotton gins, oilseed pro­
cessing plants, asparagus canning factories, and the 
like, are to be established on an economically viable 
basis in the vicinity c* the community and its acri- 
cuitural production unit. (25)
The-e has been much debate within AG RI COR itself as to what 
the iEMISANO approach means. The Managing Director, David
ceuster, stated that TEMISANO projects have quite a lot (heel- 
wat ) in common with the Israeli Mcahav, and ascribed the suc­
cess of the AGFICOR projects to the system of co-operative
farming. (26) Other members of AGRICOR have preferred to
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see TEMISANO as a long range planning concept, stressing that 
efforts to create a tangible ' something1 such as a "TEMISANO 
unit have been based on an ill conceived attempt to replicate 
various aspects of the Moshav movement. It is useful, at 
this stage, to look at the co-operative concept as it functions 
within the Moshav movement in Israel.
THE ISRAELI MOSHAV AS A CO-OPERATIVE
The Moshav is basically a settlement ranging from 60 to 90 
families, each with an individual arable allotment, usually 
intensively farmed under irrigation, belonging to a multi­
purpose co-operative. Each family unit owns basic agricultural 
equipment but the larger, more sophisticated and modern mechani­
sation is owned by the co-operative and hired out to the far- 
mer• Under this system it is possible to use modern mechanisa­
tion and the latest ideas but still remain a small farmer.
The produce of each farm is marketed through the Moshav' s 
central organisation. Although a system of production quotas
operates for each Moshav, it is up to the members of the Moshav
to decide on individual contribution. This central organisation 
also provides a range of services to members, both the husband 
and wife being equal partners and enjoying equal rights and
Pr^v -t^ e 9es as members. There is a co-operative store where 
everybody can buy their day-to-day needs on an open credit 
system, a creche for small children and a communal hall for
entertainment and meetings.
The Moshav, having a strong democratic ethos, elects various 
committees (including a management committee) on an annual 
basis through a General Assembly. Land is distributed so that 
all holdings are similar in area and quality. The size is
such that a family can work its land without hiring outside 
labour, but big enough to supply the livelihood of two genera­
tions. (27)
As Israel has no co-operative act, a very strong feature is
the degree of autonomy accorded to each Moshav. While adhering 
to broad principles of the different Moshav Movements, the 
degree of "co-operation" varies tremendously; from a minimum 
where only water for irrigation and the marketing of produce 
is done co-operatively, to the maximum where production is 
dene communally and only consumption occurs on an individual 
basis. (28)
Different Moshavim, as part of an integrated rural development 
plan, are usually clustered around a regional centre which
has l-»-"ger facilities such as a high school, bigger shops, 
a hospital, agricultural machinery suppliers, a post office 
and various other services. All land on which Moshavim are
situated is owned by the Jewish National Fund and can be con­
sidered to be national land. Each Moshav leases its land on 
a 49 year automatically renewable contract and each family is 
entitled to pass its land on to one of its children.
All new Moshavim are designed jointly by the Department of 
Agriculture, the Settlement Planning Centre and the Jewish
Agency, the plan comprising the physical planning of the vil­
lages, the production plan and the services. New farmers, 
without money or experience receive long term soft loans, 
which are virtually grants because of the high rate of infla­
tion, as well as training and the service of a highly organised 
and qualified extension service. The minimum income aimed 
for is equivalent to that of an industrial worker in one of 
the cities.
The Moshav thus combines equality of provision, land size, 
water, cred:", with private incentive. Although it is possible 
for a more efficient family to earn a higher income, a large 
degree ofcommunality demands that the better farmers advise 
and help the weaker ones, as the Moshav, as a unit, competes 
against the other Moshavim and Kibutzim as well as private 
business in the market place.
The Moshavim and Kibbutzim form the main thrust of an attempt 
to settle the more remote and inhospitable areas of the state 
of Israel, as well as the Palestinian areas (west bank) and 
the Golan, captured in 1967, for military and ideological 
reasons. In an attempt to legitimise its continued occupation 
of these last mentioned areas, vast numbers of new settlements 
are being established ("making the desert bloom") and as such 
the people are usually highly educated and motivated by Zionist 
zeal.
What then are the similarities between the Israeli Moshavim 
and the TEMISANO system of co-operative farming?
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The first point to note is that on the Moshav, each family 
is given a big enough piece of arable land, farmed intensively 
under irrigation, to enable them to earn a minimum eqivalent 
to that of an urban industrial worker. This must be seen a- 
gainst a background where planning takes place on a completely 
blank page, that is, there are no people living in the regions 
being planned. As noted by an AGRICOR planner w.ien comparing 
the situation to Bophuthatswana:
"In all cases we have to deal with firmly established 
populations and firmly established sets of economic 
relations. Inevitably these economic relations are 
not confined within any defined region, but linked 
to other regions." (29)
Jeppe ( 1978) with regard to land tenure, states that the na­
tionally owned land in a western state such as Israel is not 
comparable to the "communal" tribal land in the Bantustans. 
He mentions the traditional role of leadership, the security 
provided by subsistence agriculture, both of which he subsumes 
under the rubric of a “complicated ground culture" (30). Beuster 
on the contrary suggests that the only "communal" asoect in 
African culture with regard to agriculture is that of communal 
grazing. The use of arable land is on an individual basis.(31)
This point is made by Ma_'< fe in his critique of Wolpe:
"(Who) overlooks the important but little known 
fact that under the system of quit-rent all arable 
land is individually registered at the magistrate's 
court in the name of the family head, who then ac­
cepts liability for the annual rent... In practice 
it means that particular descent groups are able
/  <- 
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to hold the original plots in perpetuity. What is 
communal about that?" (32)
The private ownership of land is even more marked on state- 
owned land, a distinction not made by Jeppe. Here "the state 
can put such land at the disposal of private persons or tribes
in any manner it desires”. (33) For example in Ditsobotla,
the site of the Mooifonte in and Shiela Projects, 4 7,8 percent 
of the land is state -owned.
Thf point is that it is not the system of tribal ownership 
of land, of some "dark custom" holding back the forces of
progress as Jeppe would have us believe. Rather the problem
lies (with specific reference to the question of land use) 
in the fact that the hope less overcrowding in marginal agricul­
tural areas comprising the rural areas of the Bantustans means 
that tnere is no way that AGR1C0R or any one else working 
within the confines of the Bantustan system can allocate arable 
allotments which w^ll provide a full-time living as do the 
Moshavim.
Any attempt to provide arable land of sufficient size will 
force 60 to 70 percent of the population of the Bantustans 
into a perpetual state of landlessness and total dependence 
on migrant labour. This, as the AGRICOR officials are well 
aware, is a political rather than ai agricultural problem. The 
result is that on AGRICOR1s projects, such as the Ditsobotla 
ones, the existing allotment of 15 ha. for the cultivation 
of dryland maize is totally inadequate in terms of providing
„L
a living wage for a family. This will be shown in more detail 
in chapter 9 of this study. It has been estimated that up 
to 78 percent of the project participants are not actively 
involved in the farming process. (34) most of these working
in other areas as migrant workers or in other jobs in the 
vicinity.
This brings us to the second major characteristic of the Moshav, 
that of democratic participation and decentralised management. 
It stands to reason that if up to 78 percent of the project 
participants on Mooifontein are not involved in the production 
process or the running of the primary co-operative that there 
cannot be much decentralised, democratic participation. Conse­
quently both Shiela and Mooifontein Projects are run along 
highly centralised lines with the seconded white management 
making decisions without much consultation with the project 
participants.
It is clear that however much AGRICGR would like its projects 
to be based on the Israeli Moshavim, the reality of the situa­
tion makes it an impossibility given the present circumstances 
on the projects. Calling the existing primary co-operatives 
"TEMISANO's" or "TEMISANO Units" would indeed appear to be 
based on an ill-conceived attempt to replicate various aspects 
of the Moshav. This will become more clear when actual condi­
tions on the Shiela and Mooifontein Projects are examined 
in chapter 8.
It is also pertinent to comment on the wider definition of
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TEMISANO as a long-range planning concept. Given the publicity 
that AGRICOR has devoted to the '•oncept of TEMISANO, especially 
the elements of production and community development, it is 
important to elucidate the real meaning behind the term. The 
following quotation fnon an AGRICOR Annual Report is enlightening:
"Somehow the concept of Community Development had 
to become a part of the Agricultural Projects without 
hampering the race to feed the nation from its own 
resources... TEMISANO is AGRICOR1s approach to Inte­
grated Rural Development." (35)
The quotation is interesting because it reveals what is meant 
by the earlier statement that TEMISANO is a comprehensive 
and co-ordinated planning effort with the aim of establishing 
sound rural communities with their initial bases being economi­
cally viao1e agricultural projects. It would appear that the 
viability of the projects are measured in terms of whether 
Bophuthatswana theoretically produces enough maize to feed 
itself rather than in ^erms of whether individual farmers 
have control over a production process which will provide 
their families with an adequate income.
In this definition of what TEMISANO is all about, community 
development is a secondary appendage which must in no way 
hamper the management of the capital intensive projects from 
their primary aim: to produce as much maize as possible no
matter what the cost may be.
What the are the other elements involved in this product ion
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orientated approach to rural development in Bophuthatswana?
Since AGRICOR has managed to attain its position of dominance 
with regard to rural development policy in Bophuthatswana, 
it has, in collaboration with the authorities, been instru­
mental in setting up various institutions to facilitate the 
development of the capital intensive production projects.
THE MANAGEMENT AGENTS
One of the functions of AGRICOR, as detailed earlier, is to 
obtain the services of suitable management, technical and 
administrative staff for its projects. In order to obtain 
these services AGRICOR enters into management agreements with 
outside bodies such as the CED, Noord Wes Kooperasie, Noord 
Transvaalse Kooperasie, Loxton, Venn and Associates and Robina 
(Pty), Ltd., the latter two being private agricultural consult­
ants .
A management agreement usually means the secondment of manage­
rial, technical and administrative staff to run the various 
agricultural projects for AGRICOR for a management ree. The 
management fee is based on two percent of gross income received. 
This is designed to cover the production agent's fees as well 
as that of the tinancer/developer. (35) For exa^nle AGRICOR
paid the CIO's agricultural management branch R6 881 609 during 
the 1982/83 financial year for these services. (36)
/-S
—  86
THE 30PHUTHATSWANA MARKETING BOARD
The Bophuthat swan a Marketing Act, 1977 (Act 21 of 1977 ) pro­
vided for the establichment of the Bophuthat swana Marketing 
Board. AGRICOR was responsible for setting up the Board, pro­
viding seconded staff, premises and a secretariat in the ini­
tial phases of its development. The Board's main functions 
aret
"to regulate, undertake and deal with any matters 
relating to the production, manufacturing, processing 
and sale of any agricultural product, as well as 
the grading and standardisation of agricultural 
products or any other matters concerning these pro­
ducts ." (37)
The Board de 'Is mainly with controlled agricultural products. 
When a product is classified as "controlled" it means that 
the producer has to sell that product to a registered agent 
of the Board. Because of the relatively small volume, all 
controlled products fall under one board, unlike South Africa 
where each product has a separate board. The fallowing are 
controlled agricultural products in Bophu hatswana:
maize and maize products; 
wheat and wheat products;
oilseeds such as groundnuts, sunflower and soya beans; 
meat and meat products.
In terms of Article 13 of the Bophuthatswana Marketing Act, 
the Board has appointed four storage agents in Bophuthatswana•
AGRICOR;
Lesedi Secondary Co-operative;
Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative;
Noordwes Kooperasie, officially know as Noordw.^s Grain 
(Pty) Ltd.
The duties of the Board's Agents are as follows: (38)
a. to purchase grain from producers on behalf of the
Board and to pay the producer for such grain when 
it has been received;
b. to determine the mass, class and grade of grain
purchased;
c. to handle and store the purchased grain; and
d. to execute the Board's instructions with regard
to delivery of the grain to the buyers.
Due to the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel, 
the Board decided to negotiate with the South African Maize, 
Wheat, Oilseed and Meat Boards to undertake certain necessary 
administrative and marketing functions on an agency basis. 
Because of Bophuthatswana's scattered geographical situation, 
quantities of agricultural pr duce are still being marketed 
in South Africa. For example during the 1981/82 season the 
following amounts of maize from Bophuthatswana were received 
by co-operatives in South Africa:
Tons
South Western Agricultural Co-operative, Ltd. 306
Magaliesburg Agricultural Co-operative, Ltd. 44
Marico Co-operative, Ltd
3 695
Northern Transvaal Co-operative
250
TOTAL 7 05 3
There are basically three commercial mills m  Bophuthatswana
the fourth being very small. The biggest is the Epol (Pty,
Ltd. Mill, which is part of the Premier Milling Group, it
situated in Thaba Nchu and buys most of its maize from
the South African Maize Board. The second biggest is Mafikeng
Milling whicn gei:s its maize from the Bophuthatswana Marketing
Board as well as some from the South African Maize Board'
The tnird mill is known as Lesed. Taung Meule and the fourth 
as Moshala Mills.
Much is made of the fact that in 1981 Bophuthatswana produced 
enough maize for its own consumption as well as for export. 
As the AGRICOR 1981/83 Annual Report states, -Maize remains
the COn" ° 3l,y °f BoPhut hats wane. It i. the mainstay
of the average ,i.t and in years of good rainfall the country 
produces enough maize to feed itself. This statement must 
be seen within the context of the present marketing system.
the bulk of the maize produced in Bophuthatswana 
^  S°ld by the A9ricultural Marketing Board to the South Afri­
can Maize Board, who in turn sell it. as part of the total 
South African maize crop, to the various milling companies 
South Africa. These milling companies then process, 
package and distribute the maize meal through the large retail­
ers all over South Africa. Bophuthatswana included.
What this means is that whether Bophuthatswana produce." a 
bumper crop or no crop at all, does not affect one iota, except 
as part of the general supply of Souih African Maize , the 
price the consumers pay in the shop for therr maize meal. 
While a bumper crop obviously has a good effect on the local 
economy in terms of farmers having maize to reed themselves 
and money to spend, the fact that Bophuthatswana produced 
enough naize for internal consumption doesnot tell us anything 
about the distribution of that maize or the access that the 
average consumer has to it. On the contrary, a close look 
at the way in which maize is marketed, suggests that the deve­
lopment of maize projects in Bophuthatswana has merely served 
to increase the catchment area for the supply of that commodity 
to the South African Maize Board. A large proportion of that 
maize is therefore being produced for the benefit of the force- 
fed chickens and beef industry and for milling monopolies 
producing processed maize products such as pet food for the 
urban market.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have seen how the Bophuthatswana Department 
of Agriculture, as a representative of a traditional class 
with vested land interests, attempted to salvage a failing 
subsistence cultivation t h o u g h  a programme of extension and 
community development. However, in the wake of the 1977 ammend- 
ment to the Promotion of Economic Development of the National 
States Act No 46 of 1968, these effects were short-lived.
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The establishment of AGRICOR and its promotion of the Cz-D s 
policy of capital intensive agricultural projects with produc­
tion as top priority, soon swept aside this last-ditch resist­
ance to the large-scale flow of South African state and private 
capital into agriculture, and the virtual dispossession of 
project participants of their land.
The chapter further examined how AGRICOR has tried to cope 
with the rising tide of "community development', and its at­
tempts to use the concept of TEMISANO as a way of combining 
the production approach and some elements of the community 
development approach without involving the majority of the 
project participants in the production process. The concept 
of TEMISANO, as we saw, was based on an attempt to replicate 
elements of the Israeli Moshav, without being able to fulfill 
any of the necessary conditions for the successful implementa­
tion of such a multi-purpose co-operative.
Finally, the chapter concluded with an analysis of some of 
the institutions which have been set up to promote the Pro­
duction-orientated approach to rural development; namely, 
the management agents and the Agricultural Marketing Board. 
It is clear that the latter institution has acted mainly as 
a co-ordinating body for the delivery of Bophuthatswana s 
maize to the South African Maize Board. To these institutions 
must also be added the Agricultural Bank of Bophuthatswana 
and its central role in the financing of primary co-operatives 
which form the foundation of the AGRICOR projects. The role 
of the Bank was discussed in more detail in chapter five.
Y"/
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C H A F T E R
-r
THE HISTORY OF THE DITSOBOTLA PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the history of land ownership in Ditso- 
botla; the process of settlement after the incorporation of 
the area under the Released Area Act No 18 of 1936, the re­
structuring of the stateland area of the projects under better­
ment planning in the 1950's, and the agricultural conditions 
prior to the establishment of the AGRICOR projects.
XiLE: H^S.ORY OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN DITSOBOTLA
In an attempt to settle outlying areas, much of the land in 
the region today known as Ditsobotla, was granted in perpetuity 
to white farmers by the Transvaal government around the turn 
of the century. The farm Louisdal, for example, was procurred 
by Louis Jacobus Nel in 1892, and the farm Verdwaal was granted 
to H S Clarks in 1920. Vast areas were also bought by land 
companies such as the Transvaal Proprietary Ltd. and the Afri­
can European Investment Company Ltd. The farms Sprinbokfontein, 
Mooipan, Mooifontein, Lombaardslaagte, Enselsrust, and Siberia 
ere amongst those bought by the latter company in 1907.(1)
These land companies bought and sold land to both black and 
w h u e  farmers in the years preceding the 1936 Land Act. Black 
farmers bought land ranging from 5 morgen to 200 morgen as
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early as 1918, many of these private farms still existing 
today as part of the Brooksby, Schoongezicht, Ensulsrust, 
Vrede, Weltevreden, Doornlaag, Kaalpan, Gelukspan and De Hoop 
60 farms, a total area of 13 223 ha. and totalling 5,5 percent 
of the reaion.
In 1909, the large area lying in the south-west of the region, 
known as Kunana Location, was declared tribal trust land in 
terms of a crown grant. It was held as tribal »_ust land for 
Chief Aaron Moshwete of the baRolong Tribe by the Minister 
of Native Affairs of the Transvaal Colony. This trusteeship 
passed on to the State President of the Union and later Repub­
lic of South Africa before being transferred to the President 
of Bophuthatswana in 1980. Trust property known as the Middle­
ton estates has recently been incorporated into the Kunana 
Locat ion.
The Kunana Location is bounded in the north-west by the Setlo- 
goli Reserve which was reserved for the baRolong boo Ratlou 
boo Seitshiro Tribe in terms of the 1913 Land Act.
A smaller area in the north-east of the Ditsobotia region, 
makes up the remaining tribal trust land known as Matlabes 
Location and consisting of two farms, namely Driefontein and 
Randfontein, it was granted to the baRolong boo Rapulana tribe 
at the end of the last century and declared as tribal trust 
land in terms of the 1913 Land Act.
Nearly 48 percent (47,8) of the Ditsobotia region, which makes
UP the remaining portion, is comprised of what is known as 
"stateland farms." These state-owned farms, were all bought 
from white farmers and from the African European Investment 
Company Ltd., by the South African Native Trust after the 
passing of the Released Area Act No 18 of 1936. These farms 
were held as trust land until their inclusion into Boputha- 
tswana through the Bophuthatswana Government Proclamation 
R347/77 in December 1977.
The Released Area Act No 18 of 1936 was passed in order to
buy up land which had been scheduled for inclusion (known 
as "Released areas") in the Native Reserves in terms of the 
1913 Land Act, but which until 1936 was still occupied by
white farmers. An example of this process of changing land 
ownership is found in the sales of the Verdwaal farm. After
being granted to H S Clarks in February 1920. he sold the 
farm to a Mr W J W Vorster, who was in turn forced to sell 
it two years later in 1938 to the South African Native Trust.
Although portions of some farms were bought by the S.A.N.
Trust as early as 1920 and as late as 1975 the vast majority
of the land was bought after the 1936 Released Area Act in 
1938. (2)
THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT
After the farms were bought from the white farmers and the 
African European Investment Company, many of their former
employees preferred to remain and were eventually allocated 
land tenure rights on small pieces of land. While these people 
formed the basis of the growing population, the majority of 
the people presently living on these stateland farms were 
refugees from Western Transvaal urban areas such as Ventersdorp, 
Lichtenburg, (Goedgedagte) Carltonville, Klerksdorp, Potchef-
stroom, as well as from white farms in that district.
Many of these people from 1936 onwards were victims of forced 
removals. According to Mr "Lang Mos" Motsuane, a private farmer 
and former headman of the tribal authority who arrived in 
the area ■>n 194 2, people were usually promised more land than
they previously had if they moved to Ditsobotla, although
this extra land rarely materialised. (3)
People also moved for various other reasons, such as coming 
to work for white farmers in adjacent areas, the possibility 
of acquiring land for farming because of a shortage in other 
regions, the "unfavourable conditions made by whites..." 
(4) in the urban areas of the Orange Free State and Western 
Transvaal, and in more recent years to take over land from 
ailing parents. Of the respondents interviewed, 60 percent
were originally from outside the Ditsobotla region, although
many more were children of people who had come from outside, 
they themselves being born in the region.
The following table indicates when project participants wao 
took part in the study and who had land before the project
started, acquired, land in the area:
Table 2.1
Before 1936 ............... 4%
1936 - 1950 ................ 41%
1950 - 1960 ............... 22%
1960 - 1970 ................ 16%
After 1970 ................ 18%
Table 2.1. The year project participants acquired land in 
the Ditsobotla region. (N = 126)
From Table 2.1 it is clear that the great majority of the 
people (67%) acquired land in the area before 1960. with the 
period between 1936 and 1950, that is the period directly 
after the purchase of the land by .the South African Native 
Trust, being the greatest period of influx. This is borne 
out by Bembridge et al who state that the trust land area 
of the present projects was "settled between 1936 and 1944".(5)
People obtained land through the Tribal Authority subject 
to approval and confirmation of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner 
under whose authority the former fell. The Commissioner acted 
as the senior prefectorial district officer to the Tribal Autho­
rity. The main functions of this body, which consisted of 
the local hereditary chief and his senior tribal heads "were 
to govern their tribes according to traditional rules and
customs, to ensure law and order, to act as local courts and 
to work in close cooperation with the district commissioner 
for ensuring law and order and to assist him in his overall 
control of that part of the district". (6) The tribal autho­
rity for the trust land area of the present projects consisted 
of a headman, six councillors and sub-headmen for the various 
wards. The tribal authority was replaced in 1972 by a Community 
Authority, the functions being the same except that the headman 
is appointed by the President and the councillors are elected.
The Bantu Affairs Commissioner was also replaced by a magistrate 
in 1972 and the different tribal authorities in the Ditsobotla 
district (along with the community authority on the the trust 
land) augmented by a regional authority. This body is known 
today as the Ditsobotla Magisterial District Regional Authority 
and is made up of all t h e  Chiefs and two appointed Senior 
Councillors from each respective tribal authority, meeting 
monthly under the chairmanship of the District Magistrate.
BETTERMENT PLANNING
The trustland area on which the projects are situated came 
under betterment planning in the early 1950's. It is not possi­
ble to get detailed information as regards the actual process 
of planning and implementation of the betterment policy in 
this area. All records were destroyed in 1°76 when the Depart­
ment of Agriculture offices, which were loused an the Magis­
trate's offices in Itsoseng, were burnt down by students during 
the boycotts and protests which swept the country at the time.
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However, betterment planning has remained virtually unchanged. 
The main steps taken in planning an area such as this are 
outlined by Beuster: (7)
Basic soil surveys are undertaken to determine the 
best locality for cultivated fields. These new fields 
are preferably in larger, concentrated blocks which 
are properly fenced, sub-divided and re-allocated 
to the individual farmers.
Grazing areas are fenced, sub-divided into camps 
and wherever possible, watering points are provided 
for every camp.
Concentrated residential areas, which will fit in 
the overall physical plan are selected. Basic infra­
structure such as streets and water supplies are 
planned for and provided. The scattered dwellings, 
interfering with the agricultural planning are re­
moved and re-erected in the new areas. Compensation 
is paid out to all persons who are affected by the 
resettlement of the dwellings.
An agricultural plan for the area is drawn up. This 
plan provides details such as recommended crops, 
fertilizer programmes, carrying capacity of the 
grazing camps, rotational grazing system, livestock 
breeding programme, e t c .
Until 1972, as part of the western u^eas" , the trustland
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area of Ditsobotla fell under the jurisdiction of the Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Potchefstroom. The usual procedure 
was for the Commissioner to appoint an "ad hoc" committee to 
make recommendations for the reclamation and settlement of 
the region. This committee included the commissioner, as well 
as the Principal Agricultural Planning Officer and various 
other agricultural officers for the district.
As no records exist for the Trustland area of Ditsobotla, 
it is useful to look at the plan which was drawn uF in 1965 
for the adjacent Kunana Location, which is also in Ditsobotla. 
Here the existing residential areas were left as they were, 
even though some of the houses were widely spaced. The idea 
was that population growth would soon fill up the gaps. Indivi­
dual residential sites were measured and beaconed in 1/4 morgan 
allotments by the Trust officials. It appears that in the 
trustland area of the projects, some of the older residents 
either maintained or received t morgen residential allotments, 
while the newer ones received a 1/4 morgen. (3) Allocation
of the plots was done by the chief or headman and his council.
'eople who were situated outside the demarcated residential
a-ea were moved. he chief or headman and his council deciding
into which residential area they should be settled. With re-
gards to compensation "individual applications (had to be)
made to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, who (would) consider
them according to their merits in accordance wich General 
Circular number 23 of 1965". (9 )
#/*
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The ad_hoc committee was of the opirion that "in an area such 
as this where fair crops are reaped in normal seasons the 
income should be derived in the proportion of 51 percent from 
crops and 49 percent from stock farming." (10)
T m s  income, which amounted to a sum of R123- 00 per year,
would be obtained from a 9 morgen allocation per farmer -
6 morge , for grain crops and 3 morgen for cattle. This would
give each "farmer" R63 from 18 bags of grain and R60 from
12 cattle per year. The yield per morgen was thus three bags 
of grain.
In theory the Department of Agriculture (at that stage of 
the Agricultural Advisory Services of the Department of oantu 
Administration and Development) was supposed to motivate 
the farmers to implement the proposed production programmes. 
According to Beuster, very little of this has become evident 
in practice, and he suggests that the very fuct that production 
in certain planned areas has dropped over a number of years, 
places a huge qu ition mark over the conventional planning 
and extension approach as a means of increasing production.(11,
The arable land allocations after the planning of the trustland
area seem to be roughly similar, if slightly bigger, than
those Planned for the Kunana Location as is evident from the 
following table:
Table 2.2
1
1 5 Moigen 11%
10 Morgen 79%
15 Morgen 3%
30 Morgen 7%
Tabln 2.2 Percentage of respondents receiving different
land allocations after implementation of betterment planning. 
(N = 117)
The figures are in morgen as this was the unit given by the 
majority of the respondents. A morgen, which is equal to .8 56 
of a ha. , is a hundred yards square while a ha. is a hundred 
metres square. The majority of the people (79%) received 10 
morgen allocations, with almost equal amounts having more 
(10%) and having less (11%). Redelinghuys, in a study of the 
Ditsobotla region, also found that the majority of people had 
access to 10 morgen. (12)
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROJECTS
To obtain an idea of the agr:cultural production on the state- 
land farms prior to the implementation of the projects five 
different sources are consulted:
Respondent's estimates during the questionnaire
z Y- 
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survey .carried out for the present study.
2. Respondent's estimates during the questionnaire 
survey carried out by the ARDRI evaluation team 
in 1981. 03)
3. A study by Seobi on the farm Naauwpoort prior to 
its inclusion in the Mooifontein projects in 1980.(14)
4. From data compiled by Pretor ius and issued as the 
official AGRICOR publication on the Projects. (15)
5. Respondent's estimates during a questionnaire survey 
carried out by Redelingshuys in 1977 in the Ditsobot- 
la region. (16)
Respondents for the present study were asked what was the 
average yield reaped in a good year and the average yield 
reaped in a dry year. All answers were give:, in bags per hold­
ing. To obtain the nur oer of bags per morgen the number of 
bags per holding were correlated with the size of the holdings. 
Tv-ole 2.3 and 2.4 show these findings.
Table 2.3
Average number of bags
Per 5 morgen = 96 
Per 10 morgen = 211 
Per 30 morgen = 3 5 7
Per 1 morgen = 19 
Per 1 morgen = 21 
Per 1 morgen = 12
Average = 221 Average = 17
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Table 2.3 Average number of bags for different size 
allotments in a good year and average number of baas 
per morgen for the same.
Table 2.4
Average number of bags
per 5 morgen = 40
|
per 1 morgen = 8
per 10 morgen = 9 2 per 1 morgen = 9
per 
-------
30 morgen = 215 per 1 morgen = 7
L Average = 116
I
i
---------------— i
Average = 8
2.4 Average number cf bags for different size
aij.o^ments in a dry year and average number of bags pe 
morgen for the same.
If we combine the average number of bags per morgen for
a good year (17 bags) with the average for a dry year
(8 bags) we obtain a total average of 12.5 bags per morgen
As there are 14 bags (weighing 71 kgs each) per metric
ton our total average of 12.5 bags per morgen would give
us a figure of .89 ton per morgen or 1 . 039 metric ton
per ha.
-he figure of 12.5 bags per morgen compares favourably 
with the estimates obtained by the AKDRI evaluation team. 
They obtained from their survey a figure of 13 bags per 
ha. for Shiela and Mooifonte in combined, which is equal
to 11 bags par morgen. However. it must be borne in mind that
both sets of figures are estimates by farmers and. as the
ABDRI report warns, due to to the lack of documentation, must 
be treated with caution.
For instance both Seodi and Redelinghuys come up with lower 
Yields _ although their figures are for specific years rather 
than average yields over the years. Seobi found that during 
the 1977/78 season maize yields on Naauwpcort averaged 7 bags 
per morgen. Redelinghuys's figure for allotments of 15 morgen 
and below is also 7 bags per morgen. This works out to 0.5 
ton per ha. Although giving no indication of how he arrives 
at these amounts. Pretoria's (17) figures coincide with Seobi's 
and Redelinghuys's. He quotas production figures of 0.5 tons 
and 0.6 tons per ha. for Moo.fontein and Shiela areas respect- 
ively, prior to project development. Table 2.5 gives a compari- 
LJ"Ve *-lstin9 of all the estimates considered so far.
Table 2.5
bags per morgen
------------ ------------- -—
tons per ha.
Present f^udy 12.5 1.039
ARDRI evaluation team 11.0 0.911
Seobi
0.582
Redelinghuys 7,0 0.500
Pretorius 7.0 0.500
Average
1 0. 706
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Table 2.5 Average bags per morgen converted to tons per
h a .
At 1979/80 prices (for the sake of comparison with project 
yields during that year.) of R100 per ton, this would have 
given the average farmer a gross income of R70-60 per ha.
or R604 * 34 per 8.56 ha (10 morgen) allotment. With their pre­
sent allotments of 15 ha. which most of the project partici­
pants received, R70-60 per ha. would have given a gross
average income of R1 059-00.
Redelinghuys found that 56% of the farmers in the area he 
studied in the Ditsobotla region cultivated their own land 
prior to the implementation of the project while 44%, many 
of them female headed households, relied on contractors for 
a share-cropping arrangement. In some areas, share-cropping 
was the main means of obtaining assistance with tillage. This 
was the case in the Naauwpoort area studied by Seobi, where 
the contractors carried out all operations for the farmer. 
Some of these contractors were white farmers from nearby areas.
Under this arrangement the contractors received amounts varying 
from one fifth to half the crop, with the majority (60.4%) 
receiving the latter amount. (18) To obtain a more accurate 
account of the cost of inputs, given the lack of accurate 
records, the cash payments charged by contractors per ha in 
Seobi1s study is useful. He found that on average the farmer 
paid R15-80 per ha. for these services in 1978. ( 19) This
■
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figure, adjusted for inflation, amounted to R17-87 per ha 
in 1979/80, giving a total of R152 97 for 8.56 ha. (10 morgen).
Added to these cultivation costs were those for threshing 
and transport, being 50c per bag for each of these in 1978. 
Again, adjusted for inflation, the combined cost of threshing 
and transport came to R 1 -13 per bag in 1979, giving an amount 
of R100 -57 for the 89 bags per 8.56 ha (10 morgen) that was 
found to be the average yield for the region. (89 bags per 
morgen in Table 2.5). These figures are brought together for 
comparison in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6
Gross income » R604-34
Cost of cultivation « Rl52-97
Cost of threshing & transport » R100-57
Nett income per 8.56 ha. = R350-08
Nett income per ha. * R 4 0-89
. .  , I
Table 2.6 A summary of gross income, the cost of inputs and 
the resulting nett income from maize farming on 8.56 ha (10 
morgen) plots at 1979/80 prices.
The average nett income from maiie farming on the trustland 
area cf the Dit sobotla region before the implementation of 
the Mocifontein and Shiela Verdwaal Projects was R350- 08 per 
year for those farmers who had access to a 8.56 ha (10 morgen)
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piece of arable land. It must be borne in mind that this is
a rough average which varied enormously from year to year, 
depending on the weather and many other factors such as time 
of ploughing and the quality of the contractor and his imple­
ments. If the farmers had 15 ha. arable allotments as on the
present project, they would have received R614-72 nett income
at 19 79/80 prices.
Another important factor to -onsider is that while all respond­
ents grew maize, the majority (69%) grew crops other than 
maize, in terms of the findings of the present study. Only 
31 Percent of the respondents grew maize only. Crops such 
as sunflower, grain sorgum, beans, wheat, watermelons and 
pumpkin were widely grown as dietary supplements as well as 
for sale. Green maize on the cob was also eaten during the
year before the harvest. It is therefore conceivable that 
some of the farmers received higher incomes than the above 
figure of R350-08 per year on a 8.56 ha. piece of arable land.
DEBTS
Only 32 percent of the respondents in the present study had 
production related debts before the commencement of the pro­
jects. The highest debt was R3 500- 00 while the lowest was 
R6-00. The average debt amongst those who had debts was R497. 
According to Seobi, a proportion o* the farmers on the farm 
Naauwpoort, for example, had accumulated long-standing debts 
and were not prepared to risk further loans. (20) As we will
see later, once included in the projects, they had no such 
choice.
While some farmers were able to obtain credit from the Agricul­
tural Division of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), 
Seobi suggests that many farmers could not obtain credit be­
cause of the limited amount of finance available for crop 
loans.(21) The Agricultural Development Act of 1973 provided 
that credit for Bantustan farmers obtained from the Agricultur­
al Development fund should only be channelled through co­
operatives. Many primary co-operatives were established merely 
for this purpose and existed on paper rather than as operating 
production units.
As late as 1978/79, for example, only R110 000 was available 
for production aids and for crop and livestock production 
to all co-operat. ves in Bophuthatswana, giving each one an 
average of R 2 340-43 at 1979 prices. (22)
CONCLUSION
.n this chapter we have seen that while a few black farmers 
bought private land from the land companies prior to 1936 
in the Ditsobotla region, the majority of the present popula­
tion settled in the area after that date. Many of these people 
were victims of relocation from both urban areas and from 
white farms in the Western Transvaal and Orange Free State.
The rapid population growth, as a result of the influx of
people due to relocation and the high birth rate has led to 
a situation in the 1980's where up to 50 percent of the people 
in the closer settlements do not have access to arable 
land. (23)
After comparing various sources for agricultural production 
figures an average yield of 0.7 tons per ha. of dryland maize 
was .aken as a rough estimate of the amount produced by farmers 
in this area before the implementation of the AGRICOR projects, 
either farming by themselves or with the help of contractors
on an average of 8.56 ha. (10 morgen). This means that if
farmers had access to 15 ha., as on the present AGRICOR pro­
jects, they would have received a nett income of R614-72 at
1979/80 prices. The majority of the farmers also grew crops 
other than maize, suggesting that they enjoyed a fairly varied 
diet as well as a possible higher income than suggested above.
Many of the farmers belonged to primary co-operatives as this 
was practically the only way they could obtain a limited 
amount of credit for basic production inputs such as seed
and fertilizer. More than half the people who owned land were 
responsible for and involved in the production process while 
the rest relied on the services of contractors.
This chapter will serve as a useful yardstick to measure the 
degree of development which has taken place since the projects 
were implemented by AGRICOR and its management agents, the 
CED and Noordwes Kooperasie.
- 109 -
C H A P T E R  8 
THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T  OF THE D I T S O B O T L A  P R O J E C T S  
I N T R O D U C T I O N
As will be remembered from chapter 6, the first capital inten­
sive project, the Shield Verdwaal Project, was started in 
1976 by the Bcphuthatswana Department of Agriculture under 
the then Secretary of Agriculture, Mr David Beuster. When 
Beuster was transferred to the position of Managing Director 
of the newly established Bcphuthatswana Agricultural Develop­
ment .orporation (AGRICOR) in 1978, the control and management 
of all agricultural projects in Bophuthatswana (1) passed 
on to AGRICOR and its seconded CED personnel.
The rise of AGRICOR was marked by the development of alterna­
tive approaches between itself and tie Department of Agricul­
ture 'Bophuthatswana), to the process of rural development. 
The conflicting approaches led to the retirement of the Secre­
tary of Agriculture, Mr C Seape in 1982 and the acceptance 
of the capital intensive project approach as the long term 
vehicle for rural development in Bophuthatswana.
After AGRICOR took over control of the projects, the number 
as well as the size of the existing projects increased dramati­
cally. Influenced by the criticism inherent in the differing 
approaches between itself and the Department of Agriculture
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under Seape, AGRICOR has attempted to introduce elements of 
community development and fragments of the Israeli Moshav 
into ' + S strategy of capital intensive projects. This comb .*3- 
tion of production orientated projects, community development 
and che Moshav has been subsumed under the mantle of TEMISANO 
PROJECTS. Although still subject to dispute wit . n AGRICOR 
itself, the TEMISANO approach has involved ar attempt to turn 
the existing primary co-operatives into TEMISANO production 
units. These TEMISANO units are supposed to serve as a focal 
point for production, training, community development and 
at a later stage, secondary industry.
This chapter will trace how the development strategy discussed 
in chapters 2 and 6 has developed in the concrete form of 
the Ditsobotla projects. This will involve an explication 
of the role played by the various institutions discussed in 
chapter 6, as well as the project participants themselves, 
in the establishment of the projects.
THE SHIELA VERDWAAL DRYLAND MAIZE PROJECT
Prior to the granting of "independence" to Bophuthatswana, 
about 70 000 ha. of high potential land had been identified
in the Ditsobotla region as suitable for dryland, summer grain 
crops, particularly maize. (2) Because of the slow progress 
being made with regard to agricultural development in Bcphu- 
thatswana, officials of the Bophuthatswana Department of Agri­
culture decided in 1976 that a new approach was needed. The
development of a new approach in Bophuthatswana must be seen 
against the background of a general realisation by the South 
African government that agricultural development in the Bantu- 
stans was failing. This led, as was discussed in chapter 2 
of this study, to the passing of the 1977 ammendment to the 
Promotion of Economic Development of the National States Act 
No. 46 of 1968 and the establishment of the CED with its inten­
tion to concentrate on. the development of large agricultural 
projects. Another important influence on the new approach 
was the decision in principle in 1976 of the South African 
Agricultural Union to provide aid to the Bantustans with regard 
to the development of their agricultural potential. (3)
The new approach, which later formed the basis of AGRlCOR's 
development strategy, in essence meant that a few high potenti­
al areas would be selected as target areas for concentrated 
efforts to develop the production to its optimum level. (4)
Although initial surveys had been done, the Department of 
Agriculture, with assistance from the Department of Soil 
Science at the University of Potchefstroom, carried out inten­
sive soil surveys on three farms, Shiela, Verdwaal ai.d DeHoop 
in the north-east of the Ditsobotla region, and established 
that the area had 3 800 ha. of arable soil suitable for maize 
production. At that time only 1 700 ha. was being farmed by 
the 2 )0 people who had land rights, the rest being used as
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As was noted in chapter 7, farmers had access to arable allot­
ments ranging from five to 30 morgen, with 10 morgen being 
the most common. They either cultivated the land themselves 
or relied on contractors. As these initial three farms included 
in the project lie adjacent to the So,th African maize triangle 
(later expanr ons such as Mooifontein being further west and 
therefore more arid) the average yield of one ton per ha. 
that was being achieved by the farmers on their plots was slight­
ly higher than the average for the stateland farmers in the 
rest of Ditsobotla. (see chapter 7)
As the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture did not have 
the necessary funds, it approached Noordwestelike Kooperatiewe 
Lar.dboumaatskappy, Beperk, to finance and to act as agricul­
tural advisors to what became known as the Shiela Project. 
Noordwes Kooperasie, which is based in the western Transvaal 
maize capital, Lichtenburg, applied for and received ministerial 
permission to finance the project. Tnis permission was applied 
for through the medium of the Sou^h African Registrar of Co­
oper at ives.
The firm of agricultural consultants, Loxton, Hunting and 
Company were appointed to provide the management and technical 
advice for the project, while the Department of Agriculture 
(Bophuthatswana) provided an extension advisory service to 
the farmers. The Lichtenburg District Agricultural Union ap­
pointed a committee of four local white farmers to give practi­
cal advice to the project management during the planning phase.
The Department of Agriculture held many meetings with the 
2 00 farmers to explain the nature of the project. It is clear 
from the survey done for this study (see chapter 10 for de­
tails) that the majority of the farmers were initially in 
favour of the project. In order to increase the size of the 
individual arable allotments to 15 ha., it was decided to 
plough up 1 800 h a ., of what was until then, grazing land.(5) 
Most of the f aimers believed that this step 'ould serve to 
incK ase their incomes through maize production and were will­
ing to sacrifice the communal grazing lands for this purpose
The management of the project decided t.iat the grazing land
had tc be ploughed before the next season. As the tractors 
ordered for the project would have arrived too late, an appeal 
was made to all the agricultural unions in ‘he north-west 
region of the Transvaal to make tractors, implemento and dri­
vers available to break up the soil. The Directors of Noord- 
wes Kodperasie set the example by making 16 tractors available 
and at one stage 58 tractors took part in the ploughing. (6) 
These white farmers were renumerated for the costs incurred 
through the use of their tractors by the Department of Agricul­
ture on a non-profit basis. (7) As the ploughing of the graz­
ing land constitutes expansion into virgin territory the cost 
was carried by the Department of Agriculture and not debited 
to the farmer.
Each of the 200 farmers who had land rights on the three farms 
comprising the project was allocated a 15 ha. plot. The majori­
ty of the farmers were in favour of this land alloc; tion as
it represented an increase in arable land size for most of 
them.
THE CONTRACTOR FARMER SYSTEM
A contractor is one of the more "progressive" farmers chosen 
by the Department of Agriculture, who for a set fee per hour, 
ploughs, cultivates and harvests for the farmers on the project 
who do not have tractors and implements. In practice, at the 
commencement of the Shiela Project, 29 full-time farmers were 
chosen as contractors for the project. Many of these had been 
performing contracting services to part-time farmers prior 
to the commencement of the project and as a result were famili­
ar with, and usually had their own, tractors and equipment. 
Most of them had at some stage worked for white farmers as 
tractor drivers.
During the first season a total of 3 546 ha. was cultivated. 
It was calculated that 29 tractors plus implements were needed 
to -ffeetively work an area this size. (8) The project planners 
decided that only three of the 29 contractors chosen had trac­
tors which could still be used effectively. As a result, 26 
new Fiat 640 tractors were ordered from VETSAK. The trans­
action was concluded through Noordwes Kooperasie, who charged 
the contractors the same rate of interest as their own members, 
except that the "mechanical unit" (tract or plus a set of imple­
ments) was repayable in four equal instalments ever four years. 
These capital items cost a total of R255 000. (9) The number 
of contractors was increased to 31 the following year.
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As has been mentioned, each of the 200 farmers who had land
rights on -he three farms comprising the project were alio-
cated a 15 ha. plot. The 15 ha. plots were meas.red and laid
out in such a way that groups of eight comprised a 120 ha.
block, capable of being cultivated with one tractor by one
contractor. Each contractor, being responsible for a 120 ha.
block, was allocated a second 15 ha. plot to enable him to
pay off his mechanical package, giving him a total of 30
ha. The remaining six plots were given to six other farmers 
making up the block.
By the end of 1981, some of the contractors had paid off their 
machinery and withdrew their services, but continued farming 
on the two 15 ha. plots initially allocated to them. This
created problems as they were meant to continue the service 
after paying off the tractors. The gap created by their with- 
drawal was overcome by the Shiela Primary Co-operative which 
acquired additional machinery to provide the necessary service 
to the farmers who were left stranded. (10) This system
of the primary co-operative owning the tractors and implements 
and employing drivers to operate them, was to replace the 
contractor system (where private individuals own the equip­
ment) on subsequent expansions of .he Shiela Project, as well 
as on the Mooifontein Project. As will be explained ir. more 
detail when dealing with Mooifontein itself, this system means 
that the primary co-operative hires out tractor, implements 
and a driver to the project participants and then debits their 
accounts at the end of every harvest for the number of hours
they u s e d .
By 1982, 12 of the original farmer contractors had withdrawn
from the project. Nine of these are still financed by AGRICOR, 
as private farmers, through their primary co-operative. The 
other three, also as private farmers, have opted to receive 
assistance from the Bophuthatswana Landbank. It would appear 
that the contractor system, by giving the contractor farmers 
double the land of the other project participants as well
as the necessary credit to buy tractors and implements, has 
acted as a springboard for the development of a small group 
of semi-independent private farmers. However, it is too early 
to predict the growth of a new class of private capitalist
farmers on such a slender basis. It is not clear at all whe­
ther these farmers have a large enough portion of arable land 
to survive the present and continuing drought conditions,
or whether they will be able to expand their activities signi­
ficantly given the shortage of land in the Ditsobotla area.
The majority of the contractors have continued with the origi­
nal system within the project. They acquired another new trac­
tor in 1982, which was financed by AGRICOR through the Shiela 
Primary Co-operative. (11) The contract which was drawn up 
between the management committee of Shiela Primary Co-opera­
tive and the contractor, stipulates that the latter must per­
form his task to the satisfaction of the committee. In prac­
tice a few contractors have had their tractors a id implements 
withdrawn and relocated to other contractors. This action
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resulted in administrative problems and in some cases even
legal action. (12) Contractors who have had their implements 
withdrawn have often been reluctant to give up the extra 15 
ha. they were originally allocated and some have disputed
the right of the management to withdraw machinery which they
have come to regard as their own private property.
To prevent the problem of "inefficient and untrustworthy con- 
L r set ors , all new applicants are now placed on a two year 
probat ionary period before being allowed to buy a tractor
and implements. In the meanwhile the equipment belongs to 
the co-operative.
According to a progress report (1981) compiled by the manage­
ment agents of the Shiela Project, it was originally envisaged 
that the project participants would be responsible for the 
supervision of the cultivation of his/her arable allotment 
by the contractor. This help and active participation, it 
was thought, would be particularly racessary during the plant­
ing and harvesting periods. According to the original aims 
of the planners, the project participants would also be en­
tirely responsible for any manual weed control ("skoffel- 
ing"). (13)
However, since the inception of the project in 1976, it has 
become clear that the majority of project participants are 
not actively involved in the production process. This is due
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to a variety of reasons, chief of which is the fact that th. 
Project participants (excluding contractors, cannot make an 
adequate living from 15 ha. of dryland maize cultivation and 
therefore obliged to seek employment elsewhere. Many of 
those permanently present on the project are retired and there- 
fore too old to make an active contribution. These factors 
"ill be dealt with in more detail in chapter 10 which deals
results of the questionnaire survey conducted for 
this study amongst the project participants.
The result is that, since the project was started, the project
management has hired labour to do the necessary hoeing and
harvesting. ,14, The hired labour has consisted of women,
school Children and casual labourers from the surrounding
villages and have often been obtained with some difficulty.
x^ose, t he content of which was subsequently denied by
AGRICOR. revealed that many of these casual labourers were
children who were being forced to sleep in the open in the
middle of winter during the harvest period. (15) The cost
of the la-hour is debited to the project participant's seasonal 
account.
importance of participation in the project by the indivi- 
dual participants is shown in the findings of the ARDRI re­
port. (16) Participation was found to be the most important 
variable m  determining the project member's yield per ha., 
with involvement in weed control of particular importance. 
The fact that many of the participants are not involved means
that the hired labour as well as the contractors do not 
alway, render suitable service on the absentee farmer's 
land. The contractors especially, as we will see when 
*e discuss the demise of the contractor system on the
Mooifontein Project, tended (and rtill do on the Shiela 
Project) to concentrate on their own lands to the detriment
-he other participants to whom they are supposed to 
be providing a service
jHE SHIELA PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE. r.Tn
When rhe project commenced in 1976, the farmers on the
farms Shiela. Verdwaal I and Verdwaal II, each with their
primary Agricultural Co-operative, amalgamated to
form the Shiela-Verdwaal Primary Agricultural Co-operative, 
Ltd.
The new Shiela-Verdwaal Primary Co-operative was permitted
to rent part of a plot of land allocated to the Department
of Agriculture on Shiela farm adjoining itsoseng town.
The headquarters, with a fuel depot, a fertilizer store.
a workshop and store, and an open-sided Implement shed,
“ S Set “p here' Another fertilizer store was set up 
at Verdwaal II village. (17)
In 1981, a new site was allocated to the Shiela-Verdwaal
Co-operative along the main tarred rood to Itsoseng.
A new infrastructure of offices. personnel housing. a 
large fertilizer store, an implement shed and a modern
/ .
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mechanical workshop was erected. (18) During mid-1982,
the project was reconstructed from an "administrative 
aspect", leading to the dissolution of the Shiela-Verdwaal 
Primary Agricultural Co-operative, Ltd. and its reconstitution 
as the Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative, Ltd. 
A new management committee was elected.
This administrative restructuring essentially represented 
a further step in the process of centralisation which 
began in 1976 with the amalgamation of the Shiela, Verdwaal I 
and Verdwaal II primary agricultural co-operatives. The 
1982 restructuring resulted in the dissolution of the 
Akanyang Primary Agricultural Co-operative (Springbokpan 
Project ) , which at that time was an autonomous co-operative 
with its own management committee, running its own affairs 
under the "guidance" of the Shiela (Noordwes Kooperasie) 
management. The Springbokpan Project was thus included 
under the newly constituted Shiela Agricultural Co-operative, 
Ltd.
I
As far as the structure of the primary co-operatives is
concerned, the implementation of the Shiela Project has
had a retrogressive impact. Instead of an increasing
devolution of power and local control over administrative
affairs, the opposite has occured. The management of 
the Project, that is the seconded Noordwes Kooperasie 
officials, have increasingly centralised the administration 
of the project, resulting in a corresponding decrease
in democratic participation by the management committees 
of what used to be fully-fledged primary co-operatives. 
These former primary co-operatives have now been reduced 
to what are called "Temisano Units". (19)
In terms of what has happened at the Shiela Project, 
a Temisano Unit represents the remains of a former primary 
co-operative. What is left behind are various degrees 
of physical infrastructure; storage depots, implement 
sheds, and in the case of the Springbokpan Project, its 
own agricultural machinery. These various depots or units 
are presided over, through the medium of the centralised 
Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative, by a central 
management committee, which as we will see in due course, 
has very little control over its own affairs.
The role of co-operatives in general was discussed in 
more detail .in Chapter 5 of this study. The central theme 
of that chapter was that where litt.e private entrepreneurial 
capital is available, peasant/mig ant farmers can be 
vertically concentrated through co-operative organisation. 
In this way small pieces of land can be brought together 
into an economically viable unit so as f o make capitalist 
farming and the provision and recovery of credit a viable 
proposition. As Djurfeldt puts it:
"But this is exactly the role of co-operatives: 
to centralise capital without expropriating the 
peasants, so that we get a capitalism without 
capitalists." (20)
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The Shiela Primary Co-operative is a good example of 
the vertical concentration of peas ant/migrants and the centrali­
sation of capital through the co-operative structure. 
All transactions on the project have to be conducted
through a legal persona. '"he primary co-operative rather
than the individual farmer has legal standing as regards 
the project. (21) The legal standing o 2 the co-operatjve 
means that all loans are made to the co-operative, which
is also responsible for the payment of debts. The co­
operative in turn is responsible for the recovery of 
individual debts from its members. This is made possible 
by the co-operative law which makes it illegal for constituent 
members to market their produce anywhere other than through
the co-operative itself. The co-operative is therefore
able, after the marketing of the produce, to recover
f.-om the members' account any money owed by him for costs 
incurred during the previous year. The member is then
entitled to what is left over.
Officially the project is under control of the management 
committee of the Shiela Primary Co-operative, assisted 
by the seconded staff from the management agent appointed 
by AGRICOR, namely Noordwes KoSperasie. (22) The management 
committee is elected on a yearly basis by members of 
the Shiela Primary Co-operative, from amongst its own 
ranks. In practice the committee seems to be little more 
than a "rubber stamp" for decisions made by the white 
management of the project.
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It is clear from the minutes of » meeting of the shiele
Management Committee in 1983 (see appendix B ) that there is
great confusion as to it. actual function in the running
of the project. It does not have control over the hooks
or bank account and a, this meeting demanded that these
be handed over to it if its authority is recognised by
Doth AGRICOR and Noordwes Kooperasie.
The management agent. Noordwes Kodperasie. which acknowledges
that the project participants are not involved in the
decision making process. nonetheless blame the lack of
involvement on the fact that -there are still serious
problems (leemtes) with regard to the composition and
election of the management committee which frequently
leads to the situation where the best people are not
elected." (23)
*
The complaints that the management committees of the
primary co-operatives are not capable of running the
co-operative efficiently, have led to Increasing centralisation 
of the decision-making process as well as the day -to-
day running on most of the AGRICOR projects. Since the
beginning of the 1978/7, season. for example, Noordwes 
Kooperasie has taken over the responsibility for the 
preparation of project participants debit accounts from 
the Shiela Primary Co-operative, a service for which 
AGRICOR pays. An administrative official, whose task 
^  is to train four clerks running the co-operative,
has also been seconded from Noordwes.
The attempt by AGRICOP to introduce the concept TEMISAN 
bhits was examined in Chapter 6. We suggested that TEMISAN, 
- s  the product of attempts by the ACRICOR Public Relation,
section to combine -community development- and a product .o, 
orientated approach without really involving the -farmer'
"  the or the production aspects of the
projects. furthermore. erne to the conclusion that
TEMISANO was indeed based on an ill-conceived attempt
<o replicate various aspects of the Israeli Moshav system.
“  “  ClB“  fr°m t6e ab discuss ion of the Shiel, Primary 
that apcrt i the community development 
initiatives. Chapter e very little of the Moshav
system has been implemented.
It would appear that the concept of TEMISANO. as it applies
to the Shiela Project. is precisely , combinat.cn of 
a highly centralised Production orientated approach with 
elements of community development added for good measure.
have seen. the former primary co-operatives have 
o-en reduced to storage depots u-der the control of the 
Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative which is run by 
seconded Noordwes Kooperasi. management. It is to
examination of this seconded white management that we 
now turn.
MANAGEMENT OF THE SC" 1
Although during the original planning of the project, 
Noordwes Kooperasie was only responsible for financing and 
technical advice, after the first season it was decided by 
Noordwes directors that the appointed management agents, Lox- 
ton, Hunting and Company, were not utilising the finances 
adequately.(24) As a result, Noordwes Kooperasie concluded 
a management agreement with the Bophuthatswana Department of 
Agriculture. It was decided that Noordwes would take 
over tne responsibility for the management of agricultural 
production as well as the administration of the project.
Since 1978, with the establishment of the Bophuthatswana 
Agricultural Development Corporation (AGRICOR), the Bophutha­
tswana Department of Agriculture has considerably reduced 
its involvement in the Shiela Project . AGRICOR took over 
the management agreement from the Department with the 
management agent Noordwes Kooperasie as well as the seconded 
personnel involved in the running of the project.
Since 1979 AGFiCOR has financed all new capital expenditure 
and since 1980 the main part of the seasonal costs (production 
inputs ) for the Shiela Project. (25)
The Noordwes personnel in Lichtenburg mainly involved 
with directing the technical and management aspects of 
the p-oject are the Managers cf the Department of Agricultural
Projects and a Production Manager, also attached to the
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Noordwes Department of Agricultural Projects.
Other personnel who are seconded full-time from Noordwes 
3 project are a project manager, an assistant project 
manager. an administrative manager, a workshop manager, 
two section managers and an administrative clerk. Additional 
clerks. storemen, watchman, a typist, a telephonist,
apprentice mechanics and ethers at the scheme are employed 
directly by the co-operativ . (26)
Three additional section m a g e r s , trained at the AGRICOR 
training centre in Mma .cho. have also been seconded
to the project. Each s :tion manager is in charge of
one or two of the farms (such as Shiela Verdwaal I and
Verdwaal II) comprising the Shiela Project as well as
the Springbokpan, Matil stad and Polfontein Projects 
which strictly speaking ire separate projects but
also fall under the Shiela Primary Co-operative and
Noordwes management. For the purpose of this study, the
Springbokpan project will be dealt with as part of the
Shiela Project and will be discussed in more detail later 
m  this chapter. The Matilestad and Polfontein Projects 
are fairly small and recently established and will not 
be included in this study.
THE SPRINGBOKPAN PROJECT
This project was started in 1979 on the farms Springbokpan 
and Stiglingspaa, situated about 14 km south of Itsoseng town.
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With the commencement of the project a primary co-operative 
was established known as the Akanyang Primary Agricultural 
Co-operative.
The project was financed entirely by AGRICOR, but the 
Noordwes Kooperasie provided administrative, technical 
and management seirices as the appointed Management 
Agent there. There were 131 farmers, the majority of 
whom were allocated 10 ha. each, although a few received 5 ha. 
No contractor farmers were appointed, but tractor drivers were 
employed by the Akanyang Co-operative to provide a communal 
mechanical service to its members. (27)
During the 1980/81 season, 8 farmers withdrew to farm 
privately with their plots leaving 123 farmers who planted 
1 274 ha.of maize and 27 ha. of sunflower.
The Akanyang Primary Agricultural Co-operative was dissolved 
during 1982 and the project and its farmers joined the 
newly constituted Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-opera­
tive. (28) The main reason for this administrative reshuffle 
was the increasing dissatisfaction of the project management 
with the way in which the clerical staff and the management 
committee were conducting the affairs of the primary 
co-operative. The result has been an increasing centralisation 
of the administration of the various branches of the 
Shiela Project, branches such as the Springbokpan Project 
which were originally intended to be autonomous entities
■ill
i i a a e
addition 300 ha. of maize was planted for Chief Mangope on the 
farm Weltevreden during the 1979/8i season. (32)
Originally an expansion of 10 000 ha. was planned for the
1980/81 season. However, subsequent soil surveys by the De­
partment of Soil Science from the University of Potchefstroom, 
revealed that only 5 189 ha. of the planned expansion area was 
suitable for maize cultivation.
This expansion represented an enlargement of Naauwpoort/Groen- 
wal and Nooitgedacht/Vlakpan/Roosendal, as well as the 
inclusion of the farms Driehoek/Kapsteel, Makouspan, Rietfon- 
tein/Mooilaagte/Schoongezicht/Welverdiend, Louisdal/Siberia, 
Weltevrede, Mooipan, Doornlaagte.
Subsequent years have seen the enlargement of arable 
aieas on farms already included in the project until 1983 
when "the total area of high potential soils according to the 
pedological surveys, has been brought into production on the 
stateland farms in the District". (33) Future plans include 
the consolidation of existing farming systems to achieve high­
er potential production levels, albeit with more intensive 
mixed farming incorporating beef production. Certain 
farms also withdrew Frcm the project after 1981, namely 
Roosendal and Doornlaigte.
As was noted in Chapter 7, the most common size of arable 
.Land holdings was 8.56 ha. (10 morgen). Since the project's
f a r m
Brooksby
Mooifontein East (Central Unit)
Gelukspan
Kaalpan
Lombaardslaagte/Vrede 
Uitkyk
E n s e Isrus/Mooifontein W e s t /Goedgevonden/Sambalbroek 
Naauwpoort/Groenwa)
Nooitgedacht/Vlakpan/Part of Roosondal 
Driehoek/Kapstor 1 
Makouspan/Part of Roosendal
R i e t f o n t e i n /Mooilaagte/Schoongez icht/WeIverdlend
Louisdal/Siber ia 
Weltevrede 
Mooipan 
Doornlaagte
Roosendal (Up to 1980/81 )
President s Lands (Weltevrede)
S e o d i ’s Lands (Vrede)
19 h /tsJj o w ' ^
H E C T A - 9
1982/ 83
1 766 
650
TOTAL
INCREASE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR
1 766 
650 
1 233 
919 
1 794 
1 813 
774
2 4 16 8 919
6 50
1 766 
650 
1 357 
919 
1 794 
1 813 
1 547 
1 968 
1 867
13 68 
4 76
1 V t, u 1 7 56 1 766
650 650 650
1 35 7 1 377 1 377
919 1 123 1 123
1 794 1 763 1 763
1 813 1 800 1 550
1 547 1 547 1 547 i
2 169 1 778 2 300
2 246 2 600 2 600
922 1 133 1 133
1 495 2 100 2 100
191 1 305 1 605
805 1 3 50 1 350
205 765 765
784 877 877
341 0
286
224 224
210 210
18 870 22 368 22 940
5 189 3 4 98 572
Reproduced from Pretorius (1983)
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development, all participants have been allocated 15 
ha. allotments. The increase in the size of arable land has 
necessitated certain costs such as soil surveys, bush clearing, 
land surveys, fencing and water development. As the project 
is on s t ate land, the cost for these infrastructural deve­
lopments was redeemable from the Government. Agricultural De­
velopment Fund as a subsidy and was not charged to the far­
mers .
THE PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVES AS TEMISANO UNITS
When the Mooifontein Project was started in 1977 by the 
Tswana Agricultural Company (to be discussed in more 
detail in the following section) a system of contractor far­
mers similar to that operating on the Shiela Project 
was introduced.
Each selected contractor farmer received a "mechanisation 
package" comprising a 55 kilowatt tractor, a plough, 
an Ox f set discharrow, a planter and a trailer and was respon- 
sable for the cultivation of a 150 ha. block subdivided into 
15 ha. farming plots, the rest going to eight other farmers 
to whom he provided a service under project management 
guidance.
However, the contractors were only selected in the second year 
of operation. During the first year they were employed 
by the management agent as drivers. This allowed for 
in-service training and an evaluation process. Af*-er
•v
the first year the drivers were allowed to make an application 
to the secondary co-operative to become contractors.
Each applicant was evaluated by the Co-operative together with 
the Bophtthatswana Department of Agriculture and the 
Regional Authority who made recommendations to the management 
agent. Successful applicants were then bound by formal con­
tract to provide services to eight other farmers. This 
had to be done to the satisfaction of the Ditsobotl,
secondary Co-operative's management committee or the 
machinery unit could be withdrawn.
The contractors were expected to pay off their machinery
unit over a five year period. However, as dissatisfaction 
with their services grew, the machinery was withdrawn
in 1982 by the Primary Co-operatives, who then employed dri­
vers to operate the machinery at hire-charges to the 
farmers. The Contractor system was thus completely done a.ay 
with on the Mooifontein Project.
The dissatisfaction with contractors related particularly 
to the efficiency of weed control. ,34, The ARDRI team re-
cieved the following complaints:
‘S  - ' S  concentrate ton^ their11 own
Other respondents were unhappy about the lack of consultation 
between farmers and contractors.
The system that now operates on the Mooifontein Project is 
one where axl machinery is owned by the 14 primary co-opera­
tives. Each primary co-operative hires tractor drivers to do 
tne ploughing, cultivation and harvesting for its members, 
the costs being deducted from their seasonal account.
The management committee of each primary co-operative is 
elected on a yearly basis and it is responsible for
choosing. in consultation with the project management,
the tractor drivers. The number of drivers for each co-opera­
tive varies depending on the numoer of farmers belonging 
to it. T.iere is usually one driver for every ten project 
participants, each driver working, as did the contractors
before them, an average of 150 ha.
This system, where the primary co-operatives own most 
cf the agricultural machinery (tractors, implements, transport, 
combine harvesters, etc.) is one of the few aspects of 
the Israeli Moshav system that has actually been implemented 
on the Ditsobotla Projects. In Chapter 6, we saw that 
under the Moshav system the co-operative owns the larger 
machinery such as combine harvesters, trailers, large 
tractors, etc., which it .ires out to the individual
farmer members. Some of the machinery is operated by 
the farmer himself, while others are operated by drivers 
hired by the co-operative. On the Mooifontein Project it 
is not possible for the individual project participants to 
hire and operate the machinery; it can only be operated
.. r
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by salaried drivers employed directly by the co-operative,
The ownership of agricultural machinery by the primary co­
operatives and the cultivation of the project participants' 
land by drivers/operators employed by the co-operative 
rather than by private contractors, while seeming to 
introduce elements of the Moshav system, and therefore by 
associatio , elements of TEMISANO, in fact represents a 
further attempt to centralise and control the production 
process. The drivers employed by the primary co-operatives 
in effect fall directly under the control of the CED managers 
seconded to the project as each project manager is in 
charge of a primary co-operative and the cultivation 
of its members' lands. (35)
8
At present the 14 primary co-operatives farming the Mooifon- 
tein Project are still fully-fledged co-operatives, <_ach 
with its own management committee. As has been mentioned, each 
primary co-operative (sometimes two), is under the control of 
a seconded project manager as well as an AGRICOR-trained 
"section managerM. All 14 of the Mooifontein Primary Co-opera­
tives, along with the Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative, 
are members of the Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative, which 
is primarily responsible for the marketing of its member 
co-opt natives produce. However, it must be understood that 
the Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative is physically situated 
on the Mooifontein Project (on Mooifontein farm) and 
Is more directly involved in the control and administration
tr. z z. /
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of the affairs of the Mooifontein Project, especially the 
projects 14 primary co-operatives. Althougn each primary 
co-operative on the Mooifontein Project has its own management 
committee, a central co-ordinating management committee 
is located within the Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative, 
and is known as the Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative 
Management Committee.
-sr
An explanation of the location of the respective management 
agents (as opposed to the locally elected management 
committees) of the two projects, that is Shiela and Mooifon­
tein Projects, will further serve to clarify the situation. 
While the Shiela Project Management (seconded from Noordwes 
Kooperasie) is located within the physical and administrative 
confines of the Shi a la Primary Agricultural Co-operative, 
^he Mooifontein Project management (until recently seconded 
from the CED) is located within the confines of the Ditsobotla 
Secondary Co-operative. Both the Ditsobotla Secondary 
Co-operative and the management agents for the Mooifontein 
Project are discussed in more detail below.
As was mentioned in Chapter 6, the efforts of AGRICOR1s 
Community Development section has recently extended onto
the Mooifonte in Project after initially concentrating
solely on the Shiela Project. But as with the Shiela 
Project, the Mooifontein Project remains essentially 
a highly centralised production orientated, scheme with
very little involvement of the project participants in 1
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either the production or decision-making process. The 
non-involvement of the project participants will become 
clearer in Chapter 10, when the results of the questionnaire 
surv- conducted amongst them, is discussed.
In the next section of this chapter the role of the Ditsobotla 
Secondary Co-operative is examined.
THE DITSOBOTLA SECONDARY CO-OPERATIVE
The Ditsobotla Secondary Agricultural Co-operative (D.S.A 
Co-operative), through its management Committee, is the 
body responsible for the Mooifontein Project. As with the 
Shiela Primary Co-operative management committee it is 
not clear to what extent this responsibility is excercised 
in practice. The Project is run along highly centralised 
lines by the management agent.
The D.S.A Co-operative was established in the early 1970' s 
by the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). It provided 
marketing and limited credit facilities to the surrounding 
primary co-operatives. (36) Since 1977 most of the D.S.A. Co­
operatives' administrative functions have been run by seconded 
Corporation for Economic Development (CED) personnel. 
As the seconded CED staff have also been the management 
agents for the Mooifontein Project, it is difficult to 
separate the functions of the D.S.A. Co-operative and 
the management agents .
The fallowing fourteen Prirrary Agricultural Co-operatives are 
sffiliated to the D.S.B. Co-op. and their farming members 
receive assistance from the scheme including an organised 
Accountancy System for each farmer:-
Name of Primary 
Agricultural Co-op
N<_ of 
Farmers
Stadt where 
Situated
Names of Stateland Farms 
Associated with Co-op.
Itireleng 83 Bethel ■ Rietfontein
Maikutlo 128 Makouspan Makouspan, Rossendal
Naauwpoort 127 Naauwpoort Naauwpoort, Groenwal
Ipopeng 83 Uitkyk Uitkyk, Sambalbroek,
Goedgewonden
Enselsrust 117 Enselsrust Enselsrust, Mooifontein
West
Louisdal 91 Louisdal Louisdal, Siberia
M&khubung 145 Mooipan Mooipan, Weltevrede,
Dcornlaagte
Makgalwane 143 Nooit gedacht Nooitgedacht, Vlakpan
Bapong 52 Gelukspan Gel"kspan
Lombaardslaagte 80 Lombaards- Lombaardslaagte, Vrede
laagte
T1hatlhogang 80 Brooksby Brooksby
Kealpan 40 Kaalpan Kaalpan
Driehoek 79 Dr iehoek Dr iehoek, Kapsteel
Naledi ±16 Schoonge- |Schoongez icht, Nooitge­
zicht dacht , Welverdiend
TOTAL 1264
-y
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Table on previous page reproduced from Pretorius (1983).
The D.S.A. Co-operative does not only serve the Shiela 
and Mooifontein projects. Membership of the D.S.A. Co-operative 
consists of 23 primary co-operatives, of which 14 are 
participating in the Mooifontein TEMISANO Project.
In the next section of this chapter the different management 
agents, which have been involved in the management of the 
Mooifontein Project, are discussed.
MANAGEMENT AGENTS INVOLVED IN THE MOOIFONTEIN PROJECT
It will be remembered that when the Mooifontein Project 
commenced in 1977, the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture 
was still ii control f Agricultural projects in Bophuthatswana. 
AGRICOR was only established in the following year (1978), 
when it took over all agricultural projects from the Department 
of Agriculture. When the Mooifontein Project was started, 
the Department of Agriculture appointed the Tswana Agricultural 
Company (T.A.C.), also referred to as the Tswana Landbou 
Maatskappy (T.L.M.), as the management agent.
I
The T.A.C. was jointly owned and financed by the Corporation 
for Economic Development (CED) and the Bophuthatswana 
National Development Corporation (BNDC). It was staffed 
by seconded CED personnel and responsible to that body 
for the finance, technical and management services for 
the project.
During 1981, the T.A.C. was dissolved and withdrawn as 
management agents from all the projects with which it 
was involved in Bophuthatswana and was directly replaced 
as such by the CED. AGRICOR took over the investment interests
of the BN DC and started to second its college-trained
assistant management personnel to the scheme (37) (Known as
"section managers"). In 1983 AGRICOR terminated its management 
agreement with the CED for the Mooif ontein Project. All CED
seconded personnel on the project were given the choice
of joining AGRICOR as permanent staff or of leavino if 
they wished to remain with the CED.
The management structure of the project has not changed 
much since the management agreement with the CED was terminated. 
Under the CED the general manager was assisted by four 
managers responsible for the sections of technical production, 
grain marketing, workshops and administration. It is clear 
from this structure that the functions of the Ditsobotla 
Secondary C c - operative and the management agents are strongly 
intertwined.
The production manager is in charge of the numerous project 
managers who are each responsible for a production unit 
and a primary co-operative. Each project manager is assisted 
by an AGRICOR trained section manager who is supposed 
to replace the seconded project manager after a period 
of on-the-job training. A few of the black section managers 
have been promoted to project managers but the majority
/:
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As we shall see in the next chapter this has led to a 
situation where none of the participants know what inputs 
are put into their specific 15 ha. plot. The uncertainty about 
inputs has been compounded by the fact that in many areas 
of the project individual allotments were not marked out, 
the lands being farmed as a whole for each primary co­
operative. The lack of control over and knowledge about 
the production inputs is one of the main reasons for the 
discontent of the project participants with the way the 
project has developed. This will become clearer in Chapter 
9 and 10.
have tended to fall into a role of messenger between the 
primary jo-operative management committee and the white 
management.
The project and section managers work closely with the
t^sctor drivers and the clerk attached to each primary
co-operative, supervising the ploughing, planting, fertiliza­
tion, weed and pest control as well as the harvesting
at the end of each season. The primary co-operative clerk
is primarily responsible for keeping a record of costs
incurred in the name of each individual farmer, although
in practice the costs of each production unit are calculated
as a whole and merely divided equally between each project
participant.
t/  s  -'
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have examined the development and structure 
of the Shiela and Mooifontein Projects, Bophuthatswana's 
two major capital intensive dryland maize projects. We 
saw that the development of these projects was accompanied 
by a brief struggle between the Department of Agriculture 
(Bophuthatswana) and AGRIC3R, before the latter institution 
established the dominance of the capital intensive, production 
orientated project approach as a blueprint for a long-term 
rural development strategy.
The Shiela Project, which has become AGRICOR's "model" 
project, was established in 197 6 and has subsequently 
been developed under the management of the Noordwestelike 
Kobperatiewe Landbou-maatskappy, Beperk. The project partici­
pants' lands are cultivated by contractor farmers, who 
were initially financed by Noordwes Kobperas ie in order 
to acquire a mechanical package. The contractor farmers 
are the only group on the Ditsobotla Projects who, albeit 
on a very precarious basis, have any chance of developing 
into semi-independent private farmers.
%
The Shiela Project has been characterised k , increasing 
administrative centralisation, which has in practice meant 
the amalgamation of all the primary co-operatives on the 
project into the Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative. The 
centralised administration and management of the project has
tz ^ :
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meant that the participants , as well as their management
committee, have had very little say the organisation
of the project.
The Mooifcntein Dryland maize project, the largest of
its kind in Southern Africa, was established in 1977 and 
has been, until recently, developed under the management 
of the CED. Since the 1983/84 season AGRICOR has replaced 
the CED as the management agent of the project with its 
own staff. The project participants' lands are cultivated 
by drivers and machinery employed by the 14 primary co­
operatives which make up the project. The drivers employed 
by the co-operatives are directly under the control and 
supervision of the project management.
The Mooifontein Project is centrally administered from 
tne Ditsobotla Secondary Co-operative, which also provides 
secondary co-operative services to the projects' primary 
co-operatives as well as to the Shiela Primary Agricultural 
Co-operative. The elected management committee for the
project, as well as the individual primary co-operative 
management committees (many of which exist in name only) 
appear to have very little say in the running of the project.
Most decisions are made directly by the project management
without consultation with the project participants. The
next two chapters, especially Chapter 10, will make this 
point clear.
r".
Given the above-mentioned conditions on the projects
it would appear that AGRICOR1s rural development strategy, 
which it has marketed for public consumption as "TEMISANO", 
consists of little more than highly centralised, production 
orientated projects with an added community development 
appendage. As will be practically demonstrated in the 
next two chapters, not only are the project participants 
financially in a worse position than before the projects 
were implemented, but the central element of anything 
vaguely resembling rural development, the active involvement 
of the people in the decision making and production process, 
would seem to be non-existent.
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C H A P  T E R 9
E C O N O M I C  C O S T S  AND B E N E F I T S  OF THE P R O J E C T S
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Of the R6 7 -million that AGRICOR had invested or provided
as loans to agricultural projects by the end of the 1983/84
season, R32.75 million was spent on the Ditsobotla projects 
in an attempt to boost both the production of maize and
the image of Bophuthatswana as a self-sufficient producer
of its basic foodstuff.d) This vast sum of state money
has not been enough to ensure the success of this enterprise.
The increased production of maize has been procurred
at the expense cl the approximately 1700 project participants 
who have provided their land for the project management 
to farm along highly capital intensive lines, the vast
debts incurred in the process being passed on to the
project participants through their primary co-operatives.
This chapter shews conclusively uhat AGRICOR and its
management agents had very little intention for the Mcoifontein 
and Sheila projects to provide adequate incomes for the 
participants. Using AGRICOR's own figures for the planned 
expenditure and income for new areas being incorporated
into the projects, it is clear that the participants
would end up in a worse position than they were in before.
In reality the situation has been even worse. The majority 
of tie participants have been earning negative incomes
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and are now in a great deal of debt which they have very 
little hope of paying back.
As has been mentioned before, there is very little chance 
of earning a living wage from 15 ha. of dryland maize farming. 
Because of the nopoless overcrowding in the rural areas, 
AGRICOR's attempts to work within the confines of the 
Bantustan policy has led it into a 'batch 22" situation; 
an increase in the size of individual arable allotments 
will lead to increasing landlessness and an increasing 
dependence of the majority on the migrant labour system.
THE 1 9 9 -  60 MJOI FONTEI N INCORPORATION AS A CASE STUDY
The incorporation of the Naauwpoort/Nooitgedacht farms 
into the Mooifontein Project during the 1979-80 season, 
provides a good example of how project finance is utilised. 
The details of the expansion programme are documented 
in a study prepared by the Planning and Development Division 
of AGRICOR. (2) All prices in the case study are for 
the 1979-80 season except where otherwise specified.
The Corporation for Economic Development was appointed 
by AGRICOR to do a feasibility study on the farms Naauw­
poort and Nooitgedacht. The Pedalogical Institute of 
Potchefstroom University identified 4500 ha. as suitable 
for maize production. AGRICOR and the Corporation for
Economic Development provided the finance and the Tswana 
Agricultural Company was appointed as the management
XT
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agent
The two farms Naauwpoort and Nooitgedacht were of a sufficient 
size for them to be developed as a self-contained unit. 
The following capital items, including the mechanisation 
packages for the tractors were purchased: (3 !
ITEMS NUMBER PRICE!RANDS) TOTAL
Tractors 30 11 000 333 000
P.l enters 30 3 500 105 000
Ploughs 30 700 21 000
Offset discs ou 1 500 45 000
Trailer 17 4 000 68 000
Cultivators 30 400 12 000
581 000
Vehicles 2 4 000 8 000
Motorcycles 2 1 000 2 000
Housing 2 42 000 84 000
Shed 15 000
Workshop and office 3 600
Water and electricity 2 200
Harvesters 4 62 4 30 249 720
364 520
TOTAL 945 520
m a n a g e m e n t  c o s t s
A l t h o u g h  the farms f o r m i n g  p a r t  of the e x p a n s i o n  are 
o p e r a t e d  as a s e p a r a t e  unit, the t w o  s e c o n d e d  p r o j e c t  
m a n a g e r s  are d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  to the p r o d u c t i o n  m a n a g e r  
of the M o o i f o n t e i n  Project. A C l e r k  a n d  an E x t e n s i o n  
O f f i c e r  f r o m  the B o p h u t h a t s w a n a  D e p a r t m e n t  of A g r i c u l u r e  
we r e  a l s o  a p p o i n t e d  to the n e w  unit.
The v a r i o u s  e x p e n s e s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  the m a n a g e m e n t  are 
a l l o c a t e d  to the f a r m e r s  as an o v e r h e a d  cost. (<) I n c l u d e d  
in t h e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  costs are the f o l l o w i n g :
S a l a r i e s
Depreciation and repairs 
Vehicle and Motorcycle costs 
Administration costs
R24 600 
6 044 
6 680 
3 600
4 0 924
Over and above the direct costs of management, the farmer 
also has to pay a management fee and interest charges. 
The management fee is based on 2« of the gross income 
received from the project. (5) The 2* is designed to 
cover the management agents fee i 1«) as well as that 
of the finances/developer fill, which in this case wouid 
be the CED and AGRICOR. Interest is calculated at 5i 
on capital invested (tractor package excluded) and operating 
capital for production inputs.(6) Interest was always
calculated at 5« at that time (9* at present) as the 
difference between 5i and bankrates are subsidised by
/ ^  
r*
>:
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the Bophuthatswana administration 
government.
or the South African
/
The interest costs were as follows for the first year:(7)
A
on capital invested 
on production costs 
on overhead management costs
TOTAL
18 226 
20 475 
1 023
39 724
I
x
-Jr
TRAINING
According to the AGRIC'OR study on the Naauwpoort/Nooitgedacht 
expansion,(8) a training programme is supposed to operate 
on the projects. The training programme involves co­
operative management committees, the seconded white management 
("race relations"), as well as the individual project 
participants. Training for the project participants
consists of:
tractor and implement training.
general crop training by various experts.
general co-operative training for farmers.
To help towards the payment of these training expenses, 
it was proposed that C ,5% of the total income received 
by the farmer should be contributed icwards the training. 
The total tiaining for the Naauwpoorc/Nooitgedacht unit 
was R5 400 for the first year.
Total levies paid by the 232 farmers are therefore as 
follows:
Overhead management expenses 40 924
Overhead management fee 22 950
Interest 39 724
Training fee 3 4 00
108 998
THE SITUATION Of THE P R O J E C T  P A R T I C I P A N T S
The production costs (ie. the cost of agricultural inputs) 
for each project participant can best be demonstrated 
on a ha. basis. As production costs are calculated for 
the unit (Naauwpoort/Nooitgedacht farms) as a whole, 
these prices represent average costs per farmer:(9)
-----— --------------------------
ITEMS R/ha.
Seed 7
fertilizer 57
herbicides 3
pest control 6
labour 7
transport 10
tractor and implement costs 75
harvest costs 17
TOTAL 182
Project participant input costs per he.
The AGRICOR study took a yield of 2.4 tons per ha. as 
the average yield for the Mooifontein project. The average
4'
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price of maize for that year was R100 per ton. Thus
the total income received per ha. was F.240.00 ( 2.4 tons 
at 100 per ton).
From the total income of R240.00 per ha., the production 
costs of R 182 .00 are subtracted leaving a gross margin 
per ha. of R58.00. Further:
gross margin per ha.
" ----- - —  ■’
58.00
LESS-
overhead management expenses per ha. 9.00
overhead management fees per ha. 5.00
interest per ha. 9.00
training fee per ha. 1.20
Nett income per ha. 33.80
Nett income per 15 ha.
allotment 507.00
Gross marain less overheads
In the second year the contractors fee would further 
lower the nett income per ha. by R4.00 to R29.00 per
ha. The contractor system was discontinued in 1982 on
the Mooifontein project but is still in operation on 
the Sheila project. For the first few years farmers
had to pay an additional R22.00 per ha. for phosphates 
as well, further reducing the nett income to R7.00 per
ha.
/ z'
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THE SITUATION OF THE CONTRACTOR
The contractors have to pay a further R9.57 per ha. for 
6 years as repayment on the tractor and implements.
THE SITUATION OF THE DEVELOPER
The financial reauirements for the Mocifontein Project
expansion on the Naauwpoort and Nooitgedacht farms were
as follows:
Capital investment 945 520
Production Inputs 819 000
Overhead management costs 40 924
Overhead management fee 22 950
R1 828 394
Based on the 5% interest rate the following returns on
investment were realised. In the case of production
and overhead management costs the interest ret urns applied
to six months: (10)
Capital 47 276
Production inputs 20 475
Overhead inputs 1 023
R 68 774
The redemption of the loans varied according to the conditions 
under which they were obtained. In the example above 
(Naauwpoort/Nooitgedacht) the repayment of the mechanised 
packages was over a period of 6 years for tractors and
i
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10 years for implements. The emamder of the capital 
items were to be repaid as follows: (11)
ITEMS PURCHASE PRICE
(R)
REPAYMENT 
PERIOD (YEARS)
REPAYMENT 
RATE (R )
Harvesters 249 720 6 41 620
Vehicles 8 000 4 2 000
Motorcycles 2 000 3 667
Hous ing 84 000 30 2 800
Shed 15 000 30 500
Workshop and
Off ice 3 600 30 120
Water and
Electricity 2 200 30 73 , ..
TOTAL 364 520
!
47 780
COSTS OF BENEFITS?
It must be borne in mind that the figures used in the
study on Naauwpoort and Nooitgedacht represent an ideal
situation as envisaged by the AGRICOR Planning and Development 
Division. In reality the situation has often been worse. 
The average yield for the Mooifontein Project over the
six years of its existence ( 1978-84) is 1.5 tons per
ha.,(12) which is considerably less than the 2.4 tons
per ha. in the above stud}. The Sheila Project, however, 
is closer to the South African maize triangle and has
an average yield of 2.15 tons per ha. over the eight
years of its existence.
i
z  z. • 
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The f o l l o w i n g , for e x a m p l e , are the actual nett incomes 
for the M o o i f o n u e i n  P r o j e c t  over the three years from 
1981. N e g a t i v e  a m ounts are s hown in brackets: (13)
per ha per 15 ha.
1980 - 81 60 - 81 912 - 15
1981 - 82 ( 172 - 36) (2585 - 40)
1982 - 83 ( 182 - 04 ) (27 30 - 60) 
..
An i m p o r t a n *  part of the e v a l u a t i o n  of development projects 
s u c h  as M o o i f o n t e i n  and S h e i l a  is an assessment of the 
d e g r e e  of a t t a i n m e n t  of o b j e c t i v e s . However, it is important 
to aIs o e x a m i n e  the o b j e c t i v e s  themselves and to compare 
t h e n  to the s i t u a t i o n  e x i s t i n g  before the implementation 
of the p r o j e c t s  .
The o b j e c t i v e s  of the A G R I C O R  Planning and Development 
D i v i s i o n  for the N a a u w p o o r t /Nooitgedacht unit, as has 
b e e n  d e m o n s t r a t e d  a o o v e , was for p.p. to earn R7.00 per 
ha. for the first few years until the phosphate content 
was s u f f i c i e n t l y  high, and after that an amount of R21.00 
p e r  h a .
This amou n t  mus t  be c o m p a r e d  to the nett income per ha. 
that f a r m e r s  in the D i t s o b o t l a  district w e r e  e a r n i n g  
b e f o r e  the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the A G R I C O R  projects:
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AGRICOR project (including phosphates ) 
AGRICOR project (excluding phosphates ) 
Ditsobotla farmers pre-project
R 7 .00 per ha. 
R29.00 per ha.
R40.89 per ha.(14)
Comparison of project and pre-project net income per 
ha .
I A
It is clear from the above table that AGRICOR1s priority 
was not to improve the lot of the individual project 
participants. On the contrary, it would appear that 
the planners of the capital intensive agricultural projects 
are willing to decrease the nett income per ha. as long 
as the end result of increased maize production is achieved. 
This would seem to support the earlier hypothesis that 
these type of projects were introduced primarily for 
political reasons, to boost in the eyes of the world, 
the economies of the "independent" homelands.
In a marginal maize area such as the Ditsobotla region 
"maximum profits are closely allied to the settir.r of 
realistic target yields that can be acnieved in a high 
proportion of seasons".(15) As the variability of the 
rainfall in the Ditsobotla region is a major factor to 
be considered in the determination of the yield potential,(16) 
it is essential to lock at" the potential yield over a 
number of years rather than for one good year as AGRICOP 
has tended to do. (17) The following tables show the production 
statistics for the Kooifontein and Sheila Projects since 
their inception:(18)
MOOIFONTEIN PROJECT
MAIZE
SEASON HECTARES AVERAGE TONS Per ha.
1978/79 7306 2,0
1979/80 13290 2,3
1980/81 19179 3,4
1981/82 21339 1,0
1982/83 22416 0,5
1983/84 21671 Crop failure
. .....
Average 1.5
SHEILA PROJECT
MAIZE
SEASON HECTARES AVERAGE TONS Per ha.
1976/77 3426 1,7
1977/78 3621 1,8
1978/79 3635 2,7
1979 /80 5061 3,3
1980/81 4902 4,2
1981/82 6511 2,0
1982/83 6511 1,5
1983/84 6511 Crop failure
Average 2.15
It must be stressed that drought is not an unusual phenomena 
in the Ditsobotla region. It i? clear that a potential 
yield estimated over a number of years which takes into 
consideration the probability of bad, average, good and 
excellent year in terms of rainfall, will give a more 
realistic idea of yield possibilities. After consultation 
with farmers in the Lichtenburg district and consultation 
of historical sources,(19) the following pattern emerged
for an average ten year cycle:
1 bad year
4 poor to average years
3 good to average years
2 excellent years
If the average yields for the Mooifontein and Sheila 
Projects are combined (1.5 and 2.15 tons per ha.) a total
average of 1.64 tons per ha. is obtained.(20) At the
1979/80 price of R100 per ton of maize, a yield of 1.64
tons would give each project participant a total income 
of R2460 per 15 ha. allotment. After the total average 
costs for Mooifontein and Sheila Projects for 1979/80
are subtracted the following picture emerges:
Total income for 15 ha. R2 4 60-00
Total income per ha. 164-00
Total average costs per ha. for -
Mooifontein and Sheila Projects (21) 232-99
Nett income (69-99)
Nett income per 15 ha. ( 1049-35)
Negative amounts (losses) shown in brackets.
As we have seen, in terms of AGRICOR's projected figures 
in the plans for expansion of the Ditsobotla Projects, 
the participants would end up in a financially worse 
position than they were in before. From the above table
it is obvious that in reality the situation has been 
far worse. Taken as a whole, the project participants
on the Ditsobotla Projects have beer. los m g  an average
of R69-99 per ha. a year as opposed to the R40.89 per
ha. they were making on average before the implementation 
of the projects .
Because of the losses incurred by the project participants, 
the management has been forced to give them a guaranteed
amount of maize in kind for their own consumption. On 
Mocif onte in this has amounted to 30 bags (2.7 tons) per 
year and on Sheila a lesser amount of 1.5 tons per year.
The average Iocs of R1049.85 per farmer per year (at
1979/80 prices ) would therefore give the Naauwpoort 'Nooitge-
dacht project participant a total accumulated debt ever 
five years of R6972.39 (adjusted for inflation to 1984 
prices ) . Project participants who have been incorporated
into the projects for longer (for example the Sheila 
farmers who have been in since the 1976/77 season) will 
obviously have proportionately higher accumulated debts. 
It must be stressed that the above figures represent
averages. In reality debts vary enormously. In many 
cases project participants owe over R15,000 . (See appendix
C, i-iii for an example of debts owed by one farmer by 
the end of 1983).
The following table shows more clearly the differences
between Mooif onte in and Sheila Projects; all figures
are at 1979/BO prices for sake of comparison. The pre­
project figures have been converted to 15 ha. arable 
allotments also for sake of comparison:
Nett income 
per ha.
Nett income 
per 15 ha.
Pre-project Ditsobotla area R 40-89 R 613-35
Mooifontein Project R( 83-99 ) R ( 1259-85)
Sheila Project R (16-99 ) (284-85)
Ditsobotla Projects average R(69-99) R ( 1049-85 )
Negative amounts shown in bracket? .
AGRICOR's stated aim is to give each project participant
a nett income of between R3C00 and R5000 a year.(22) 
This represents the amount calculated by AGRICOR, needed
to keep a fulltime farmer on the land. It is qu:'te clear,
that with present inputs as high as they are, this is
going to be an extremely difficult, if not impossible,
task to accomplish, especially on 15 ha. allotments
The question of inputs, especially fertilization, is 
a question that is receiving much attention in South
Africa today. To quote Berrbridge et al.:
"As the fertilizer costs may constitute as much 
as 60% of the variable production costs for
maize, the level of fertilizer applied can be 
of cardinal importance in the establishment 
of realistic target yields."(23)
What this means in practice is that if a farmer fertilizes 
for a yield of 5 tons per ha. and he achieves a yield
of 1.5 tons per ha., he will have spent an excess of 
R103,71 per ha.(24 j The achievement of a low yield can 
be due to a variety of reasons such as drought, rain
not falling during vital stages of growth (anthesis and 
kernel filling), rainfall occuring in localised patches, 
time of planting, not achieving an acceptable stand of 
plants, efficiency of weed control and the occurence 
of theft.
As the Ditsobotla region is prone to all of the above
problems, especially variability of rainfall, it is clear 
that over - capitalisation is one of the main reasons why 
the total amount spent on inputs at Mooifontein and Sheila
often exceeds gross income.
For example during the 1981-82 season the management 
of the Sheila project spent R81-65 per ha. on ordinary 
fertilizer (excluding phosphates). This represents a
fertilization programme aimed at a yield of between 3.5 
and 4 tons per ha. As a yieid of only 2.04 tons per
ha. was achieved at the end of that season this represents
a waste of approximately R52-00 per ha. or R775-00 per
15 ha. (at 1981 prices).
It seems as if AGRlCOR's major investor, the Foreign 
Affairs Department of South Africa, is aware of the problem 
of over-capital isat ion as it ha 3 requested AGRICOR to
calculate production costs for new projects in the a?ea
on yields of 2.4 tons per ha. and to reduce the fertilization
z/
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programme "to be closer to the real potential of the
area."(25) This has in fact been done and AGRICOR is 
planning a project for the western sub-region of Ditsobotla 
where farmers would receive 7lha. to achieve a yearly
income of R5000. If mixed with groundnuts (3 years maize,
1 year groundnuts) 55 ha. is needed. Also "the approach 
of 1 reduced physical inputs', applicable to a marginal 
are, has been adopted so as to create a realistic balance
between inputs and outputs".(26)
What are the implications of the negative or very low
nett incomes achieved on the projects so far? It is
increasingly obvious that 15 ha. arable allotments in
a marginal maize growing area, where drought is the rule 
rather than the exception, are unable to support the 
capital intensive production techniques and the cost 
of the management infrastructure as well as to provide the 
project participants with an equitable (or supplementary) 
income .
AGRICOR and its management agents may have succeeded 
in the political objective uf producing, in years of
"normal" rainfall, more maize than before the implementation 
of the projects. But the main effect of AGRICOR's actions 
has been to promote the extension and intensification 
of commodity relations in conditions where it might not 
have been immediately profitable for productive and finance 
capital to do so.(27) AGRICOR and its management agents, 
with the help of state and private capital, have created
a R7 million a year ; 28) market in agricultural inputs 
for multi-national agribusiness on tne Ditsobotla projects 
alone.
The project participants have not been so fortunate.
As the last people in a vast chain of aopropriation,
their incomes have actually declined. As Bernstein puts
it:
"As far as rural development programmes are concerned, 
these objectively operate to incorporate the 
peasantry further into commodity relations,
and attempt to standardise and rationalize peasant 
production of commodities for the domestic and
international market ....  The more commodity
relations and the acquisition of cash income 
become conditions of reproduction, then shortfalls 
in production and/or income can lead to a cycle 
of indebtedness."(29)
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, AGRICOR has 
succeeded in putting the vast majority if the project 
participants into thousi nds of rands of debt which they 
have very little chance of ever paying back. The indebtedness 
of participants makes it extremely difficult for them 
to leave the project as they are legally bound, through 
their co-ope' .tives, to pay their debts.
In an atter.pt to remedy the cc tinued failure of th- 
existing Ditsobotla Projects to provide the participants 
with an adequate income, AGRICOR, as has been mentioned, 
now has plans to scale down certain incuts and provide 
each farmer with 71 ha. to achieve an income of R5000 
a year. If the problem of land tenure was overcome and 
these new plans were to be implemented in the Ditsobotla
region (for example), it would mean that far fewer farmers 
could be accommodated on the existing arable land than 
would have been the case had the 15 ha. allotments been 
a feasible idea.
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE DITSOBOTLA REGION.
Apart from a few civil service jobs, a few small businesses, 
and the Thusang and Gelukspan Hospital, the rural areas 
of Ditsobotla, developed to its maximum potential, will 
be dependent on three main sources for employment:
1. Arable farming:
70 000 ha. of high potential land has been identified 
as suitable for dryland summergrain crops, particu­
larly maize in the Ditsobotla district. If each 
farmer receives 71 ha. it means that 986 farmer/fami­
lies can be accommodated in fulltime crop farming.
2. Livestock farming:
Potgieter (1J80) calculated that under optimal 
conditions, 27 000 livestock units can be kept
on the remaining 166 000 ha. of land not suitable
for cropping. This gives a further 90-100 cattle 
farmers an income of R3,500 per annum at 1979 
prices (P5262 in 1983).(30)
3. Agro-industries :
z z
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lie in the establishment of agro-industries. 
AGRICOR has appointed an Israeli consultant to 
investigate the setting - up of industries in the 
rural areas of Bophuthauswana. These rural indus­
tries will not be solely agro-related, but will 
also include, it is hoped, other types of secondary 
industry. This "integrated rural development"
approach has its roots in the Israeli experience,
where many of the Kibutz im, and to a lesser
extent the Moshavim, have come to rely for the
major portion of their employment absorbt ion 
and income generation on agro-industry. According 
to Y.Abt of Israeli Settlement Study Centre in 
Rehovot, "The need to develop secondary and tertiary 
sectors is essential, recognising that economic
growth implies a relative decrease of those employed 
in agriculture and therefore necessitates taking 
up the slack, in services and industries."(31)
The Bophuthatswana Administration has decided in principle 
that a new district centre for Ditsobotla should be developed 
on the farm Deelpan. In order to establish a viable 
settlement "it is clearly important that the necessary
labour opportune s are created to attract people to
settle in and around the centre".(32) AGRJCOR has commi­
ssioned the Corporation for Economic Development to do 
an intensive feasability study on the possibility of 
establishing agro-industries at the proposed district 
centre. As the study is confidential, it is not possible
to give any details. What is relevant however, is that
if the suggestions are implemented it woulu create only 
433 basic job opportunities . This figure does not include 
non-basic jobs or jobs created by way of forward or backward 
linkages or ripple effects but gives a fair idea of the 
difficulties of establishing industry in remote rural 
areas far away from the main market centres.
To sum up briefly:
arable farming 986 families
livestock farming 100 families
agro-industries 483 families
TOTAL 1569 families
This means 1569 households will have access to definite 
employment in the rural areas of Ditsobotla.
The population of Ditsobotla will be in the region of 
148 000 by the end of 1984: (33)
1984 Ditsobotla total population 148 000
Less :
Itsoseng (Town) 27 745
Atamelang (Town) 7 582
Rural inhabitants of Ditsobotla 112 673
At 6.84 perso- per household 112,673 people equal 16,473 
households. From the 16,473 rural households we must
subtract the number of rural households able to find 
employment in the rural areas:
Total rural households 16 473
Less :
Those able to find employment 1 569
Those with no access to employment 14 904
i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The 14 224 households represent 69% of the rural households, 
which are, under optimal conditions of development, 
unable to survive in the rural areas of Ditsobotla without 
having to resort to migrancy. It is important to bear 
in mind that this region is considered to be one of the
better areas in terms of agricultural potential and that
many other areas of Bophuthatswana are less centrally 
situated and even more arid.
The situation of too many people and too few employment
opportunities is being exacerbated by the natural population
growth of the area (It will double in 24 years at present 
growth rates)(34) as well as tne South African states 
determination to continue to relocate people from the 
urban centers of South Africa. The number of unemployed 
are also increasing because of the movement of people 
off white farms because of increasing mechanization in 
maize farming in the Western Transvaal.
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Vshat has been demonstrated m  this chapter in practical
terms has been said by many others since the turn of
the century. As a departmental report mentioned in 1936:
It is unfortunate that many of the farms purchased 
by the Trust inside the released areas are over­
populated before purchase..."
and
"In most of le Native Reserves in the northern
areas dryland arable farming is no more than
a gamble. In recent years with the increase
in population the land has become smaller and
smaller..."(35)
In the 1950's the Tomlinson Commission showed that if
£120 were to be adopted as the standard for determining
the future size of farming units for Black farmers, it
wo .ild mean that at least 80% of the present number of
families would have to be removed from the land. Nothing
has changed in the 1980's.
That this is the fundamental political issue facing the
rural areas of the Bantustans is not in doubt. It is
^ problem that cannot and will never be solved by attempts
to treat Bophuthatswana as a separate political entity
and to find internal solutions to the problem of too
many people e ad too little land. It is an issue which
is structurally a part of the unequal access that Black
people in South Africa have to land, employment and political 
power.
J
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C H A P T E R  10
THE DITS0B0TLA QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY:
PARTICIPANT'S HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first 
section examines the personal characteristics of project 
participants as well as the work and income characteristics
of their households. The second section looks at the atti­
tudes of the project participants to various aspects of the
project, aspects such as production techniques, co-operatives,
management, and the degree of participation and consultation. 
Their attitudes are reviewed against the background of
conditior presented in previous chapters of this study.
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
The Research Area 
1  -----------------
The field survey was undertaken in December 198 3 and included 
the following primary co-operatives:
f
/
Table 10.1
No of farmers
Shiela Primary Agricultural Co-operative 197
- including the Springbokpan Project 131
Itereleng 83
Maikutlo 128
Louisdal 91
Makhubung 14 5
Makgalwane 14 3
Bapong 52
Lombaardslaagte 80
Tlhathogang 80
Kaalpan 40
Driehoek 79
________________________________________________________________1 249
SAMPLING PROCEDURE
A list of project participants was obtained from each 
primary co-operative . Using a random sample table, a sample 
was drawn from each list. The sample for the projects 
as a whc^e was thus stratified in terms of co-operative 
membership.
A sample of ten percent was drawn for each primary co­
operative, giving a total sample size of 126 respondents.
SETTING UP THE INTERVIEWS
After an initial pilot questionnaire survey, project and 
and section managers were requested to call a meeting 
of the selected respondents at the primary co-operative 
premises at pre-arranged dates and times. Selected participants 
who were away were either traced and interviewed at their 
place of work or interviewed on weekends at home. As the 
field survey took place shortly before Christmas, many 
of the project's participants had returned home cn leave 
and were more easily contacted.
INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE
The study was undertaken using standardised questionnaires 
to conduct personal interviews. Each selected primary 
co-operative member was interviewed privately for approximately 
an hour. This enabled all questions to be carefully explained 
in Tswana and reduced the possibility of respondents not 
understanding the questions.
Although the independent nature of the study was continuously 
stressed to the participants, the fact that they were 
in many cases called by the project management or by the 
AGRICOR section managers, may have influenced them to 
moderate their answers for fear of reprisals. This would 
be especially true of the Mooifontein drivers and committee 
members who are in continuous contact with project management.
' -
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PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY CO-OPERATI' ^ MEMBERS
Sex of Respondents 
Seventy-nine percent of the respondents were men and 
twenty-one percent were women. The women were usually 
widows who had had land rights passed on to them by 
their deceased husbands.
Age of Respondents 
The everage age of the respondents was 57 years:
TABLE 10.2
29* 29*project
20participants
70 100
Table 10.2 Percentage respondents by age.
Fifty-eight percent of the project participants are between 
the age of 50 and 70 years.
1
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Education Respondents
The modal level of education was 0 to 4 years of schooling 
anongst primary co-operative members:
TABLE 10.3
53V
50
Respondents
20
13%
Years of schooling
Table 10.3 Percentage of respondents by education.
IHOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVE MEMBERS
The term household rather than family is used as the residence 
unit often includes non-family members who are nevertheless 
an integral part of its income and expenditure cycle.
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
The average household size for the villages in the Ditsobotla 
Projects is 7,70 persons. This figure includes migrants.
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HOUSEHOLD INCOME
At we saw in the previous chapter, AGRICOR's attempts 
to boost grain production through the intensive concentration 
of capital resources in selected areas have resulted in 
the majority of project participants being placed in debts
which they have very little chance of paying back. It
is also clear from AGRICOR's planning report, referred 
to in the last chapter, that there was little intention
initially to provide an adequate living wage or even to 
improve existing agricultural incomes for project participants. 
Apart from the few contractors who left the Shiela Project 
to farm privately, the majority of the project participants 
have lost rather than gained any means of accumulating
the income necessary to launch themselves into private 
productive investment in agriculture.
Given the above process of immiseration, it is necessary 
to look at alternative sources of income which project 
participants and their households utilize in order to 
survive. For the purposes of this study project participant 
households (PPH's) have been divided into the following 
categories:
1. PPH's which have members working in the formal 
sector;
2. PPH's which have members who are self-employed;
3. PPH's which have members who are full-time migrant 
workers;
4. PPH's which have members who are engaged ir, informal
sector activities;
5. PPH's which have members who receive pensions;
6. PPH's which have members who receive maintenance
grants;
7. PPH's which have cash savings ;
8. PPH's which have livestock.
It was hoped to construct a profile of average household 
incomes from sources outside of the orojects. However,
analysis of the survey questionnaire revealed that respondents 
were in the majority of cases not sure :
a. Exact amounts obtained from different sources .
Amounts often varied, depending for example on
how much a household member donated to the household 
or spent elsewhere;
b. The regularity of income, especially from informal 
sector activities and migrant remittances. The 
following categories therefore give a rough idea 
of the sources of income amongst PPHs.
1. FORMAL SECTOR ACTIVITIES
According to the survey thirty-four percent of households 
have members who work in the formal r e c u v r and a~e not 
fulltime migrants. Many of these people do not work within 
the Ditsobotla region itself but commute on a daily basis 
to towns such as Mafikeng, Lichtenburg and Delareyville.
This category includes household members who are 
net project participants. Some of the household members 
who work fulltime in the formal sector are, for example, 
children who are temporarily residing with their
parents until they can obtain permanent accomodation
in the towns where they work.
This category of household members represents a small
rural working class with (in Poulantzian terms) new
petit — bourgeiose elements for whom farming is, if
at all, at best a marginal activity. Their relevance 
to the present study is limited in that they ha/e 
managed to obtain these posit ons in spite of the
project rather than because of it. It is clear however
that project participants who fall into this category
are unable to participate actively in the project.
Formal sector jobs within the Ditsobotla region are
comprised mainly of civil service activities.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT
Four percent of households in the survey have people
who are self-employed members of the traditional 
petit - bourgeoisie. There appears to be, however,
a fine line between this category and " informal sector" 
activities. The formal difference lies in the permanence 
of the work; a self-employed person has fulltime
employment ( 12 months per year), while informal 
sector" work is more intermittent.
'"'I
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According to an AGRICOR study completed in 1980, 
there are forty-nine businesses of various kinds 
scattered through the Ditsobotla region. The major iy 
of these are situated in the town of Itsoseng; only 
13 being in the surrounding rural areas. These businesses 
consist mainly of small general dealers, wood and 
coal establishments and butcheries. (1)
The average income from own businesses, as recorded 
by the present study survey questionnaire, is R98 
per month.
s MIGRANT WORKERS
:
I
Forty percent of households have migrant members. 
Many households have several migrant members (52
households have 83 migrant workers). Only twenty-
one percent of these households claimed that they
received migrant remittances regularly. As most remit­
tances are extremely irregular and varied greatly 
in amount it is impossible to determine monthly or 
yearly averages.
Migrant workers work in the following places:
i
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T A B L E 10.4
30
| 29%
2010
J O H A N N E S B U R G
21%M A F I K E N G
8%R U S T E N B U R G
R A N D F O N T E I N 6 %
L I C H T E N B U R G
K L E R K S D O R P
K R U G E R S D O R P
P R E T O R I A
M A G A L I E S 3 U R G
P O T C H E F S T R O O M
S T A N D E R T O N
O R K N E Y
M O O I D O R P I E
F O R D S V I L L E
H A M M A N S K R A A L
C A R L T O N V I L L E
V E N T E R S D O R P
I T S O S E N G
O R A N G E  FRE E  STATE
T a b l e  10.4
I N F O R M A L  S E C T O R
Fi v e  p e r c e n t  of h o u s e h o l d s  have m e m b e r s  who are i n v o l v e d
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In informal sector activities. The average income from 
this type of work is R23 per month, usually on an intermittent 
basis. The highest income is R41 and the lowest R5 per 
month. Informal sector activities include seasonal farm 
labour, building, "selling homemade beads", knitting, 
repairing farm machinery, etc.
PENSIONS
I
>Y
Seventeen percent of households have members who receive 
pensions. Some of the pensioners receive their money every 
two months while others receive theirs every three months. 
The average amount received every two months is R60, while 
for every three months, R80.
MAINTENANCE
Four percent of households included in the survey have 
members who receive a maintenance grant. These grants 
are awarded on an annual basis and vary from R150 to R180.
CASH SAVINGS
Twenty-two percent of households had an average of R397 
in savings. The highest amount was R1 500 and the lowest
R40
LIVESTOCK
s
Seventy-seven households have livestock of one kind or
another. The following percentage of households have the 
following livestock:
TABLE 10.5
% of households Average no. of livestock
Cattle 71% 12
Sheep 40% 11
Poultry 17% 21
Table 10.5 Percentage of households with livestock and the
average number.
The average value of livestock was R2058 per livestock 
owning household, the highest amount being Rll 320 and
the lowest R400. Only twenty-one percent of these households 
received any regular cash income from the sale of livestock.
The average income from this source was R426 per annum.
Twenty-three percent of households in the study had no
livestock.
MAIZE-IN-KIND
All project participants on the Mooifontein Project receive 
a guaranteed allocation of 30 bags of maize from the project
after every harvest. On the Shiela Project the participants 
are allowed to pick up any maize left behind the combine
harvester for their own u s e .
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the study that the majority of project 
participants are male and over the age of fifty. More
than half of them have no effective education. It can 
be surmised that the sex and age composition of the project
participants are due to two main factors. Firstly, because
of the over-crowding in the rural areas of the Bant us tans,
due to:
- the state's Bantustan policy:
- the state's programme of systematic relocation 
of any people who are defined as marginal to the
central economy;
- the population growth in conditions of rur^l poverty; 
there is limited access to arable land holdings. Secondly, 
in these conditions of scarcity of land, only the most 
senior, male married residents are allocated land by the 
Community Authority. The younger, generally more educated 
people a r e , because of lack of access to land and employment 
in the rural areas of the Bantustans, forced to seek employment 
elsewhere, either as migrant workers or as commuters to 
the surrounding towns.
This necessity of finding outside sources of employment 
is true even for those with access to land in an area 
such as Ditsobotla. Over forty percent of the land holders,
usually the younger and more educated ones, have, especially 
since the implementation of the projects and the concomitant 
lack of income from their arable allotment, been forced 
to seek employment elsewhere. The majority of the project 
participants however, are even less fortunate. Because 
of old age and lack of education, they are forced to remain 
on the project, having to rely on pensions, maintenance, 
grants, informal sector activities, the sale of livestock, 
and in a large proportion of cases, entirely on the project. 
These last mentioned project participants, those whose 
sole hope of an income lies with the project, are destitute 
and have to rely on other members of their household for 
survival.
As will become more clear in the next section of this 
chapter, although a certain percentage of the project 
participants were not fulltime farmers before the advent 
of the projects in the Ditsobotla region, the implementation 
of a centralised management in control of the production 
process has meant that those who were involved in farming 
before, have now also been relegated largely to the status 
of observers.
2. THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND: PERCEPTIONS OF PROJECT PARTICI­
PANTS AS REGARDS THE PROJECTS.
LANDS IZE
The majority of primary co-operative members on the Ditsobotla 
projects now have 15 ha. arable allotments, except for
the Shiela contractors who have 30 ha. This represents 
an increase in lands ize for most of the participants, 
as the modal size was 3.56 ha. (10 morgen) before the
implementation of the projects. Twenty-six percent of
the respondents claimed that they were not consulted bef re 
their land size was changed. Sixty-nine percent expressed 
the opinion that the land was too small to make an adequate 
living.
C R O P  T Y P E
The majority of the respondents (69%) grew crops other 
than maize before the implementation of the projects.
These crops, such as beans, pumpkins, water-melon, grain
sorgum, sunflower, etc., were used to supplement the basic
maize diet or sold as an extra source of ir.ome. The latter 
option was especially resorted to in times of drought,
when these, often hardier crO*'s, survived better than
the maize crop.
However, with the implementation of the projects and the 
advent of capital intensive cultivation methods, the mono­
cropping of maize was deemed to be more profitable by 
the project management. Sunflowers are grown on a very 
limited scale by the management, usually on soils which 
are not suitable for th° cultivation of maize. The cultivation 
of crops such as beans and pumpkins would also require 
the acquisition of additional implements, adding even 
more costs to the already over-capitalised production
The result is that not only have project participants 
beer deprived of grazing land by the increase in the size 
of the total arable area, but they have also been deprived 
of alternative nutritional supplements which they used 
to grow. The majority of the project participants, having 
been convinced by the project planners in the initial 
phases of the projects implementation that maize mono­
cropping is the surest way to a cash income, are in favour 
of growing maize only. Only twenty percent of the participants 
felt that the mono-cropping of maize was not suitable 
and that maize should be supplemented by alternative crops 
such as beans, sunflower, red corn, millet and pumpkin.
CROP INPUTS
Respondents were asked their opinion with regard to the
amount of inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides 
being utilized by the project management on their land.
It will be remembered that the question of too many inputs, 
especially fertilization, was discussed in Chapter 9. 
The gist of that discussion was that fertilizer, according to 
Bembridge et al, may constitute as much as 60 percent
of the variable production costs for maize. It is there­
fore very important, given South African soil and climatic 
conditions, to set realistic target yields and fertilize 
accordingly. Failure to do so will result in overcapitali­
zation and a reduction in the profit margin. AGRICOR and
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its management agents, in persuit of production rather 
than increased income foi the project participants, tend 
to fertilize, use herbicides and pesticide, for a maximum 
yield of between 3.5 to 4 tons. As the projects have n 
the majority of the years of their operation come nowhere 
near the maximum yields, the results have been heavy debts 
rather than profits for the project participants.
The majority of the respondents however, did not perceive 
the fact that too many inputs were being used, as the cause 
of their debt problem. The following responses were received:
TABLE 10.6
Eno ugh 52%
Too little 2%
Too much 11%
Don 1t Know 36%
Table 10.6 (N=126) Project participants opinions
as regard crop inputs.
It is clear from the reasons given in their answers, that 
while a large number thought that the fertilizer and other 
inputs were enough; these responses were merely opinions 
rather than knowledge born of the experience of active 
participation. The following selection of responses serve 
to illustrate this:
"(I don't k n o w ) For t h e y  don't t e l l  us anything, we 
just see p e o p l e  p o u r i n g  this stuff. We don't  
e v e n  k n o w  the e x t e n t  of our plot s .  So how do 
we know w h e t h e r  it's enou g h ? "  (D r i e h o e k  P r i m a r y  
C o - o p e r a t  i v e ).
"I d o n ’t know; all I k n o w  is that the y  p o u r  the 
k i l l e r s ." (L o m b a a r d s l a a g t e  P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e )
" I take it that they kno w  their job. So I am s a t i s f i e d  
tha t  the y  pou r  e n o u g h ". (L o u i s d a l  P r i m a r y  C o ­
o p e r a t i v e  ) .
C O N S U L T A T I O N  BY P ROJECT M A N A G E M E N T
The m a j o r i t y  of r e s p o n d e n t s  said that t h e y  were never 
(56%) or s e l d o m  (17%) c o n s u l t e d  by the p r o j e c t  m a n a g e m e n t . 
Twenty seven p -rcent said that they were consulted often. The latter 
category is made up predominantly of Sheila contractors, and tractor 
drivers employed by the Mooifontein co-operatives.
Consultation by project management of project members as regard the 
production process itself roughly matched the general consultation 
mentioned above. The following responses were given when project partici­
pants were asked about consultation as regards:
TABLE 3.7
YES
. . .
NO
Choice of crops 32% 68%
Amounts of fertilizer 32% 68%
Crop spraying 36% 64%
Manual Weeding ("Skoffeling") | 40% 60%
Harvesting of crops 44% 56%
Table 8.7 Percentage of participants consulted by project management
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As with the general consultation, the majority of the 
respondents who were consulted with regard to the above 
production aspects, were Sheila Project contractors and 
Mooifonte in tractor drivers employed by tne primary o- 
operatives, as well as members of the management committees 
of certain primary co-operatives on the Mooifontein Project. 
The management committees of primary co-operatives were 
consulted in only a few cases, most notably at th„ Maikutlo 
Primary Co-operative where the Project manager, was a 
black AGRICOR trainee.
TRAINING
Project participants were asked whether they had received 
any training since the implementation of the projects,
in the following fields:
TABLE 10.0
------- YES NO
Basic accounts 14% 86%
Mechanical Maintenance 17% 83%
Crop production 25% 75*
Marketing of crops 17% 83%
Co-operative Training 15% 85%
Literacy 10% 90%
ciole 10.8 Training received by project participants
As with consultation, project participants who received
any training w^re mainly contractors on the Sheila Project
and tractor drivers on the Mooifontein and Springbokpan
Projects. This training has consisted mainly of tractor
and implement training, generally given in association 
with various tractor companies.
The AGRICOR training centre, situated in Mafikeng has
also run short courses in general co-operative training
for farmers. Again this has mainly involved members of
the various management committees of the primary co-operatives.
In spite of the limited training that farmers have received,
55 percent of the respondents in the questionnaire survey, 
completed for the present study, felt that they knew enough
to farm on their own. Asked whether they had learnt enough
on the project to farm on their own, some of the following
responses are fairly representive of comments made:
"Not that they taught me anything; but I am sure 
we would cope better without them." (Driehoek 
Primary Co-operative)
"What I have learnt is what I see happening around 
me" (Makgalwane Primary Co-operative)
"They have misused all our strength. Now we are 
old and don't have the same resistance. But if 
we were younger we could. (farm on our own)" 
(Driehoek Primary Co-operative)
SECONDARY CO-OPERATIVE
Seventy five percent of the respondents on the Mooifontein 
Project stated that the Management Committee of the Secondary
z'
Z z. 
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Co-operative were aware of their problems. However, in 
che wcrds of one respondent: "they are not doing anything 
to solve them." (Drlehoek Primary Co-operative )
It was noted in Chapter 2 that many of the primary co­
operatives in Bophuthatswana were established in the wake
of the Agricultural Development Act of 1973, an act which 
stipulated that credit provided by the Agricultural Development 
Fund could only be channelled through these primary co­
operatives. The result was that many co—operatives were
established for no purpose other than the procurement
of agricultural credit. inis has led, as was seen in Chapter 
6, to many of the primary co-operatives not functioning
properly, especially with regard to bookkeeping. The Department
of Agric. (Bophuthatswana) has appointed both auditors
and members of the Rand Afrikaanse Univers iteit to look
into the problem of co-operative development.
f
'
i
PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVES
*
With more particular reference to the Ditsobotla projects, 
it will be remembered that in Chapter 8 we examined AGRICOR’s 
attempts to turn the primary co-operatives into TEMISANO 
units. On the Sheila Project especially, increasing centrali­
zation of the administrative function has led to many 
of the former primary co-operatives being dissolved and 
reformed under the auspices of a more Central Sheila Primary 
Co-operative. On the Mooifontein Project, while the primary 
co-operatives have been retained, they have increasingly
tome under the control of the project management, especially 
with regard to the supervision of the tractors drivers. 
hired by the co-operatives.
This increasing centralization of the administrative function
and the decreased control of project participants over
their own affairs through the medium of the primary co­
operatives must be contrasted with earlier statements 
by the Bophuthatswana Dept. of Agric., AGRICOR, and the
management agents of the projects as regard the involvement 
of the so-called "farmers". For example, the following 
statement is contained in a report issued by the Bophutha­
tswana Department of Agriculture under Beuster's leadership 
(who is now Managing Director of AGRICOR) in 1977:
"Success in rural development will only be attained 
if the communities and farmers concerned are intimately 
involved in planning, decision making and implementa- 
tation on a self-help basis" (2)
Because if the centralised nature of the projects administra­
tion the primary co-operatives are increasingly seen by
the participants as the domain of the project management 
rather than as a vehicle for their own democratic partici­
pation. This has led to an "us" and "them" situation 
where many of the participants feel that the primary co­
operatives are not achieving their purpose. Some of the 
following reasons are representative of the responses 
received from project participants interviewed:
"I am getting into one debt after another. They
don't keep their word. We should be able to discuss 
our problems with these people. Communication
is important." (Bapong Primary Co-operative )
"Instead of helping us, they are just killing 
us." (Lombaardslaagte Primary Co-operative)
The beneficial effects of the primary co-operatives were
generally perceived to lie in the increased availability
of agricultural mechanization:
"They have helped us, we can now use tractors"
(Shiela Primary Co-operative)
"People who could not manage their land, have 
their land very well cared for" (Makhubung Primary 
Co-operative).
DEDUCTIONS
At the end of every season, each project participant receives 
a financial statement purportedly telling him/her what 
costs were incurred on their 15 ha. arable allotment during 
that season. In actual fact, what the participant receives 
is not a record of his individual costs, but a record
of his average share of toe total costs incurred by the
primary co-operative. The main reason for this is that
the total lan u falli.c under one primary co-operative 
is ploughed, fer ilised, sprayed with herbicides and pesticides 
and harvested as one big agricultural unit under the control 
of a project manager and a section manager. Until recently, 
especially on the Mooifontein Project, many of the project 
participants did not even know which piece of 1 and was
theirs, as they had not been marked out.
Coupled with the fact that average costs per participant 
are used, is the fact that project managers are onsible
for deciding what amount of fertilizer, pesticides. Herbicides, 
etc. are used. This kind of amount and cost structuring 
is usually done in consultation with AGRICOR and management 
agent experts at the beginning of each season.
Another factor to consider with regard to the issuing
of financial statements to project participants, is the 
centralised accounting system which operates. On the Sheila 
project, as has been mentioned. all accounts are kept 
by the management agent Noordwes Kooperasie. On the Mooifontein 
Project, although certain records are kept by the primary 
co-operative clerks, the final accounts are prepared under 
the auspices of the management, who, as will be remembered 
are situated within the Ditsobrtla Secondary Co-operative.
The combined result of the above functions, the averaging 
cot of costs. the lack of consultation as regards the
amount and cost, of inputs used, and the centralised accoun­
tancy system, is that the project participants have very 
little control over the costs incurred in their name by 
the project management. 'Not only do they not have much
control, but the majority of them do not understand how 
or why certain deductions are made on their statements. 
For example, 64 percent of respondents felt that they 
“ id n0t understand their statements. Eighty seven percent
not satisfied with the way in which deductions are
taken off.
f * '
■' *
*
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S o m e  of the f o l l o w i n g  c o m m e n t s  s e r v e  to i l l u s t r a t e  the 
p r o j e c t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  plight:
"We are b e i n g  c h e a t e d . If we are t o l d  the p r i c e s  
of the goods we are u s i n g  so that as I w o r k  I
k n o w  w h a t  kind of debt I am p u t t i n g  m y s e l f  into. 
Now we are just w o r k i n g  in the d a r k . "  (Sheila
P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e )
"We are never given r e c e i p t s  r e c o r d i n g  our e x p e n s e s . 
So y o u  never k n o w  how m u c h  you have s p e n t . "  (K a a l p a n  
P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e )
"I am o n l y  made aware of the debt t h e s e  d e d u c t i o n s  
put me in w h e n  I am a l r e a d y  deep in d e b t . It
is like they are p u r p o s e l y  l e a d i n g  me into debt . "
(L o m b a a r d s l a a g t e  P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e . )
"The a u d i t o r s , th e y  are there in Pretoria. W h e n  
t h e y  com e  the y  just come w i t h  a p i e c e  of paper. 
We d o n ' t  know, we are just in a b o t t l e . We are 
not happy. We are f i g h t i n g  t h e m  ...." ( N a a uwpoort  
P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e . )
S A T I S F A C T I O N  W I T H  P R O J E C T  M A N A G E M E N T
S i x t y - s e v e n  percent of the r e s p o n d e n t s  w e r e  u n h a p p y  w i t h  
the w a y  the p r o j e c t  m a n a g e m e n t  w e r e  r u n n i n g  the p r o j e c t . 
S o m e  of t h e i r  reasons were as f o l l o w s :
"For w h a t e v e r  we say to them, is u n i m p o r t a n t ". 
( D r i e h o e k  P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e )
" They are w o r k i n g  on t heir own". (B a p o n g  P r i m a r y  
C o - o p e r a t  i v e )
"No. b e c a u s e  they don't meet u s ....the y  o n l y  d i s c u s s 
or s e t t l e  the m a t t e r s  w i t h  o t h e r  w h i t e  a u t h o r i t i e s . "  
( M a k h u b u n g  P r i m a r y  C o - o p e r a t i v e s )
"Things are not b e i n g  run f a i r l y  and h o n e s t l y . 
We are b e i n g  led like a her d  of sheep. Let our 
v o i c e s  and w i s h e s  be h e a r d . "  (K a a l p a n  P r i m a r y  
C o - o p e r a t i v e . )
"He does not d i s c u s s  a n y t h i n g w i t h  u s . Even if
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he does when we come to an agreement, we know
that the opposite will be done". (Driehoek Primary 
Co-operative /
"They plant, plough and harvest. I never know
how much has been used on my plot, and how much
my plot has made. So I am sweating for someone
else1 s pocket." (Lombaardslaagte Primary Co­
operative )
The 33 percent who were satisfied with the project management 
gave these as some of the reasons:
"I am satisfied because we see the prosperity
of our lands and the products of them." (Sheila 
Primary Co-operative Contractor ) .
"Because it seems there is a smooth running of 
the project." (Makhubung Primary Co-operative).
THE PROJECT: TO BE OR NOT TO BE.
Of groat significance is the increase in dissatisfaction 
with the project amongst participants. While the Bembridge 
et al study, conducted in the early 198C' s f„und that 
only four percent of participants no longer wished to 
participate in tie project, the present study (conducted 
at the end of 1983) found that 57 percent of participants 
would prefer to leave and farm on their own.
Those respondents who wished to leave the projects gave 
the following reasons.
"I am better off on my own, for what I will have 
sweated for will be mine. Even if these people 
were to leave today I wouldn't say thank you 
for your help. For they have given us none. But 
I would instead say thanks for leaving. Working
i
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on white farms I used to get 30 sacks and at
least be sure of RIO a month. Now I am getting
30 sacks and debts. How have they helped me improve
myself? (Driehoek Primary Co-operative).
" I am better on my own. It is only giving me debts. 
I have a plot but I can't put my children through
school." (Lombaardslaagte Primary Co-operative.)
"I am better off on my own. If they were here to
genuinely help us I would be happy, for things
are changing and we need to be shown these things.
But this project is just cheating us." (Louisdal
Primary Co-operative.)
* I am better off on my own. Not that 
the project, but I am against the 
being treated and the problems they 
for us." (Kaalpan Primary Co-operative )
I am against 
way we are 
are creating
Those who thought they are better off on the projects 
gave sonvs of the following reasons:
"The project 
my implements
helps in its own way. 4. v.
," (Sheila Primary Co-operative
I don't have
"Because they manage my land better 
(Makhubung Primary Co-operative)
than can.
"I would like the project to continue farming 
for me provided I could get enough food and money." 
(Naauwpoort Primary Co-operative.)
"The project is a great 
would I get tractors?" 
operative )
help, on my own where 
(Maikutlo Primary Co-
J
CONCLUSION
The field survey shows that the landsi-e of the respondents 
generally increased in size with the implementation of 
the project, although the majority thought that it was
not of sufficient size to make a living.
Most of the respondents were satisfied with maize mono­
cropping and felt teat enough fertilizer and other inputs 
were being applied. However, many of the project participants 
did not know if enough inputs were being applied as they
were not involved in the production process .
The majority of participants interviewed said that they
were seldom or never consulted by the project management 
with regard to the production process. As with consultation, 
it is mainly the contractors and tractor drivers who received 
any training. The majority of respondents claimed that 
they had received no training whatsoever.
Although the management committee of the Secondary Co­
operative was aware of their problems, many of the respondents 
felt that they were not doing anything about it. Over 
half the project participants expressed the opinion that 
the primary co-operatives were not achieving their purpose 
of helping the farmer. The advantages of the primary co­
operatives mentioned included the use of tractors and 
implements which were not available before.
While many of the farmers did not understand the financial
statements issued at the end of every season, the vast
majority were dissatisfied with the manner in which deductions 
are taken off. The main thrust of the dissatisfaction lay 
in the fact that project participants do not have any
control over the amounts being spent on inputs in their
name and therefore telt they are being cheated.
The majority of respondents
way in which management are
main reasons for the project
was a lack of consultation
wishes by management.
were not satisfied with the 
running the projects. The 
participants dissatisfaction 
and the ignoring of their
More than half of che field survey respondents want to 
leave the project and farm on their own. Many of them 
felt that the project management were not genuine in their 
stated aims of improving the farmers lot. Others stated 
that all they had received was debts. Those who wished 
to remain on the project gave the availability of tractors 
and implements as the mfin reason.
X*
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to examine the different 
institutions involved in the establishment of the capital 
intensive agricultural projects in the Ditsobotla region 
of Bophuthatswana as well as to assess their success 
or failure. As important has also been the effect of 
these projects on the rural people whose land is being 
utilized. Bophuthatswana, the most " developed" in terms 
of capital intensive agricultural projects, serves as 
an example of the wider process of "rural development" 
in the Bantustans being tersued by the South African state 
in collusion with agricultural elements of monopoly capital 
in Souit. Africa.
In Chapter 1 of this study, 
changes in the structure and 
in South Africa brought the 
scale monopoly capitalism, 
had two important results 
development of agriculture in
we examined the way in which 
form of capitalist production 
economy to a period of large 
These changes in the economy 
which are pertinent to the 
the Bantustans.
Firstly, the interpenetration of capital has meant the 
replacement (as an ong m g  process) of living labour 
by the dead labour of machines and a resultant increase 
in unemployment in South Africa, especially amongst the 
least skilled segment of the African labour orce. With 
a concomitant demand for skilled labour by capital and 
the reproduction of African workers taking place predominantly
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in the urban areas, capital no longer has an interest 
in the preservation of any sort of subsistence base in 
the Bantustans . The lack of interest in the preservation 
of subsistence base by capital and the state's policy 
of relocation if the urban unemployment to the Bantustans, 
has resulted in a virtual collapse of a subsistence culti­
vation. This has led to a decline of a strong class with 
vested land interests in the Bantustans and has opened 
the way for the penetration of white agricultural capital.
The second pertinent lesult of the transition to monopoly 
capitalism is the development of agribusiness in the 
form of giant agricultural co-operatives and their central 
retail organization VETSAK. These multi-million rand
monopolies, with multi-national connections and powerful 
representation within the South African state, have been 
seeking to expand the market for agricultural capital 
stock and inputs. These white co-operatives have shown 
their willingness to provide capital and expertise to 
"develop" agriculture in the Bantustans.
It is against this background in the middle of the 1970's 
that the South African state, seeking to remedy the ailing 
agricultural development in the Bantustans prior to launching 
them as "independent" states, decided on a new approach. 
While previous attempts had been aimed at creating an 
entrepreneurial class in the Bantustans, the new approach 
was aimed at opening the gates to white capital and the 
encouragement of capital intensive production orientated
agricultural projects run by managerial expertise. The 
Promotion of economic Development of the National States 
Act No.46 of 1968 was ammended accordingly in 1977, clearing 
the way for an unprecendented flow of state and private 
capital into the Bantustans.
These events however, did not take place in a vacuum. 
In Bophuthatswana for example, the administration has 
been a victim of split loyalties. Dependent on its largely 
rural constituency for support, the administration has 
been promising them active participation in decision 
making and rural development as part of its "community 
development" efforts. On the other hand, as an extension
of the South African state, the Bophuthatswana administration 
has realised the necessity for capital intensive agricultural 
production, run by white management rather than the people, 
in order to impress the watching world with its self-
sufficiency in maize production. As is usual in these 
circumstances, political expediency has taken precedent
over the needs of the people. It is als>. clear that 
the Bophuthatswana administration is more susceptible
to pressure from, and more dependent on, handouts from 
the South African state, than it is on its rural peasant/pro­
letarians .
Although agribusiness interests such as the white South
African agricultural co-operatives and milling companies 
are seeking to expand their markets and control more 
-irectly their sources of raw materials through the creation
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of capital intensive projects, agriculture in the Bantustans 
has always been a risky venture. In conditions such 
as these, where agriculture might not be immediately 
profitable for private capital, the state has had to 
provide infrastructure as well as certain subsidies. 
These subsidies, as we saw in Chapter 3, involve direct 
subsidies from the state, such as soft loans from the 
South African Department of Foreign Affairs to AGRICOR, 
as well as state subsidies to private companies in the 
form of loan finance, transport, wages, etc. Other subsidies 
available to agri-business in the Bantustans include 
differential ground rent, below cost and controlled labour.
In Chapter 4, Bernstein was quoted as suggesting that 
state forms of capital inv sted in agriculture, is more 
common in Africa than the direct involvement of private
productive capital as is found in Couth America. The
reasons ne put forward for this development include the 
notion that the ruling classes have a more direct interest 
in the development of commodity relations within any 
given country than any international companies, and the 
already mentioned fact that conditions might not be immedia­
tely profitable for private capital. To these reasons 
we can add the need for national self-sufficiency; in
the case of the "independent Bant us tans" this factor 
is of cardinal importance in their quest for international 
recognition.
In South Africa the involvement of the state in Bantustan
/ X-
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to the Promotion of Economic Development of National 
States Act No.46 was passed precisely with the intention 
of creating state institutions, such as the CED and the 
regional corporations and agricultural companies, whose 
task it is to manage capital investment in the Bantustans. 
The 1977 ammtndment provides the CED with almost blanket 
power to enter into just about any sort of agreement.
Together, state and private capital and expertise, through 
the CED and the regional agricultural corporations and 
companies, create the infrastructure and set up the high 
technology projects which provide large-scale productive 
capital such as VETSAK and its multi-national suppliers 
with an expanded market. Although not specifically touched 
upon in this study, there is also increasing involvement 
of Israeli capital, expertise and agri-equipment (especially 
to do with irrigation) in many of the Bantustans.
I
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agriculture has led to an intertwining of private capital 
with the state apparatus th-ounh various forms of agency, 
tri and bi-partite and other agreements. The 1977 ammendment
Historically, with the rise of monopoly capitalism in 
Europe and the United States of America, there has been 
a decline in the horizontal concentration of agricultural 
units (into larger and larger units using hired wage 
labour) and an increase in the vertical concentration 
of small producers . The vertical concentration of numerous 
small producers usually takes place through co-operative 
organization, which serves to centralize capital when
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private entrepreneurial capital is weak, without expropriating
the peasants. The organization of small producers into 
a co-operative also serves to combine into an economic 
unit fragmented land holdings; the co-operative itself 
becoming the legal body for the obtaining of credit and 
the repayment of loans.
The vertical concentration of peasant/migrants through 
the medium of the agricultural co-operative has become 
common in Africa as well. For example in Bophuthatswana, 
the Bophuthatswana Agricultural Bank created in 1981 
is specifically charged with making loans and advances 
to co-operative companies. These co-operatives foim basis 
of the capital intensive agricultural projects in Bophutha­
tswana .
In Section II of the study the focus of attention was 
more specifically on the Ditsobotla Dryland Maize Projects 
in Bophuthatswana. Chapter 6 examined the various institutions 
involved in the establishment of the projects; drawing 
attention especially to the brief resistance crrered 
by representatives of the interests of a feci.ring class 
of tribal and peasant farmers to the wholesale invasion 
of the Bantustan by white capital and management of agricu­
lture .
The Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture under the
then Secretary for Agriculture, Mr. Clem Seape, put forward 
a dual approach to rural development in Bophuthatswana
in the early 1980's. In an attempt to control and limit 
the effects o: untramelled capital intensive, high technology
and "foieign" controlled agricultural projects, the Department 
suggested that this form of rural development be considered 
as a short term measure to increase production. As a long 
term measure the Department suggested the alternative 
of small scale farming units based on the traditional 
communal system run primarily by local extension officers 
and community development staff with the involvement 
of the farmers.
AGRICOR, along with its management agents comprised of 
seconded officials from the CED and Noordwes Kooperasie, 
favoured the capital intensive project approach as a 
long-term vehicle for rural development. This came as 
no surprise as the large project approach is the CED's 
official policy as regards the development of agriculture 
in the Bantustans. In an attempt to put a mo^e human 
face on its technocratic production approach AGRICOR 
has, in the years since its policy triumphed over that 
of the Dept, of Agric., attempted to introduce elements 
of the Israeli Moshav and community development under 
the banner of TEMISANO. As was made clear in Chapter 
6 and 8 of this study, these attempts have not changed 
the basic fact of the project participants' exclusion 
from both ehe production and decision making process 
or softened the control exerted by the white management 
running the projects.
4/ /  '
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AGRICOR, utilizing finance provided by the Bophuthatswana 
administration, "the South African Dept, of Foreign Affairs, 
the CED, the Industrial Development Corporation and the 
white agricultural co-operatives in South Africa, has 
expanded its activities significantly. Its major accomplish­
ments include the establishment of TEMOVET, the Bophuthatswana 
bianch of the huge central co-operative retailer VETSAK, 
to facilitate the flow of agricultural inputs into its 
projects, and the Bophuthatswana Marketing Board, which 
facilitates the flow of maize out of Bophuthatswana to 
the South African Maize Board.
But what of the Projects themselves? Chapter 6 showed 
that prior to the establishment of the projects, farmers 
on the Ditsobotla stateland farms utilised a modal ' rize 
of 8.5o ha. of arable land. On average farmers managed 
an income of R40.89 per ha., even when drought years 
are taken into consideration.
With the establishment of the projects there was an increase 
in the size of individual arable allotments to an average 
of 15 ha. and a decrease in the size of grazing land. 
Mono-cropping of maize was introduced, although occasionally 
sunflowers and millet are planted by the management. 
On the Shiela Project selected contractor farmers were 
equipped with a mechanical package to provide a cultivation 
service to project participants. A few of the contractors 
have left the project to farm on their own. On the Moo ifontein 
Project, the contractor system was phased out, instead
the mechanical packages are now owned by the primary 
co-operatives which employ drivers to provide a service 
to the project participants.
In the initial phases of the Ditsobotla Projects, it 
would appear that the participants were consulted fairly 
regularly through their primary co-operative management 
committees. The majority of the participants seemed to 
support the aims of the project. However, in subsequent 
years there has been an increasing centralization of
the administration of the projects and many of the primary 
co-operatives have either been absorbed within larger 
more centra -sed co-operatives or else their management 
committees have ceased to exist in all but name. As
was mentioned earlier, to compensate for the lack of
involvement of the participants in the decision making 
and production process, AGRICOR has introduced community 
development initiatives on the Shiela Project and more
recently the Mooifontein Project as well.
In Chapter 9 of this study we saw that AGRICOR's initial 
planning carried no intention of providing individual 
project participants with a living income. Rather the 
intention was, using capital intensive/high - input methods, 
to produce as much maize as possible, no matter how high 
the costs to the individual project participant. \s
a result the majority of farmers are in vast amounts 
of debt which they have little hope of paying back. In 
Chapter 9, we calculated that as opposed to the R40.89
/  V .  •
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per ha. that farmers were making before the implementation 
of the projects, by 1983 they were losing R 69-99 per ha. 
on average. But as was stated before, averages can be 
deceptive. Many project participants, especially on the 
drier Mooifontein Project, owe over R14 000, while on
the Shiela Project adjacent to the South African maize 
triangle, some of the participants have made a small 
profit. In terms of our calculations in Chapter 9, these 
profits on the Shiela Project are on average still lower 
than what farmers were earning before the implementation 
of the projects.
Due to the lack of income from the projects, participants 
and their households are forced to turn to other means
outside of the projects in order to survive. We saw in 
Chapter 10 that 34 percent of households have members 
who have managed to find work in the formal sector without 
having to resort to migrancy, although many of these
peopn commute daily to the surrounding towns in South 
Africa proper. Another 40 percent of households rely 
on migrant workers, but it would seem as though remittances
from this source are intermittent and vary in amount.
Other sources of income include pensions, maintenance 
grants and informal sector activities. A small number 
have managed to start their own businesses.
While project participants, by their own accounts, are 
generally dissatisfied with the way in which the project 
management is handling the project, of special significance
is the increase in the number of people who wish to leave 
the project to farm on their own. The Bembr idge report 
in 1980 ;ound only four percent of participants wishing
to leave the project; by 1983 this figure had risen to 
over 50 percent according to the survey conducted for 
the present study.
In the final analysis the earlier hypotheses as to the 
reason for this type of rural development seem to be 
borne out. The primary aim of the projects in the Ditsobotla 
region of Bophutha1* swana is to increase production to 
boost claims to self-sufficiency, even if the maize is 
going to the 'th African Maize board as part of the 
total South African crop. For agribusiness the projects 
provide an expanded market for agri-management and inputs 
running into millions of rands annually. For the project 
participants the projects represent yet another, more 
sophisticated method of disposses ion of the little land 
they had control over before the implementation of the
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MEETING WITH EHIELA/VERDWAAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
The Management Committee, which consisted of Messrs. Lesabe, G. Cebisa,
Ngesman, Tsatsimpe and J. Cebisa wanted to see Agricor officials.
They were quite furious. Their complaints were:-
* They have been asking for their minute books from their former
secretary, Mr Sekabe, for the last two months and could not get them.
Mr Strauss was approached in connection with this and he promised to 
go and fetch them, which he never did. Mr Erasmus was approached 
and also failed to help them.
* Mr Lesabe took his tractor to the co-operative for repairs. It was
dismantled and thereafter Mr Erasmus refused to have it repaired.
He said Mr Lesabe was owing the Co-operative too much money and,
therefore, did not deserve this service. Mr Lesabe approached the
Management Committee on this and they, in turn, arranged for a meeting 
with Mr Erasmus. At this meeting Mr Erasmus was then asked to assemble 
the parts of the tractor which were scattered all over the place.
He refused, saying he would first have to get the consent of Noord-Wes 
and Agricor, who had ordered him not to do it. Th» Management Committee 
asked Mr Erasmus if the yield of Mr Lesabe did not compare with others 
so that his debt may be paid. He said it did. Mr Lesabe then told 
Mr Erasmus that he would harvest on his own and take his maize to the 
co-operative so that he may get his tractor
* Mr Erasmus went on to tell the Management Cbmmittee that six farmers 
were about to be dismissed from the project, with Mr Lesabe being the 
first one. He even told them that this matter has been forwarded to 
the President.
He also told them that they don't have land or money but they are 
paying rent for the land. ' At this point he was quite angy and emotional. 
He said the only people who had money was Agricor and N.W.K.
* Tractors belonging to the co-operative were used to plough for
Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings and also at Bodibe without the consent 
of the Management Committee. They were later told chose tractors 
brought in R8 000 which they did not see.
* There is confusion on who has to sign cheques. hr Lesabe as the
chairman is authorised to sign but there is another person (unidentified) 
who e.lso signs. In practice Mr Lesabe only signs cheques directed to 
farmers. The Management Committee does not know who is responsible for 
the payment of labourers every Friday.
* With every load of maize, 15c is deducted from the income. It is said
that 5c is for fuel expenses for vehicles used on the project, but, the 
black section managers told the M.C. that they filled their vehicles 
out of their own pockets.
CONCL'JSi IN
Tne Management Committee does not want to be used as "rubber stamps". If they
have any authority they want to use it to promote the interests of the farmers
who elected them. If not, the Committee should dissolve.
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They say they aloe want to have their books, including bank account,
(if there are any), handed over to them, as soon as possible if their 
authority is recognised by both Agricor and Noordwes.
Mr Lesabe's tractor should be repaired because he is owing (Rll 000) 
just like any other member. (There are some people who owe more than 
he dees).
The Management Committee does not want to see anybody being dismissed 
from the project. All the cheques must go through the Committee and 
be signed by the chairman and his secretary only.
they concluded the meeting by saying tb*t in the interest of the FAR IRS,
AND THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, MR ERASMUS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM SHIELA 
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
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T E M I S A N O :  Farming Together. C  rowing Together
a p p e n d i x  d
s e e s
T E M I S A N O
w
O
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Th e farm ing project must be economical!' 
viable to provide a sound base for the 
secunts and grow th of the rural com- 
munits Th e Production Units are m anag­
ed in conjunction w ith an Agricultural 
C o-operative .
o
C O M M U N I T Y  DEVELOPMENT
T o  ensure that the residual income made 
by the participants in rhc project is wisclv 
spent and to see that the whole rural com ­
m unity benefits from  the agricultural 
phase o f the Tem isano Protect. C o m ­
m unity Developm ent workers assist and 
guide the com m unity members in estab­
lishing various projects such as day care 
facilities, schools and civil improvements. 
The ideas behind comm unity develop­
ment arc to 1 develop the human 
resources in the com m unity and u 
broaden the economic base o f the com- 
munits m aking it less dependent on larger 
towns for its basic economic and social 
needs, thus rendering it more stable and 
m ore attractive >s a dwelling place
o
TRAINING
An ongoing process both w ith in  the com­
m unity and on the Production U nit is the 
gradual train ing o f people o f capacity to 
take on the numerous responsible roles 
not onlx in agricultural skills ind manage­
m ent. but of community leadership, ac- 
countancy for the co-operative and the 
com m unity . as well as in child- and com- 
munitx health care and education.
w
O
S E C ONDARY INDUSTRIES
W here practicable, agriculturally-based  
secondary industries such as mills, cotton 
gins, oilseed processing plants, and the 
like are to be established on an 
economically viable basis in the vicmitv of 
the comm unity and its Agricultural Pro­
duction U n it. Such industries will again 
broaden the economic base o f the com- 
m unirv, provide more em ploym ent op­
portunities. and stimulate further growth.
# # # *
T E M I S A N O
(omed together these four facets 
become Tem isano. C o-ordinated  
presently through Agricor itself, 
the role o f managing a Temisano 
Project in each o f its aspects of 
A gricu ltu ra l P roduction . Com - 
m um tv Developm ent. Train ing , 
and Secondary Industries should 
eventually be taken over by the 
com m unity.
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